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RESIDENTIAL WOOD COMBUSTION EMISSIONS:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEGOTIATED REGULATION
Introduction
As I write this introduction, EPA and interested
parties are near culminating what, if successfully
implemented, will be the first truly negotiated new source
performance standard (NSPS).  When I began my investigation
into the residential wood combustion (RWC) emissions problem
in early 1985, EPA had been less actively investigating the
subject for at least ten years.  One EPA employee at that
time felt it would be 15 years before EPA set a RWC-NSPS.
My initial investigations and recommendations for action
were based on the traditional "safe track" approach EPA has
adapted to avoid court and/or internal challenges.  My
recommendations had followed basically a national ambient
air quality standard (NAAQS) approach to the RWC emission
problem and had called for an improved and centralized data
base for RWC NAAQS contribution as well as calling for a
coordinated EPA and state research and development (R&D)
program for stove improvement and testing procedures.
There- were forces at play, however, that would cause
EPA to amend its usual rulemaking procedures.  By May 1985
EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS)
had in fact already submitted an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR) for high level EPA review.  When the
notice was published in the Federal Register in August 1985,
it announced that EPA would seek an expedited rulemaking
which would result in a regulation "two years sooner than
under the Agency's traditional standard-development process"
(Federal Register, August 2, 1985, p. 31505) and a good deal
sooner than many would have anticipated.
EPA's RWC interest had reportedly been accelerated when
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, Joseph A.
Cannon, was introduced to Missoula, Montana emissions by
Senator Max Baucus on a particularly bad inversion day in
the winter of 1984.  Cannon promised to look into the issue
and set up a wood smoke advisory committee.  The call for an
expedited NSPS, however, went beyond the recommendations
that the wood smoke committee reported to Cannon in November
of 1984.  Although there was no mention of it in the ANPR,
EPA was in fact already engaging in court negotiations
concerning polycyclic organic material (POM) emissions, RWC
being the major source.   Although the final
#
The State of New York and NRDC brought suit in August
1984 for EPA's failure to regulate POM, a large class of
often carcinogenic material.  Agreement was reached after
eighteen months of out of court negotiations.  The final
ruling required EPA to propose standards for wood smoke
emissions no later than January 1, 1987 and promulgate
standards by January 1, 1988 (NRDC 1986).  (The ruling also
required EPA to propose a schedule for regulating waste
incinerators and to study toxic emissions from fossil-fueled
boilers.  Diesel exhaust, the remaining large source of POM
is addressed in another NRDC suit.)
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ruling  was not filed until May 1986 , EPA had already
agreed to consider the NRDC's suggestion that EPA employ
mediated negotiations with the Wood Heating Alliance (WHA),
a woodstove industry voice, and other interested parties in
order to promulgate an RWC regulation in the shortest
reasonable time period.
As pointed out by Conservation Foundation principal
Gail Bingham (Bingham, 1986), mediation may not always be
the best way to handle environmental disputes.  There are,
however, many aspects of the RWC emission scenario which
seem to lend themselves to this method.
This paper has five purposes:
(1) To report on the technicalities of the RWC
emission issue.
(2) To enumerate the various factors which must
be considered in an RWC emission regulation.
(3) To report on the use of regulatory negotiation,
and how this differs form normal EPA rulemaKing
procedures.
(4) To show how negotiation is particularly applicable
to an RWC regulation.
(5) To examine the thesis that a negotiated regulation
was an appropriate alternative by reporting on how
2
State of New York v. Lee M. Thomas and Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. Alvin L. Aim, First
Federal Circuit Court, 1984.
various specific issues were resolved in the six
regulatory negotiation (reg-neg) committee
meetings held monthly from March to August 1986.
Chapters 1 and 2 present the background of the RWC
emission problem and the attempts by various states and
localities to find solutions.  Chapter 3 examines these
solutions and how they affect the different concerns
introduced in chapter 1.  It also presents a model for
decision analysis that could be used (with refinement) for
optimizing an RWC strategy.  Chapters 4 and 5 introduce the
concept of environmental mediation and describe EPA's
growing interest in regulatory negotiation or, more
specifically, negotiated rulemaking (see footnote 10, p. 83)
Chapter 6 explains how RWC emission regulation is a suitable
candidate for negotiated rulemaking.  An analogy is drawn
with the multi-objective decision analysis described in
chapter 3 showing how mediation is a logical forum to
formulate an optimal solution - in this case an NSPS - when
affected parties have differing agendas - i.e. multiple
objectives.  Chapters 7 and 8 describe the preparations and
the negotiations both chronologically and by issue.  It is
intended that the reader may gain a sense of the negotiation
process itself - how positions developed and how they
compromised.  Chapter 9 comments on the less obvious agendas
of several participants.  Special attention is given to the
role of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB), since
their position on the use of regulatory negotiation is
critical to reg-neg's future as a viable alternative to
traditional adversarial or adjudicatory rulemaking
procedures.  The role of the Wood Heat Alliance (WHA) as an
appropriate representative of the woodstove industry is
examined in chapter 10 with an analysis of interviews with
stove manufacturers.  Finally, chapter 11 presents
conclusions on the negotiations and comments on negotiated
rulemaking in general.
In the course of this investigation I have attended all
but the first two negotiation meetings to observe the
dynamics of the interchange.  I have also interviewed twenty
woodstove manufacturers - primarily from the Southeast - as
well as members of the reg-neg committee and others who have
become involved.  I will attempt to show that the issues
involved in the RWC emission problem logically require that
many interests be represented - that it is perhaps a perfect
candidate for a negotiated regulation if the criterion for
success is reaching an agreed-upon standard.  Other criteria
exist, however, and in the long run court challenges and/or
public opinion may present opposing evidence.
Tables and figures will follow the page in which they
are first referred.  The appendices follow the bibliography.
Appendix I is a draft of the NSPS final reg-neg agreements.
This may be amended before official EPA publication in the
Federal Register.
CHAPTER I
EMISSIONS FROM WOOD HEAT DEVICES:
"DOESN'T IT BOTHER ANYBODY THAT IT'S PART OF OUR
AMERICAN HERITAGE TO SIT DOWN^IN FRONT OF A
CRACKLING FIRE?"
The precipitous increase in foreign oil prices of the
early 1970s resulted in many changes in energy use patterns
in the United States.  One striking change in many areas was
a rapid increase in the use of residential wood combustion
(RWC) for home heating.  Although RWC had been a primary
source for some rural and/or lower income sectors, and had
been gradually declining in this century, the 1970s
witnessed an increase in RWC use across almost all
demographic groups.
WOODSTOVE USAGE
It is estimated that 7 to 8 million new wood stoves
were sold between 1974 and 1984.  In Vermont, a 1981 survey
indicated that wood was used as the primary source of heat
in more single family households than was electricity,
natural gas, kerosene, coal, and wood and was secondary only
to oil (Peterson 1984, Loh 1984, Roper 1984).  Lipfert (1983)
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Medora Lile, President, Woodburners United of Missoula
County, one of the first localities to recognize a RWC
emission problem. (New York Times, November 6, 1983.)
estimated that 9-11% of United States space heating was from
wood-fired heaters in the 1978-79 season.  Weintraub
estimated that in the 1980-81 season 20% of Americans heated
at least partially with wood, while a more detailed Forest
Service study indicated 28% for that period.  These
percentages are more significant when one considers that for
a large number of households, wood heat is not possible.
Figure 1 depicts this increasing trend in use and the early
increase and subsequent decline in sales.  Contacts with
woodstove dealers indicate that the market has since
stabilized, and all indications are that people will
continue to heat with woodstoves.  The open fireplace has
also become more popular for a certain growing and young
urban (as well as suburban and rural) professional
population.  Although fireplaces are not considered an
economically viable heat source, more and more new
households can afford the fireplace "charm."  Table 1 shows
that whereas fireplaces in most communities are negligible
source of emissions, in certain areas (Denver, Fresno) where
most RWC may be more "recreational," fireplaces can be
significant contributors to RWC emissions.
Data on state-by-state RWC trends have been scarce and
inconsistent in method.  Figure 2 shows state-by- state
usage as estimated by a U.S. Department of Energy report
based on 1980 census data.  [Due to a "dry wood assumption,"
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Source:    U.S.  Census  (1972-d2)
Figure 1, Annual and Cumulative U.S. Sales of
















Table   I
RWC   EMISSIONS   ESTIMATES   NORMALIZED   BY   USING   EPA's   LATEST   STOVE   AND   FIREPLACE   EMISSION   FACTORS
Locality,   State Date
Cord Total RWC   TSP   Emissions RWC   CO Emissions
Wt HHs Stoves Frplc     Total   Per     Stoves Frplc Totl     Per
kg/ 1000s        1000 1000 1000      lb/        1000 1000 1000      lb/
cord T/Yr T/Yr        T/Yr      HH/Yr   T/Yr T/Yr T/Yr   HH/Yr
Waterbury,   VT
Western  MA
Nashville,   TN
Petersville,   AL
Minneapolis,   MN
Albuquerque,   NM
Missoula,   MT
Denver,   CO
Telluride,   CO
Reno,   NV
Las   Vegas,   NV
Fresno,   CA
Boise,   ID
Portland,   OR
Medford,   OR
Eugene,   OR
Yakima,   WN
Spokane,   WN
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.031 96 .179 .013
N/A N/A N/A N/A
2.21 25 10.76 2.87
N/A N/A N/A N/A
10.25 28 52.5 10.7







.529-     46-
1.07       93
2.88-      .386-     3.27-     284-
5.81        .779       6.59        573
6.78 24 16.42 25.05 41.46 146
.024 71 .142 .006 .148 440
.749 24 2.737 1.863 4.6 147
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1.20 25 .221 7.07 7.29 152
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
9.04 47 40.31 15.32 55.63 289
1.87 89 9.75 1.77 11.52 549
2.87 82 13.50 4.16 17.66 505
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.07 86 5.95 12.79 18.74 528
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
V£>
Figure 2.  Statewide Average per Household Wood Usage,
From U.S. Department of Energy Estimates
upon which NEDS Is Based
r/
0
/o/    0-0.5 Cords /+/     .5-1.0 Cords /x7    1.0 - 2.0 Cords
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felt to be as much as 25% low (Nero 1984).]  A national wood
usage telephone survey by the USDA Forest Service in 1980-
1981 provided what may be the best available estimate of
state-by-state total wood burned.  Table 2 gives the results
of the Forest Service study and Table 3 compares the two
studies.  Per household, usage was highest in the Pacific
Northwest and in Northern New England.  Data such as these
are typical of most of those available in that they do not
accurately point out local problems.  For example, in 1983
the head of the Western Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering David Howland identified
wood burning as the greatest source of air pollution in
Western Massachusetts (New York Times, December 8, 1983)
although Massachusetts shows a relatively moderate .52 cords
per household in the Forest Service study.  Moreover,
woodstove emission problems are not limited to the Northeast
or the Northwest.  Other areas such as the resort areas of
the Rocky Mountains have concentrations of RWC use.  Perhaps
surprisingly, the Southeast contains 39% of the wood heating
devices and accounts for 32% of the wood burned (DeAngeles
et al., 1980).  Approximately 16% of North Carolina
households used wood as their main home heating fuel in 1981
and 47% burn at least some wood, for a total of at least 3.4
million cords per heating season (Kamens 1984).  A detailed
and consistent nationwide information base on RWC usage is
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Tabl e 2
(conti nued)
FUELWOOD CONSUMPTION CHARACTERISTICS BY STATE , 1980-81
Households burning Average
Households burning any amount 1/3 cord or mor e burnedstate
over all
Number % Average Total % Average  Total households
hshld brng burned burned brng burned burned
Million Million
Millions Cords Cords Cords Cords Cords
New Hampshire 0.324 47 3.00 0.46 44 3.10 046 1.42
New Jersey 2.551 18 .89 .41 15 1.01 .40 .16New Mexico .444 43 1.18 .23 33 1.46 — .51New York 6.332 18 1.86 2.12 14 2.30 2.06 .33North Carolina 2.047 46 2.05 1.92 40 2.31 1.90 .94North Dakota .229 36 1.70 .14 36 1.70 .14 .61Ohio 3.837 30 1.84 2.09 26 2.07 2.07 .54Oklahoma 1.114 22 — .57 19 2.67 .57 .51Oregon .993 58 2.68 1.55 54 2.87 1.54 1 .56
Pennsylvania 4.213 23 2.25 2.20 19 2.69 = 2.17 .52Rhode Island .339 25 — — 21 — — —
South Carolina 1.031 36 1.6 3 .61 30 1.9 4 .60 .59South Dakota .244 27 3.32 .22 23 3.93 — .90Tennessee 1.615 38 2.40 1.47 36 2.50 1.46 .91Texas 4.945 25 1 .08 1.32 20 1.27 1.28 .27Utah .448 32 2.03 — 24 2.65 — —
Vermont .178 58 3.95 .41 52 4.38 .40 2.28Virg inia 1.857 46 2.06 1.76 42 2.25 1.74 .94
Washington 1.540 53 2.04 1.67 43 2.51 1.65 1.09
West Virginia .687 35 2.67 .64 33 2.82 .64 .94Wisonsin 1.653 28 2.72 1.28 25 3.04 1.27 .77
Wyoming .166 40 2.19 .14 31 2.72 .14 .87
u>
TaDle 3 14
STATEWIDE RWC WOOD USE ESTIMATES FROM U.S. DOE
AND THE USDA FOREST SERVICE (CORDS/VTEAR; 1980-81)












































































































































































































































Regardless of the inconsistencies in RWC use data, new
stove sales figures attested to a significant nationwide use
increase.  It can also be assumed that there had been a
similar increase in the use of existing stoves as well.
Concurrently, there developed growing concern with potential
health risks associated with RWC.  These concerns focused
basically in three areas:  ambient air quality standards,
health risks, and indoor air pollution.
Ambient Air Quality Standards
Several communities noted that RWC emissions were a
significant factor in meeting U.S. EPA's national ambient
air quality standards (NAAQS).  In some areas, increased RWC
usage was even found to negate gains made in cleaning up
industrial point sources.  Figure 3 shows such emission
trends in Oregon.  In Missoula, Montana, which is currently
a non-attainment area for both carbon monoxide (CO) and
particulate matter (PM), RWC contributed to 60-70% of winter
PM and 35-50% of winter CO (Weigold 1984 and Table 4).
Since adverse health effects are implicit in NAAQS non-
attainment there were also concerns with health.  In 1980 a
four-year study concluded that Missoula, Montana's
children's lungs had lower capacities than the average of
other Montana children (Table 5 shows a summary of this
study.)  One-half of the 22,000 homes in the Missoula Valley
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EMISSION INVENTORY FOR WINTER SEASON,*^
MISSOULA, MONTANA
Emission Seasonal Emissions (tons)
Source Category Particulates        Carbon Monoxide
1979/80^  1982/83^   1979/80^  1982/83*^
Residential Wood
Combustion*^ 600     1,315     5,340    6,362
Paved Roads 204 204 - -
Point Sources 150 150 194 194
Fuel Consumptiin 149 149 49 49
Transpor tation 73 73 7,928 7,9 28
Unpaved Roads 56 56 - -
Total Emissions       1,234     1,947     13,511    14,533
RWC % Contribution       48.7      68 39.5      43.1
a) Church, 1980
b) Steffel, 1983.  All 1979/80 emissions except RWC were
assumed to remain constant.








































































84 Missoula adults 1978-
with chronic      1979
obstrue-pulmonary
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Sources:  Carlson, J. in 1980 International Conference on
Residential Solid Fuels, Portland Oregon.
Montana Air Quality Bureau 1980.
FEV
1
^TSP:   Total Suspended Particulates
(Forced Expiratory Volume)  The volume of air expired
in the first second.
'PFT;   (Pulmonary Function Tests)  Measurements of lung
function.
19
blanket of wood smoke" during the frequent thermal inversion
conditions (Loh 1984).  This is illustrated in the picture
on page i i.
Other areas have had air quality problems associated
with RWC as well.  In 1983, Joseph Grimsley, N.C. Secretary
of Natural Resources and Community Development, reported
that wood emissions could have an impact on some N.C.
cities:  Raleigh, Durham and Charlotte were all having
difficulty in meeting carbon monoxide standards (Spohn
1983).  Studies in Nashville showed that residential wood
combustion was a significant contributor to particulate
levels and were "cause for concern as to whether particulate
ambient air quality standards could be achieved" (Imhoff et
al. 1984).  Since only 11% of the homes were estimated to
heat with wood in Nashville, potential existed for further
use.  RWC has been specifically identified as a major cause
of PM non-attainment in Medford, Oregon and to CO non-
attainment in Albuquerque, N.M. and Reno, Nevada.  Figures 4
and 5 show the national distribution of locally perceived
RWC emission problems.  The nature of these perceived
problems is not given.  Often the most obvious problem is
visibility, due to the efficient light scattering effect of
RWC emissions small particle size.  A recent study showed
that 50% of Albuquerque's winter visibility impairment was
caused by wood smoke (Weigold 1984).
RWC is not considered to be a significant contributor
to other priority pollutants currently regulated by NAAQS.
rigure4 Areas Identified by State and Local
Agency Contacts as Having Known or
Suspected RWC Impacts
—*• "•    'c.....
p       fall*    u-ui
r.11.,1
ij5Si.»t      »M>MUM     .
r«ifi
O
Figure 5. Frequency of Occurence of RWC
Impacts as Perceived by State
or Local Agency Contacts
\
[^   0-3 Days /^ 25 Days, to
[JT      4-25 Days 1^1    Don't Know or No Answer
^
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Hydrocarbons (HC) are basically products of incomplete
combustion, a characteristic of most residential stove
operation, and may possibly be of some local concern.  (HC is
not a criteria pollutant but is regulated as a precursor of
ozone.)  Oxides of nitrogen (NO ) are basically products of
high temperature combustion:  not a characteristic of RWC
use.
Health Risks
A contribution to NAAQS non-attainment of course
implies a health risk commensurate with the basic
assumptions of the Clean Air Act (CAA).  Beyond this,
however, RWC emissions are particularly respirable (80% are
smaller than 2.5 micrograms (um)), and are thereby a greater
health hazard than NAAQS-total suspended particulates (TSP)
compliance implies.  In addition, much of the polycyclic
organic matter (POM) in wood smoke has been found to be
mutagenic and thereby a possible human cancer risk.  Studies
in London 200 years ago related a high incidence of scrotum
cancer among chimney sweeps to the soot from smoke, and coal
tar has induced cancer in animal studies (Harvey 1982).
More recent studies show that at least one wood smoke
component, benzo(a)pyrene (BaP) is a very potent animal
carcinogen.  A 1984 EPA study reported that in New Jersey,
61% of these carcinogenic particles in the air were
generated through combustion processes and not major point
sources.  The study concluded that these air pollutants may
#
23
be a greater health threat than previously thought.  (New
York Times, August 1984).  In fact, Harkov (1985) reports
that RWC accounts for 98% of New Jersey's winter ambient
BaP.  Figure 6 and Table 6 show the seasonal variations and
source apportionment.
Studies by Kamens et  al. (1985) have shown that while
the mutagenic nature of wood smoke degrades in the presence of
sunlight, nitrogen dioxide plus ozone greatly increase the
mutagenicity.  Moreover, the mutagenicity degradation is
slowed by low temperatures.  POM mutagenicity is therefore
highly variable and would be of greater concern in some
colder urban areas with high RWC use.
Other known carcinogens may also be problematic.
Liparl (1984) found that RWC is likely to be a major source
of primary aldehydes in the winter and that formaldehyde
constituted 21-42% of the wood smoke aldehyde component.
For particulates that are not mutagenic, little is
known of toxicity.  Dartmouth Professor James Hornig
reported that wood smoke could especially pose a problem for
children with asthma and elderly people with chronic lung
problems (New York Times, December 8, 1983), but there is
little evidence of bioaccumulation or adverse effects in
plants, microorganisms or fish and other wildlife
(Santodonato et aj.. 1979).
Indoor Air Pollution
The health risks associated with the above components
of wood smoke take on an added dimension in this third area
#
Table 6
ESTIMATED ANNUAL HEATING SEASON (NOV.-MAR.)
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Residential 2.0 X 10 ^ 0.1 0.1
Autos/trucks 0.6 228 95 133
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of concern.  The use of fireplaces or woodstoves has been
shown to increase indoor concentrations of particulate
matter from 20 to 60 times that of natural gas heat (Cooper
1982).  Although indoor fugitive emissions are highly
dependent on variations in user operation and installation,
and can vary widely from household to household, use of
better insulation and building sealing heightened indoor
concentrations of any pollutant with an inside source.
There have been few studies identifying RWC as an
indoor health problem.  Early studies by Kirk Smith and
others in Thailand and Nepal established a dose response
relationship between indoor wood cooking and respiratory
disease (DeKoming 1984).  However, these were very high
concentrations not likely found in typical USA RWC use.
Also the open fires common to the study have emission
characteristics quite different from modern reduced air
stoves:  POM formation is reduced and particulate size tends
to be larger in an open fire  (personal communication from
Judy Muraford, U.S. EPA).  This may account for a lack of any
4
association found with cancer in these studies.
A more recent study in Michigan found a significant
increase in symptoms of severe respiratory illness in
children aged 1 to 7 from homes with RWC compared to matched
#
4
Holly Reid, a field worker in the Nepal study suggests
that a very low life expectancy from causes other than
cancer could be responsible.  Studies on open coal burning
stoves in China do show a lung cancer association (personal
communication from Judy Mumford, U.S. EPA 1986).
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children in homes without RWC.  A significant increase in
mild or moderate symptoms was not indicated  (Honicky 1985).
Actual air monitoring was not done and it is conceivable
that the relation could have resulted from the temperature
variations common to wood heat or humidity differences.
Nonetheless, a RWC risk is indicated.
AFFECTED GROUPS
Information has already been presented concerning the
geographic distribution of RWC use (see Figure 2 and Table
2).  The regional nature of RWC emissions has been
established although the specific contribution of RWC is not
generally known for all high impact areas.  It is
nonetheless clear that these areas stand to benefit from any
decrease in RWC emissions from both health concerns as well
as from perhaps less costly industrial development in non-
attainment areas.   The question remains, who stands to
pay for reduction in RWC emissions?  Ultimately the user as
well as the RWC industry.
Table 7 shows the demographic distribution of RWC
users.  Although the table does not account for the amount
of wood used, several interesting associations appear.
m
In accordance with EPA's "offset" policy, emissions
from new sources in non-attainment areas must be offset by
reductions in existing sources.  This greatly increases the
expense of certain industrial expansion.  Additionally, non-
attainment areas' new sources must meet stricter Best
Achievable Control Technology (BACT) standards than the
NSPSs in attainment areas.
Table  7.
Percent Of Households Using Different Wood-Burning Equipment













Total 14 20 8 28 80.0
Regions
WesP 20 8 28 1 8 8 D 34' 15.1
North Central 13 8 19 1 7 8 1 28 22.2
Northeast 11 5 17 2 7 9 2 24 200
South 14 7 20 2 7 9 1 29 22.8
Location
Urban 14 S 19 1 4 S 1 23 629
Rural 14 12 28 4 18 22 3 45 17.0
1980 Incoma
SO to 10.000 4 2 8 2 4 8 1 12 20.9
$10,001 to 20.000 9 5 14 1 7 8 1 21 22.8
$20,001 to 30.000 17 8 25 1 9 10 1 33 17.0
$30,001 to 40,000 23 11 34 2 8 10 1 42 9.3
$40.000> 33 13 48 1 9 10 1 53 9.9
Educadon .
Syearsorlaas 4 3 7 2 7 10 1 17 77
gtoll years 8 3 9 <l 9 9 1 18 6.9I2years
College. 1 to 3 yaar«
11 8 17 8 10 1 26 26.9
15 7 21 2 5 7 1 27 15.2
Coflege, 44 years 22 9 32 1 8 7 1 38 23.3
Agaofhead                   .
0 to 24 years 7 3 10 0 2 2 0 7 5.2
2S to 29years 11 7 18 1 6 7 1 11 9.0
30to44yaars 18 9 27 2 9 12 1 31 24.7 .
45to64years 18 7 23 2 8 9 1 30 24.2
65-t> years 7 3 10 1 4 S 1 18 18.0
Not determined 12 5 17 2 5 7 1 3 at
ConvenHonal fkjal used
Natural Gas 18 4 20 1 3 3 0 24 42.2
Fuel Oil 13 8 21 2 10 12 1 30 13.5
Electricity 13 10 22 2 9 12 1 32 17.0   ,Other 8 9 14 4 11 15 2 26 5.7
None 13 13 25 9 49 58 13 88 16
Tigursa are percent of households in the demographic category I
ͣIjess than 0 5 percent.
Totals do not always add up because ot rounding.
I use the given equipment. to
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Considering that most "fireplaces with inserts" are
probably equivalent to airtight stoves, airtight stove
ownership increases only slightly with income while ordinary
fireplace ownership increases significantly with income.  A
larger percentage of rural homes burn wood although the
total number of urban households with RWC is almost twice
that of total rural RWC homes.  More detailed information -
including wood usage, correlation with conventional fuel
used, and urban vs. suburban breakdown - would be necessary
to better assess the demographic impact of any RWC emission
control strategy.  Several state and local control programs
have been initiated already, and analyses from them could
improve this data base.  Table 8 shows a conceptual
distribution of various strategy cost impacts.  A discussion
of existing strategies appears in the next chapter, and a
discussion of the various strategy impacts will follow.










State government for planning,
implementation and maintenance
Consumer
Cost usually shared between
consumer and state government
State and/or local government
for planning, operation, enforce¬
ment, and maintenance
State or Federal government to
accredit test laboratories,
reviewing test results, enforce¬
ment.  Industry incurs the cost
of performing the tests.
Industry might pass the costs of
these tests on the consumer.
CHAPTER II
EXISTING RWC EMISSION ABATEMENT PROGRAMS
Compared to other air pollutants, residential wood
combustion (RWC) emission is a newly recognized problem.
Laws do exist, however, and public officials at many levels
have already investigated proposals for control regulations.
Government action pertaining to woodstove emissions can be
divided into three categories; 1) Federal, 2) State, and 3)
Local.
FEDERAL
Federal authority to regulate RWC is provided in the
Clean Air Act (CAA), which as previously administered
provides only minimal protection from RWC emissions.
Particularly applicable are sections 108 and 109, which
describe national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for
carbon monoxide (CO) and particulate matter (PM) (see Table
9).  ͣͣ' ͣ
CO is presently monitored under the air quality
monitoring system and regulated as a criteria pollutant (for
which NAAQSs are set) although no federal action had yet
been directed specifically at wood smoke.  Where wood smoke
is a significant contributor to non-attainment areas with
respect to CO, it thus could conceivably be regulated under
32
Table 9
NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS
Pollutant Averag ing Time      Pr imary Standard
Particulate       Annual ^
Matter (Geometric Mean)    75 ug/m
24-hour* 260 ug/m^^
Sulfur Annual ^
oxides (Arithmetic   Mean)        80   ug/m     (.03   ppm)
3
24-hour* 365   ug/m     (.14   ppm)
CO 8-hour* 10  mg/m^   (9   ppm)
3
1-hour* 40   mg/ra     (35  ppm)
N0„ Annual ^  .
(Arithmetic   Mean        100   ug/m     (.05   ppm)
Photochemical _
oxidants 1-hour* 160  ug/m     (.08   ppm)
Hydrocarbons
3
(non-methane)    3-hour* 160 ug/m  (.24 ppm)
3Lead Quarterly 1.5 ug/m
'Not to be exceeded more than once per year.
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state implementation plans (SIPs) authorized by EPA.  In
fact, according to EPA's National Air Pollution Estimates
(February 1984), RWC accounted for 8% of the total national
CO emissions, more than a fourfold increase since 1973.  RWC
control could in fact relieve the burden on industry's new
source development requirements in non-attainment areas,
which could be of significant economic benefit.  Industry
was in fact generally supportive of Oregon woodstove
regulations, as will be discussed later.
Existing NAAQSs for particulate matter under the CAA
can also apply to RWC emissions.  Again, however, these have
not been specifically directed at wood smoke.  EPA's 1984
national estimate for RWC particulate contribution was 12%.
Wood smoke thus contributes a significant proportion of
ambient air PM in specific air sheds and could be regulated
under the existing standards.  New particulate standards
expected to be promulgated soon will be especially
applicable to RWC emissions (Federal Reg ister, March 20,
1984 pp. 10400-10436).  Whereas the current standards limit
the concentration of all particulates in the ambient air
(i.e. total suspended particulates (TSP), typically less
than 25 to 45 um) the proposed standards will be directed
only at particulate matter smaller than ten microns in
diameter (PMIO) (Wood 'n' Energy December, 1984 p. 9).
Table 10 compares the old and new standards.  The new
standard is intended to reflect more accurately the impact
34
Table   10
PROPOSED   CAA   PARTICULATE   STANDARDS
TSP
Existing   (all   particulates)
Annual 24-hour
3 3
Primary 7 5   ug/m 26 0   ug/m     not   to










Primary 50-65   ug/m     expected 150-250   ug/m





Secondary - 70-90 ug/m
expected annual
arithmetic mean
Note:  EPA does not intend to change how particulate matter
is currently defined for purposes of the prevention of
significant deterioration increments (PSD).
From Federal Register March 20, 1984 p. 10408.
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on health, because it is only the smaller particles which
can penetrate the inner lung passageway (Cooper 1982).
Because almost all wood smoke emissions are in this
inhalable size range (Cannon 1984), wood smoke will
contribute to a significantly larger proportion of the total
regulated particulates when the PMIO standards take effect.
For example, in 1978 data, RWC contributed 12.2% of TSP but
accounted for 31% of the total respirable particles.
(Cooper 1982; see Table 11).  Later studies in Oregon and
Montana show an approximate twofold increase in RWC
contribution to the PMIO standard versus the earlier
standard (Core 1984).
To summarize, primary components of RWC emissions are
already regulated under NAAQS although action has not yet
been directed at woodstoves.  RWC's contribution to proposed
PMIO standards will be significantly more than the 12%
reported nationally in 1984 under the old standards,  In
specific inversion and high RWC use areas, the RWC
contribution will be greater still.
Other potentially hazardous components of RWC emissions
are either not in significant quantities or are not
presently listed as NAAQS criteria pollutants (see Tables 11
and 12).  EPA has additional authority to regulate RWC
emissions under CAA section 112 (42 USC sec. 7412(b)(1)(B)),
which requires an "ample margin of safety" to protect
against hazardous air pollutants (HAP) - which by definition
36
Table 11
MAJOR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM RESIDENTIAL WOOD
COMBUSTION COMPARED TO EMISSIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES
IN THE PORTLAND-VANCOUVER AQMA
(1978)
Av Tons High Tons
Tons Tons in Per Day Per Day
Pollutant Per ,Yr January in Jan in Jan
Carbon Monoxide
Wood-burning
stoves 87,000 17,000 560 2,250
Transportation 779,000 65,000 2,100 2,100
Volatile
Hydrocarbons 1,080      216        7.0       28
NOj^ as NO2 270       54        1.7        7.0
SO^ as SO2 108       22 .70       2.8
Aldehydes 600      119       3.8       15
Polycyclic Organic
Matter 160       32       1.0       4.1
Benzo(a)pyrene 1.4       .28      .009       .036
Carcinogens 21        4.2      0.14        .54
Pr ior ity
Pollutants 220 44 1.4 5.7




Portland  sources 10,200 850 27 27
Total   Particulates
from other
Portland   sources 33,000 2,749 89 89
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Table 12
EMISSIONS OF MAJOR POLLUTANTS FROM RESIDENTIAL
WOOD COMBUSTION SOURCES
Wood-Burning Stoves Fireplaces
g/kg      lbs/    % Parti-     g/kg      lbs/      i Parti-
Chemical Species wood      10 BTU   culates       wood     10 QTU      culates
Carbon  Monoxide 160
(83-370)
22 "" ͣ^ 22
(11-40)
3.0
Volatile   Hydrocarbons










SO^   as   SO2 0.2 .03 — — -----
Aldehydes 1.1 .15 — 1.3 .18
Condensable  Organics
Particulates
Total   particulates






























Benzo(a)Pyrene 0.0025 .0003 .03 0.00073 .001 o.ooa
Carcinogens .0 38 .005 .45 .0059 .0008 0.06
Priority   Pollutants 0.41 .06 4.8 0.063 • ouy U.7
Na .005 .0007 .06 .004 .0006 .04
Al .004 .0006 .05 .002 .0003 .02
Si .003 .0004 .04 .002 .0003 .02
S .03 .004 .4 .004 .0006 .04
CL .05 .007 .6 .05 .U07 .6
K .07 .01 .8 .05 .007 .5
Ca .004 .0006 .05 .005 .0007 .05
Organic  Carbon 4,2 .58 49 4.2 .58 46
Elemental  Carbon .7 a 8 1.2 .16 13
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are pollutants not covered by NAAQS under section 109.
Polycyclic organic material (POM) in wood smoke could
be such a HAP due to the demonstrated cytotoxicity and
mutagenicity of many of the RWC POM species.  RWC's
contribution to POM has been estimated from 30% (Karaens
1984) to 60% (EPA 1984).  BaP levels in N.J. were found to
be ten times higher in the heating season than in other
seasons during 1983 (see Figure 6).  In fact, in the
drafting of the 1977 CAA, a summary of the provisions of the
conference agreement indicated that Congress expected
criteria to be issued for POM, and benzo(a)pyrenes were
specifically considered  (Bonine and McGarity 1984).  Thus
EPA has been very aware of the presence of BaP and its
carcinogenic effects, but has been reluctant to "list" it as
an identified air pollutant since its "primary and only
unregulated source is RWCs."
Due to the nonspecificity of POM in general and its
many different sources (see Table 13), there are many legal
and administrative difficulties with "listing" RWC emissions
under section 112.  However, CAA section 111(d) (42 U.S.C.
sec. 7411(d)) allows EPA to set New Source Performance
^New York Times, August 19 1984, 11:4:1 The 1970 CAA
required EPA to publish a list of HAPs for which the agency
intended to establish national emission standards.  Once a
pollutant is "listed," the administrator has 180 days to
publish a proposed National Emission Standard for Hazardous
Air Pollutants (NESHAP) and another 180 days to publish a




ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL POM EMISSION BY SOURCE TYPE
ON A NATIONAL BASIS
Estimated Percent of
annual POM total POM
emissions, emissions
metric tons    ' from all
______Source type                         _______sources
Residential heating
Wood-fired   total                                    3,837 34.8
primary   heating
auxiliary   heating
fireplaces
Coal-fired                                                        102 0.9
Oil-fired                                                               7.4 <0.1
Gas-fired                                                               9.8 <0.1
Open  burning   sources
Agricultural open burning      1,190 10.8
Prescribed burning            1,071 9.7
Forest wildfires              1,478 13.4
Coal refuse piles                28.5 0.3
Land clearing waste burning      171 1.6
Structural fires                86 0.8
Mobile sources
Autos-gasoline                2,160.8 19.6
Autos-diesel                      1.2 <0.1
Trucks-diesel                   103.5 0.9
Coke production                    632 5.7
Industrial boilers
Coal                              69.0 6.3
Oil                              1.3 <0.1
Gas                                2.1 <0.1
Wood/bark                         1.2 <0.1
Begasse                          0.3 <0.1
Incinerators
Municipal                          0.3 <0.1
Commercial                       55.8 0.5
Utility boilers
Coal                            12.9 0.1
Oil                                0.3 <0.1




















ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL POM EMISSION BY SOURCE TYPE






























(Black ash rotary kiln) 0.3 <0.1
TOTAL 11,031
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Standards (NSPS) for pollutants that are neither criteria
pollutants nor HAPs under section 112.  Since 70-80% of POM
components in wood smoke either are particulates or are
adsorbed onto particulates, particulate control is
considered a sufficient means to control RWC POM emissions
if implemented specifically for woodstoves (personal
communication from Harriet Ammonn, U.S. EPA, February 1985).
Implementation of section 111(d) generally would require
establishment of an NSPS as well as a Best Available Control
Technology (BACT) for individual State Implementation Plan
(SIP) use.  This process however is complex and cumbersome.
Experience has shown that "sections 111 and 112 are not
amenable to regulating toxic air pollutants effectively"
(Cannon 19 86).
The costs to stove users of full implementation of CAA
or of possible POM regulations would vary depending on how
each state chooses to comply with NAAQSs.  The cost
effectiveness for control of particulates from woodstoves
has been estimated to be about $275 per ton and about $86
per ton for total emissions including CO and others
(Emison 1984).  (These figures do not credit potential
savings from cleaner stoves due to reduced chimney cleaning
and damage from chimney fires.)  Others estimate $350 per
ton PM and compare this with $1,000 to $17,000 per ton PM
for various industrial controls (Hough 1983).
Implications of EPA alternatives will be discussed in
chapter 3.  EPA has had the authority but did not
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take the lead in RWC emission control.  Because of delay in
federal initiative, several states led the way in
establishing emission controls.
STATE CONTROLS
Federal NAAQS are generally administered by the various
state implementation plans (SIPs) as approved by EPA.  Wood
smoke's contribution to excessive CO and TSP in non-
attainment areas prompted many states to propose legislation
and initiate studies.  Two states, Oregon and Colorado, have
already enacted legislation to regulate RWC, and Washington
has proposed legislation which has passed its House and was
awaiting Senate action as of May 1986 (Wood 'n' Energy, May
1986).  Several other states are presently studying RWC
emissions.  The Coalition of Northeastern Governors (CONEG)
completed a study on RWC in 1985 with recommendations for
legislative action (personal communication from Dave Wilson,
CONEG, February 1985).  The Massachusetts legislature has
considered a bill authorizing its Environmental Study
Committee to investigate recommendations for control
legislation (personal communication from Mark Geres,
Massachusetts Office of Energy Resources, February 1985);
and in North Carolina, a bill was proposed to initiate a
similar study (personal communication from Rep. Margaret
Keesee-Forester, February 1985).  Stove certification
legislation was introduced in New York State by August 1986
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(Wood 'n' Energy Aug. 1986).  A geographical summary of
current state action with a brief description appears in
Figure 7 (updated through August, 1984).  Note that the
Southeast is significantly underrepresented although it
accounts for 32% of all residential wood use.
A 1977-78 Portland (Oregon) Aerosol Characterization
Study was the first receptor modeling/source apportionment
study to use chemical mass balance (CMB) methods to
demonstrate that RWC was a major contributor to particulate
non-attainment.  Subsequent Oregon SIP studies concluded
that the woodstove industry must be forced to produce a
cleaner stove (Gay 1986).
In 1983 Oregon passed the nation's first statewide
woodstove legislation, to take effect voluntarily by July
1984 with required certification of new stoves by July 1986.
The law required a 75% reduction in woodstove emissions by
the year 2000, which would bring Oregon's non-compliance
cities - Portland, Eugene, and Medford - within standards
(Towslee 1984).  Specifically, the law charged the Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to work with a
Woodstove Advisory Committee to set a workable standard and
to come up with test procedures by July 1984.  Oregon's
program included five major elements:  1) a testing
procedure for stove emissions and efficiency; 2) TSP
emissions standards; 3) an accreditation process for testing
laboratories; 4) stove labeling requirements; and 5)
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Alaska - Regulations are in place in the city of Juncau.
Unique opacity nandardt require official* to Me through
the unoke.
Califoraia •> Air Rcsourco Board examining pouiblc
emistioot control uraicgiet and auitting town* in dcviaing
their own regulation*. Truckcc Mcadowi it the hardcu hit
area in the tuu,
Colorado - Statewide law goes into effect July 1,1917.
Voluntary program begin* July 1, t9t5. Require* all itoves,ifltert*, and fireplace* to be certified cleanburnen. Town*
allowed to have stricter law*. Department of Health planttesting to Oregon's uandard this Fall to see if it should be
adopted for the stau.
Idaho - Sute air quality officials recently completed an
assessment of wood smoke in Boise. Voluntary *no burn*
days in some mountain towns.
Massachusetts - Depanment of Environotental Qual*
icy Engineering's western office chief says the state is likely
to follow* Oregon's uove certification program. Legislative
approval may not be necessary, he claims.
Oregon - Stauwide law goes into effect July I, 1916.
Voluntary program begins July 1| 19t4.
Utah •> Prove and Salt Lake City arc being evaluated at
sites with emissions problems. Staw authorities currently
are evaluating usi resulu gathered last wimer.
Virginia - Town of Virginia Beach officials launching
uudy to inventory stove emissions.
Washington  -  Depanment of Ecology emissioot
MIclligan - Depanment of .Natural Resources has in*
stalled air monitoring machines in the town of Mie.
Minnesota — Statewide emiuions monitoring program
launched. No suuwide legislation eapccud.
Montana — Stau officials are weighing propouls to regu¬
late wood bcaicn. Bill* arc capccxcd to he utirodwced in
the next session of the legislature providing laa credits. Mi*>
soula's much-publiciaed emissions law faces a ballot test inNovember.
Nevada — Division of Environmental Preicnien eyeing
Oregon developments. Several towns have voluncary ref¬lations, ioduduig Tahoc.
New Mexico — Emistiotu invemory of Albuquerque re>
ccoily compleud with EPA funds. Results were inconclu¬
sive. No statewide legislation planned.
Northeast - Regional wood energy center will make
policy recommeodatioos to the Coalition of Nonhcasi
Governors in Ocfobcr on how lo best cenirel stove emis¬
sions.
nKMitoring program underway. Coouol wratcgict being
asKued for possible ioiretiucilon in the ncit legislative ses¬
sion. Officials working closely with wood energy groups.
Wisconsin - Small-scale emissions monitoring underway
in several towns.
Wyoming - Studies underway by the Departmem of En¬
vironmental Quality. Oregon standard being reviewed. Air
quality chief uyi he is watching Colorado and Oregon's
action with imeresi. Q
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to be done at different specified heat outputs so that the
data could be interpreted for different climates.  A
weighted average characteristic of Oregon problem cities
(Portland and Medford) was used to determine compliance with
the standard.  The law required all woodstoves, cookstoves,
and fireplace inserts sold in Oregon to pass a test
certifying not more than 15 grams/hr emissions for non-
catalytic stoves and 6 grams/hr for catalytic stoves.  In
July 1988 the standards will change to 9 g/hr and 4 g/hr.
All new stoves sold must have a permanent certification
label plus a removeable label giving information on average
emissions and efficiency levels.  The labels include a
simple graph of the burn characteristics (see Appendix 2).
The standards do not apply to used stoves, already installed
stoves, central heaters, or fireplaces (Maviglio 1984).
Oregon's DEQ predicted it would cost $6000 to certify
each stove design (a figure twice that originally estimated)
in order to satisfy the stove industry's desire to fjrovide
expanded information for other parts of the country and thus
avoid repetitious testing costs (Maviglio 1984).  This
additional information included setup, operations, and heat
efficiency determinations (Kowalczyk 1984).  Many felt that
the 1988 9 g/hr standard (non-catalytic) could not be met
7
The tighter standard for catalytic converter stoves is
based on the assumption the converter will degrade over
time.  Regulations require 70% converter efficiency after
5000 hrs for certification with a two year free replacementwarranty.
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with existing designs (Crasilneck 1984).  In fact, the first
non-catalytic stoves to meet the 1988 standards used a
palletized wood fuel system.  Actually, Oregon had
considered a phase II standard of 3 and 7.5 g/hr for
catalytic and non-catalytic stoves but this was rejected due
to woodstove manufacturers' objections (personal
communication from Robert Lebens, Oregon DEQ, August 1986).
The legislation was not intended to be "technology forcing"
yet it took much development for most manufacturers to reach
the standards.  A summary of stoves meeting 1988 standards
is given in Appendix 2.  Six non-catalytic stoves had
surpassed the 1988 9 g/hr standard as of May 1986.
Colorado in February 1985 became the second state to
pass similar legislation.  Its program is similar to
Oregon's in that:  1) particulate standards must be met
before a new stove is sold in Colorado; 2) emission
standards are applied in two stages (Phase I Jan 1987 and
Phase II July 1988); 3) the Oregon 0M7 test method may be
used for certification; and 4) stove testing is done by
private laboratories certified by the state.
Colorado incorporated many elements of Oregon's
woodstove certification program and in addition required
that testing laboratories rather than the state (as did
Oregon) verify that the stoves certified were those actually
on the market.  In doing so Colorado was able to implement
its program at comparatively little state expense (Wood 'n'
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Energy February 1985).  There are elements of the Colorado
program that differ from Oregon's, however.  Probably the
biggest factor is the effect of altitude on emissions.
Sheldon Energy Research conducted studies to determine an
appropriate factor to relate low altitude test scores with
emissions at higher altitudes.  (Colorado uses 5,000 feet -
where most population exposure occurs - although certain
localities with RWC emission problems are at a much higher
elevation.)  This conversion factor remains questionable.
Colorado also has a much colder climate than Oregon, and
consequently uses a different burn rate weighting formula.
It also allows for a slightly different standard for "very
large" stoves with a minimum burn rate greater than 4,000
BTU/hr.
Another fundamental difference from the Oregon program
is that Colorado set standards and required testing for CO
emissions.  Although most manufacturers are finding that CO
compliance is usually reached if TSP standards are met, some
non-catalytic stoves may have trouble meeting the Colorado
Phase II CO standards (Gay 1986).  (Colorado does not
differentiate between catalytic and non-catalytic stoves in
its standards.)  Conceptually then, whereas Oregon's
standards were developed to meet NAAQS (i.e. performance
standards), Colorado's were based on best available control
technology (BACT) and in fact may be "technology forcing"
for non-catalyst stoves.  A comparison of the Oregon and
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allows for an alternative test method, the ASTM or "hybrid"
method, and has allowed for the test differences in its
standard.  This was hailed as a major victory for the wood
heating industry's voice, the Wood Heating Alliance (WHA)
(Wood 'n' Energy, July 1985).  Colorado also seems to use an
altitude conversion factor of 1.3 for Phase II compliance
although a factor of 2 is used in Phase I.
Voluntary compliance began in July 1985.  Colorado will
essentially require that Oregon's 1988 catalytic standards
(4 g/hr) be met by July 1987.  A reciprocity agreement was
reached allowing Oregon-approved stoves to be certified in
Colorado although there are obvious differences in the
standards.  This will save stove manufacturers additional
expense.  (Wood 'n' Energy February 1985.)
Unlike the Oregon Law, the Colorado bill requires the
air quality control division to designate voluntary no-burn
days in any non-attainment area of the state.  Additionally,
amendments offered in the House Committee report would
require every municipality to enact a building code
provision by July 1987 to regulate the construction and
installation of fireplaces "in order to minimize emissions"
according to design specification to be determined by the
air pollution control division (originally) by July, 1986
(Colorado,  [House Committee of Reference Report] 1984).  If
fully implemented, these fireplace standards would affect
what may be a significant contributor to RWC emissions in
recreation areas.  A bill postponing the effective date of
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the Colorado woodstove emissions from January to April 1987
and fireplace regulations for one year was vetoed by
Governor Richard M. Lamm.  The bill was originally intended
to apply only to fireplaces and was a result of a delay in a
$75,000 EPA research grant that made the July 1, 1986 date
impractical to meet.  Those opposed to woodstove regulation
lobbied for a delay in the woodstove portion as well.
Several stove retailers in fact had lobbied against the bill
since they were already working hard to get certified stoves
in by the deadline.  A veto override failed by one vote, and
now Colorado has a fireplace certification program but no
standards - although the state health department is working
on a performance standard (Wood 'n' Energy, July and August
1986).  In short, Colorado encourages further local controls
while setting a statewide standard on basic stove design.
In February 1986 the Montana Department of Health and
Environmental Sciences (DHES) proposed to limit the-sale of
new woodstoves statewide through a certification program
similar to Oregon and Colorado.  Emissions were to be based
on levels necessary to maintain compliance with proposed
federal PMIO standards which are expected to be exceeded in
10 Montana communities.  DHES is particularly concerned with
RWC -related POM emissions, and plans to ban the burning of
materials in stoves which can cause especially toxic
emissions (such as plastics, treated wood, or refuse).
There were also concerns with CO NAAQS 8-hour attainment in
51
Missoula, the reduction of creosote related fires, and the
capacity to accommodate future economic growth.
The state of Montana had already in 1985 extended an
existing alternate energy tax credit program to include
"wood or biomass combustion devices" with particulate
emissions less than 6 g/hr.  Credits apply to purchase and
installation costs at 10% up to $1,000 and 5% for the next
$3,000.  As of January 1986, 16 stoves had been approved for
this credit by the DHES (Gay 1986).
A few other strategies for reducing RWC emissions have
been attempted by states.  Because stove operation is a
critical factor in emissions, user education programs were
felt to be promising.  Oregon, Montana, Colorado and Vermont
have published brochures on how to burn wood efficiently
(Roper 1984).  Regulating fuel wood moisture content has
also been suggested but not implemented at a state level.
Local regulation has experimented with these and other




Because of the lack of federal or state regulations and
because woodstove emissions are aggravated by geographical
conditions, several particularly susceptible communities
were the first to establish wood smoke regulations.  Because
of their novelty, many of these regulations were ineffective
and haphazard.  However, local regulation may be necessary
in certain instances since local meteorological conditions
may require stricter control than statewide or national
regulations.
Vail, Colorado was one of the first communities to be
concerned with RVvC emissions.  In 1979 Vail limited the
number of stoves or fireplaces to one per lodge, hotel, or
8
dwelling and set certain heat efficiency requirements.
Pitkin County, Colorado first regulated woodstove emissions
in 1980, but since its largest community (Aspen) was exempt
from the regulations as an incorporated area, the law was
not considered effective (Michaelson 1980).  In September
1985, however. Aspen adopted an ordinance limiting buildings
to one certified wood burning device with certain
exemptions.  Pitkin County tightened its rules, allowing a
non-certified device (including fireplaces) only if
g
Vail required a heat circulation pump and outside
combustion air feed to reduce heat loss, since indoor
combustion creates a partial vacuum which will draw an equal
amount of cold air in from the outside.
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emission reductions in existing devices were reduced in the
amount of three times that expected in the non-certified
device.  Nearby Beaver Creek resorted to banning wood fires
(Loh 1984) and even considered monitoring emissions with
individual sensors in each chimney connected to a central
computer (personal communication from Harriet Ammonn, U.S.
EPA).  Steamboat Springs, Colorado was considering an
ordinance mandating registration and retrofitting of every
woodstove within the city with a certified emissions control
device.  Low interest loans programs were being sought at
local banks.  A controversial draft rule required that
fireplaces as well meet Colorado's Phase II standards or be
rendered permanently inoperable.
Telluride, Colorado (elevation 8,800 feet) probably has
the most strict RWC regulations.  A series of ordinances in
August 1984 included the following provisions:
1. A moratorium on new solid fuel burning device
permits until completion of modeling studies in May
of 1986.
2. Permits will be issued only for devices certified
by Colorado Phase II requirements, weighted for
Telluride's altitude and climate requirements.
3. No coal may be burned after October 1988, nor coal
stoves sold after October 1985.
4. Only one device is permitted per structure.
5. Open fireplaces are allowed only at one per hotel,
multiple dwelling, saloon or restaurant.
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6. No building permits may be issued without
compliance with the above plus a payment of a one¬
time fee of $75 per g/hr particulate emissions
(based on stove certification tests).
7. Existing fireplaces must be retrofitted with
certified inserts by September 1988.
8. Permits may be sold but two purchased permits are
required to burn one additional solid fuel burning
device resulting in a two to one reduction in
permitted stoves.
9. A deed restriction must be created forbidding use
of any RWC device when a permit is sold which would
deny a new owner the right to use a woodstove.
10. Rebate programs are created to encourage conversion
to gas, propane or electricity.
11. Penalties may be imposed of up to $300 in fines or
90 days imprisonment per day of violation.
(Gay 19 86)
Missoula, Montana, after trying voluntary compliance
for two years with only a 30% success rate, voted in
November 1984 for strict regulations (Peterson 1984 and
personal communication from Steve Maviglio, Wood 'n'
Energy).  Its recently amended program currently includes:
1) Visible emissions limits within an "air stagnation"
(AS) zone; No visible emissions are allowed during
air pollution episode alert except by permit.
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2) Mandatory episode controls within a smaller "high
impact" (HI) zone.
3) Permit requirements to operate a RWC device within
the AS zone.
4) Emission standards for new RWC devices.
5) Fuel restrictions.
6) Enforcement with fines up to $100.
Various permits include a class I for "lowest
achievable emission rate" defined as less than 6 g/hr before
June 30, 1988 and less than 4 g/hr afterwards based on
Oregon test methods.  Class I permits must be renewed every
two years to ascertain that the device meets requirements
(i.e. that the catalytic combustor is functioning
properly).  Class I permits may burn during episode alerts
in the HI zone if visible emissions do not exceed 10%
opacity.  A Class II permit is given for "reasonably
available control technology" defined as less than 15 g/hr
based on the Oregon test method.  A Class II permit is
required after July 1, 1986 to install a new RWC device
inside the AS zone.  Fireplaces are included in this
definition.  Helena is the other Montana community to
regulate RWC by banning use during TSP or CO alerts and
strongly discouraging coal use.
In addition to the above high impact states, other
communities have set regulations.  Placer County, California
has proposed requiring that new RWC devices be certified
after TSP and PMIO monitoring indicated a RWC emission
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problem.  Juneau, Alaska strengthened its existing RWC
program in 1985 with a permit system modeled after that of
Missoula.  Retrofit catalysts can be used to obtain
a Class I permit.  Catalytic devices must have a permanent
temprature sensor to ascertain catalyst integrity.  Reno,
Nevada and Methow Valley, Washington have also enacted RWC
control programs based on Oregon or Colorado certification
combined with local permits and use restrictions.
On the other side of the country, the Village of Great
Neck Plaza, New York has banned the use of wood or coal
burning stoves for space heating.  Fireplace use is
curtailed where it can "impact adjacent high rise dwellings"
(Gay 1986).  Northampton, Massachusetts has limited RWC
emission to 60% opacity except during startup.
Other local controls include building code regulations
which specify fireplace and chimney design.  This is not
considered a significant pollution control.  However,
building codes as well as zoning regulations are available
vehicles for local control.  In 1984, the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) revised its NFPA 211
guidelines for the installation of chimneys, fireplaces, and
solid fuel burning appliances (woodstoves).  These included
specifications for passing chimney connectors through
combustible walls, clearances wall to pipe, stove or insert
installations into fireplaces and masonry chimney
construction.  Underwriters Laboratory (UL) also has a long
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list of RWC related safety specifications which stove
manufacturers must already comply with by Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) regulations.  These are basically
hot burn tests to ascertain that standard setback
recommendations (stove to wall) are indeed safe and that
stove integrity is maintained.  CPSC has also conducted
studies on prefabricated metal chimneys; over half of all
woodstoves use this type of chimney.
Product liability is also a vehicle for control.  Some
insurance companies already increase rates if wood heat is
used, and one Pennsylvania company bans metal chimneys (Wood
'n' Energy, August 1985).  Since chimney fires can be caused
by creosote buildup, which is directly proportional to
emissions, it is not unlikely that fire insurance could be
increased for high emission stoves once an alternative is
readily available.
OBSERVATIONS
Various regulations outlined here are concerned with
issues relating to health, economy and efficiency.
Woodstove certification is the predominant control measure
although various methods have been used in a variety of
combinations.  How these or future regulations impact
specific demographic groups, and how they affect total
energy use, have not been extensively studied.  Programs
such as TVA's low cost loans to help homeowners buy
woodstoves may in fact have increased NAAQS compliance
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problems, although this program has been suspended in
problem areas.  High design and testing costs favor uniform
standards.  Yet a nationally coordinated assessment of the
goals and objectives is appropriate before implementing an
effective RWC emission policy.  Individual states are
responsible for establishing their own means of attaining
NAAQS compliance, and local communities may still require
additional locally mandated controls, but such efforts would
be more effective if coordinated on a national level.
CHAPTER III
POLICY OBJECTIVES AND CONTROL ALTERNATIVES
Alice:  "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought
to go from here?"
Cheshire Cat:  "Well, that depends a good deal on whereyou want to get to."
Alice:     "I  don't  much care   where..."
Cheshire  Cat:     "Then   it doesn't  much matter   which way
you  go."
Before considering possible control alternatives it is
appropriate that the long-range goals of any control program
be examined.  The consequences of any RWC emission control
strategy can have far reaching effects, and these should be
weighed according to decision factors defined by specific
objectives.  Not all of the ramifications of RWC emissions
are directly related to a national strategy but they are of
concern to those responsible for coordinating national
policy with state or local concerns.  This chapter will
identify various national policy objective considerations
and discuss how they relate to the various RWC control
strategies, and discuss various methods of reducing RWC
emissions, consider these objectives and methods with
additional attention to public acceptance and administrative
feasibility, and discuss the various action options EPA





To the EPA, probably the most clearly defined objective
of an RWC policy is regional compliance with the existing
CAA and proposed particulate standards.  Using chemical mass
balance (CMB) receptor modeling source apportionment
techniques it is possible to determine the relative impact
of RWC on ambient air quality, and in particular on non-
attainment.  Given EPA's pollution offset policy for
industrial development in non-attainment areas, RWC control
could be a cost-effective alternative to industrial
modification in specific "air sheds."  Factor number one
will assess compliance with primary and/or secondary
standards for currently regulated air pollutants (i.e., CO
and TSP at the lowest cost.  NAAQS compliance has underlying
aspects of health and aesthetics, but these will be
considered separately. '
Since meeting NAAQS is a specific goal, the degree to
which the various control strategies meet this is at least
theoretically quantifiable.  Methods exist which - at least
on a local level - could be used on a site specific basis to
optimize an RWC strategy for NAAQS attainment at the lowest
cost (see footnote 14).  The other factors assessed here are
at best less quantifiable.
Health Effects
Although CAA compliance presupposes health
considerations, there may be associated health effects that
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go beyond the CAA as presently administered.  As previously
discussed RWC emission particles may cause problems beyond
those addressed by NAAQS. The mutagenic POM components in
wood smoke exacerbate this concern.  To complicate matters,
recent evidence may indicate that the mutagenic components
of RWC emissions are proportionally greater in converter
equipped stoves (personal communication from Michael
9
Osborne, U.S. EPA, March 1985).   Moreover, the quality of
the ambient air affects the potential RWC health hazard
since atmospheric reactions involving NO  and ozone are
known to increase the mutagenicity of wood smoke (Kamens
19 84).  On the other hand, wood smoke exposed to bright
sunlight under low NO  conditions showed 50-70% decreases in^ X
both mutagenicity and concentration of polycyclic aeromatic
hydrocarbons (PAH) (Bell 1984).  The rate of this
degradation, however, decreases as temperature is lowered
(personal communication from Richard Kamens, November 1986).
The implication is that RWC emissions are more a health
hazard in already polluted areas.  Since these are generally
areas of higher population, the human health risk is greater
than otherwise indicated by polycyclic organic material
(POM) measurements alone.  Also, in heavily overcast areas,
such as the Pacific Northwest, wood smoke mutagenicity will
persist longer.
9
This may be due to the increased temperature.  A
similar effect has been noted in comparing the mutagenicity
of diesel exhaust.  (See Lewtas 1982).
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Visibility
The most obvious effect of RWC in many areas is haze in
the valleys.  In some areas this can cause acute visibility
problems, and many Colorado ski resort areas have regulated
RWC primarily for these aesthetic reasons (with obvious
concern for the tourist dollar).  Visibility relates closely
to emission opacity which is relatively easily measured.
The visibility factor considers the impact on aesthetics,
tourism and public perception that any regulation strategy
would have.
Energy Policy
The contribution of RWC to total energy costs can be
affected by any control policy.  Restrictions on woodstove
use will necessitate increased energy use from other
sources.  Nationwide, about 8 percent of households use wood
as a primary heat source (Nero 1984).  In specific
localities figures can be over 50 percent.  Information such
as given in Table 7, and methods outlined in footnote 14 can
be used to relate changes in RWC use to increased use from
other energy sources.
Effect on Different Income Groups
RWC use can be categorized in a range from
"recreational" (open fireplaces which may have a total
negative heat value) to primary (where it may be the only
heat source affordable).  Consequently, various RWC controls
will affect different demographic groups in different ways.
Table 7 shows only a slight correlation between woodstove
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use and income, with use leveling off with higher incomes.
Fireplace use, however, is heavily correlated to income.
Low income groups, for example, would be adversely affected
by burning restrictions on high pollution days.  Regulations
restricting open fireplaces would affect higher income
groups.  Economic assistance programs might be especially
beneficial to lower income groups.  Programs such as energy
tax credits for low emission stoves would benefit low income
groups more than loan programs or "tax deductible" programs.
However, any such assistance programs should assess the
possible increase in total emissions from increased stove
use .
Fire Safety
Heating with wood is responsible for a large number of
winter house fires.  Strategies which would decrease RWC
emissions would also decrease this risk. Basically, there is
a one-to-one relation between emissions and the creosote
buildup which is responsible for most chimney fires.  Proper
installation of woodstoves, such as diameter and length of
exposed pipe and chimney connections, also influence safety
and emissions.  Fire safety is thus both a factor for
consideration as well as an authority for control.  Various
control strategies would affect this factor differently.
Control options such as chimney inspection and consequent
mandatory cleaning, which are already implemented in West
Germany (Greene 1981), could be an important incentive to
m
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the use of both lower emission stoves and better operator
practices.
Indoor Air Pollution
Control alternatives impacts on indoor air pollution do
not necessarily follow the impacts on outside health
effects.  For example, a required catalytic converter
retrofit could result in significant indoor releases when
the firebox is improperly opened for refueling, due to
restriction in draft.  Controls requiring mandatory
inspection could reduce stovepipe leakage from faulty
installation, a primary cause of indoor emissions.  Other
emission-reducing strategies might also have an adverse
effect on indoor air pollution.  Weatherization programs
reduce the total air exchange rate and could significantly
increase indoor concentrations of RWC related emissions as
well as other household pollutants, such as tobacco smoke
and formaldehyde emissions.  A well-insulated home can have
air exchange rates several orders of magnitude below older
homes.  Although heat exchangers can improve ventilation
heat efficiency, their use is rare in residential buildings
and assistance for such devices would be hard to include in
weatherization programs.  Programs that would improve stove
operation practices, either automatically or through user
education, would be most effective in reducing indoor air
pollution.  Along with faulty installation, this is the
primary cause of indoor emissions (Weston 1984).
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Economic Development
Any regulation of RWC emission will have an effect on
the economy of an area.  The effect, however, may be site-
specific.  For example, NAAQS compliance in non-attainment
areas could increase potential business development in some
areas, whereas strict building requirements in another area
could inhibit local development.
Cost
A final and important factor is the cost of a control
strategy.  Apportionment of indirect costs will not be
considered here, although the total societal cost and/or
Pareto efficiency of a control option is an important
consideration.  There is, however, an immediate and
significant transition cost to the woodstove industry.  The
cost considered here is the initial cost to the stove user
or to government for subsidy programs.  Other cost
distributions are implied above under fire safety and
economic development.
Forest Biomass Removal.  Burning wood as fuel in
principle substracts an equivalent amount of wood that would
otherwise be left to decay and enhance forest substrata.
Concerns have been raised regarding the impact of increased
RWC on forest ecology (Bohac 1981).  Programs that greatly
increase wood use should include considerations to insure
efficient and environmentally sound wood harvesting
techniques.  It is not likely, however, that any strategy
- w-.- ͣF^^rtjisw*'
66
designed to lower RWC emissions would significantly increase
wood use.  Fuel-wood cutting on a small scale (as is usually
the case with RWC) can, in fact, improve wood lot
production.  Also, since log sizes greater than 4 inches in
diameter burn cleaner, taking these and leaving smaller
brush in the forest would not greatly reduce biomass.  For
these reasons, forest biomass considerations are probably
not important in wood emissions control strategies and are
not listed here as a factor for assessment.
METHODS OF EMISSION CONTROL
Fundamentally, total wood smoke emissions can be
decreased by two approaches:  reduction in woodstove use or
increased heat/emission ratio.  A discussion of these
approaches is pertinent to assessing control strategies.  A
summary of existing control measures is given in Table 15
for reference.  Additional alternatives will also be
considered.
Use Reduction
Control strategies already using the first approach
include:
1. Home weatherization programs,
2. Restriction on use, such as
a. limit on number of units per dwelling
b. restricted use on high pollution days
c. visible emission restrictions (this is also an
indicator of stove efficiency), and
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Table 15





use during high pollution
ep isodes
Voluntary curtailment of
use during high pollution
episodes
Reduce wet wood burning
Weatherization requirements
or stove use
Restriction on wood burning
appliances:




Mt; Colorado (ski commun¬
ities & elsewhere);
Reno, NV
Juneau, AK; Missoula, MT
Medford, OR; Missoula, MT
Beavercreek, CO; Reno, NV;
Juneau, AK
Reno, NV; Albuquerque, NM;
Vail, CO; Juneau, AK


















3.  Energy subsidies for other fuel use.
Other design restrictions which impose additional costs on
RWC may in effect decrease stove use due to decreased
demand, but will be listed in the discussion of the second
approach category.
Weatherization assistance reduces woodstove use by
reducing heating needs, as in any other fuel.  It can be in
the form of direct grants or low interest loans.
Weatherization requirements can be required for woodstove
users or as a condition for other incentives, such as low
emission stove subsidies.  As already mentioned,
weatherization can lead to higher indoor pollution levels,
although it is presumed that such a program would
concentrate on less efficient homes and not approach very
low air exchange rate levels.
Restrictions on use, although applicable in particular
localities, would be near impossible to impose on a national
level.  Limiting the number of stoves per dwelling could
have little impact if not combined with other criteria, such
as stove efficiency or weatherization requirements.  "No
burn days" could be a viable measure, but allowances for
sole means of heat would have to be made and public
acceptance of unequal requirements could be problematic.
Visibility or opacity of emission requirements could require
more or less arbitrary judgments by local officials
untrained in opacity measurement techniques and could thus
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be even more problematic, and effectiveness has been shown
to be minimal.
Energy subsidies for other fuels could be used to dampen
the switch to RWC if energy prices increase suddenly.  This
approach was used in Oregon, although its effects are not
quantifiable (CONEG 1984).  High cost and implications for
higher energy consumption limit its long-term use.  Its use
is primarily a stop-gap measure but should remain in the
"bag of tricks" should another sudden oil price rise occur.
Efficiency Increases
The second approach to emission reduction perhaps
warrants more consideration.  There are basically three
variables in the emission equation:  the fuel used, the
stove design and the stove operation.   All three factors
can be critical to efficient operation.  Whereas the stove
design can be regulated by various methods, user operation
practices and type of fuel used generally cannot.  For
example, only one of the first stoves certified in Oregon
could not be operated in a polluting mode (Wood 'n' Energy,
March 198 5).
Efficiency related controls include:
4. Seasoned firewood requirements
5. Operator performance improvement, and
6. Stove design improvement through
a. mandatory emission requirements for new stoves
b. mandatory heat efficiency requirements for new
stoves
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c. mandatory catalytic combustor retrofitting to
existing stoves
d. performance rating information for new stoves
(both emissions and efficiency)
e. economic incentives for equipment replacement
f. regular inspection of stoves and chimneys with
required cleaning and/or repair
g. voluntary efforts by the woodstove industry to
improve stove efficiencies
Use of properly seasoned firewood can be mandated but
is best encouraged through user education.  Programs of user
education and spring wood cutting have projected emission
reductions of up to 38% from these strategies alone
(Grotheer 1984).  User education can also be effective in
influencing proper stove selection.  Many new stove buyers
believe that bigger is better and then are forced to operate
at a reduced air setting which produces the most emissions.
The tradeoff is length of burn, but proper education
stressing creosote buildup, fire safety and stovepipe
lifetime could influence better overall stove operation.
Merely increasing fuel wood size from 2-4" to 4-6" can
decrease emissions by 30% (Grotheer 1984).
Stove design improvement is probably the control option
of choice due to its direct relation to the problem and
perhaps relative ease of regulation.  For this reason, stove
design warrants further discussion. Of the categories listed
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under stove design above, a_  through c regulate emissions
while d^ through £ are basically incentives to purchase
better stove designs.  Mandatory emission controls and
mandatory efficiency are analogous respectively to emission
requirements and mileage standards for motor vehicles, in
that mandatory heat efficiency (total fuel use, £f^ gas
mileage) may be most effective as an emission control only
when combined with emission requirements.  Retrofit of
catalytic converters may also sound familiar.  However,
woodstove converters add to the heat output thereby
automatically increasing efficiency, as opposed to
automobiles where the additional heat can be a problem.  As
with automobiles, increased back pressure can be a problem.
Retrofit converters are available on the market but
generally are less efficient and/or more problematic than
built-in models.
National mandatory emission requirements for new stoves
are basically new source performance standards (NSPS) under
EPA's ongoing CAA enforcement program.  In order for the EPA
to set NSPSs, standard testing procedures must be specified
as well as the emission standards.  The specific standards
must also reflect EPA's assessment of the woodstove
industry's ability to meet the standards.  Basically there
are two woodstove design types that are most promising,
catalytic and noncatalytic.  Of the latter, only stoves of
the secondary combustion chamber design are considered
capable of meeting requirements.  Emissions from secondary
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combustion stoves, however, are somewhat dependent on burn
cycle and operator attention.   They do not perform as
effectively at the low burn rates which are typical in home
use.  Catalytic converters, on the other hand, allow
unburned flammable products to burn at a lower temperature.
Operation begins at approximately 500  and is selfsupporting
even when stove temperatures drop as much as 100  below
this.  The temperature of the converter will increase as
long as fuel (unburned flammables) is supplied, allowing
catalytic stoves to be more efficient at low burn rates.
For these reasons a converter can increase the heat
efficiency of a given stove 20%-30%.
Double standards were set by Oregon for converter and
nonconverter stoves to reflect the limited converter
lifetime.  One study indicated that emissions of
particulates increased 84% over a four-year equivalent life¬
span.  Combustion efficiency decreased also but at a lesser
rate (4%), and CO emissions reduction actually increased
(Fisher 1986).  These data somewhat dilute the assumption
that it will be to the user's advantage economically to
replace a converter after its effective lifetime, but only
with respect to the chimney cleaning costs.
Other innovative designs, such as automatic pelletized
wood feed and computer controlled draft and vent openings,
have been developed and tested successfully.  Although they
not generally commercially viable alternatives, such low
7 3
production stoves may pose a certification problem if EPA
initiates NSPSs.  A $6,000 test fee could be an undue
burden on a limited production model.
METHODS COMPARED WITH DECISION FACTORS
The control options are evaluated in Table 16 according
to their relation to the decision factors listed in the
beginning of this section.  A seventh option is listed for
evaluation, extending the CAA criteria pollutant list to
include B(a)P.  Indices given in this table are not intended
to be specific:  they are for illustrative comparison only,
and this report claims only that they are an honest attempt
to avoid over-quantification, which due to inaccuracies of
much of the available data could be more misleading.
For clarity some explanation is appropriate regarding
the assignment of index levels in Table 16.  Five categories
ranging from all negative (---) to all positive (+++) are
used.  The Control Options are thus compared as to their
relative influence on each Decision Factor or objective. For
example, as compared with its influence on meeting NAAQS
compliance, control option 2a (limit on number of RWC per
dwelling) is rated 0 mainly on the scale determined by the
other options.  A 1/2+ would be perhaps more accurate since
there would be a slight positive effect.  The "O" rating
indicates that it is less effective than options 2b or 3
indexed as "+."  Factor row 11, administrative feasibility,
is rated all negative.  That is to say more administrative
Tabla 14
COMPARISON* OP OREGON AND COLORADO WOODSTOVE EMISSION STANDARDS'* (g/hr)
Ooluani 1 2
Statai Or agon
Taat Mathod'' Or agon
Prograa Phaaai I II









(1-1-8T to 6-30-88) 7-1-88
TSP       CO TSP
Catalytic Stovaai 6
Non-Catalytic Stovaai IS








I      I II II
(1-1-87 to 6-30-88) 7-l-8t 7-1-St
TSP       CO TSP CO
22 400 8.5 200
31*   1 8004 10 15> 0.4 400+ 5   30* 0.7 8004^ 10 124^ 0.3 400« S
lOOd lAuO lOAA 1000   lobO 1600 1000 tmrt
a. Tha Colorado Standarda wara aat with Colorado'a highar altituda and coldar cllmata in mind.  'Equlvalant* Oragon
Standarda would tharaCora ba lowar in magnltuda, bacauaa of Oragon'a lowar altituda and mildar cllMata.  How Much lowar Is
difficult to datarmlna, dua to limitad teat data on varioua typaa of atovaa in both atataa.  Diffarancaa In tha atova
catagorlas usad, and othar factora, furthar complicata evaluation of which atata'a atandarda ara Mora atrlngant.
b. Tha Oragon and Colorado woodstova amiaaion atandarda in tha firat aix columna ara based on tha Oragon taat nathod*
Colorado alao allows a different test method for partlculataa, called tha 'Hybrid Oragon/ASTM Hathod'> Tha Colorado
atandarda in tha laat four columna above are baaed on thia -hybrid taat mathod. Although tha lattar Colorao atandarda app««r
ͣora atrlct than tha former ones, they are conaidered equivalent.  Their differancea in magnltuda occur bacauaa tha hybrid
taat method dllutaa flus gaa with air before partlculataa ara collected, and therefore.the pollution numbers ars always
lowar.
e.  Bsampla Interpretation (Column 3)i  Stoves with a minimum heat output of more than 40,000 Btu par hour cannot amlt
partlculataa at a rata (g/hr) above 37 '« ͣ 1 g/hr for each 1000 Btu per hour heat output, if they are to be cartlfiad (or ssls
or advartlaement in Colorado during Phase I.
-J
75
difficulty.  For example, regular inspection of stoves and
chimneys might be more difficult to implement due to public
disapproval of privacy invasion.   Thus the increased
difficulty is more negative.  Many of the relationships have
been discussed previously in this report and some certainly
deserve further explanation.  However, space forbids a more
detailed description of the choices made.
Disregarding the obvious inaccuracies and assumptions
made, if one adds up the +'s and -'s in the columns, one
finds that by this scale the most acceptable control options
are (in order) public education, seasoned wood, economic
incentives, mandatory emissions, performance rating and
regular inspections.  What is striking is a clear
desirability of public education programs.
What is also striking, however, is that the objectives,
i.e. decision factors, are certainly not all of equal
weight.  Moreover, different interest groups are obviously
affected differently and would attach a different set of
weights to the factors.  While the matrix of Table 16 is a
useful vehicle for analysis, it is not a formula for
decision making without consideration of these weights and
without more commensurate indices.
•
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ALTERNATIVES   FOR   EPA   ACTION
Given  the  above  developments,   it   is  clear   that  RWC
emissions  pose   a  problem  that  requires  some   EPA  action.     The
basic   option  alternatives   include:
1.     Expand   health   research   into   the  human  health  risk
of   RWC  emission  components  beyond   that  assessed  by
present  NAAQSs.
2 .      Expand   assessment  of   NAAQS   problem  areas   and
develop  site   specific  control  strategies  which
include  RWC   considerations.
3. Establish  a   RWC   information   focus   to  develop
effective   user  education   type  programs.
4. Develop  or  establish   existing   standard   test
procedures  to  aid  in consistency.
5. Develop  national  suggested  standards   to  aid
individual  state   RWC regulations.
6. Develop  non-catalytic  stove   technology.
7. Set   formal  NSPSs   for   woodstoves  which  would:
a. Set  a  single  standard  reachable  by  existing
non-catalytic   stoves.
b. Set  different  standards   (as  did  Oregon)   for
catalytic  and  non-catalytic   stoves,   or
c. Set  a  single  standard  related   to  best
achievable  control   technology   (BACT)   forcing   all
stoves   to  meet rates   set  by   existing   catalytic
stoves.
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^1^ These alternatives are obviously not mutually exclusive
and, in fact, a viable RWC policy would be a combined and





The RWC scenario does not exactly fit previous EPA
control-enforcement experience.  Ordinarily, when it is
evident that an industry is a significant contributor to a
pollutant for which national standards exist, EPA has the
authority to issue new source performance standards (NSPS).
In order to satisfy current court interpretation of the
Administrative Procedures Act a significant amount of
documentation is required to show both the significance of
the contribution as well as the validity of the standards
based on best demonstrated control technology or BDT.  This
is not different from the path EPA had already been
following based on RWC contribution to NAAQSs for CO and
PMIO.  In one aspect RWC is atypical in that the sources are
many and are controlled at their point of manufacture rather
than requiring user compliance as with larger power plants,
but this is similar to mobile source regulations.
A major difference is the introduction of what proved
to be the major driving force in RWC control action, EPA's
out of court settlement with NRDC e_t a_l. for controlling
polycyclic organic material (POM) to regulate woodstoves
•
79
(see footnote 1).  Although POM is a class of potential (and
some proven) carcinogens, specific standards have not been
set for POM.  Moreover, it is debatable whether the link
between POM carcinogenicity and woodstove particulate
emission profiles is well enough established to stand up to
a scientifically rigorous proof.  Most of the RVvfC emission
data with regards to stove compliance have been developed
(by Oregon and others) with CO and particulate emissions in
mind.  It is perhaps the case that the "out of court" nature
of the settlement in fact reduces the "burden of proof"
required for EPA justifying its actions to comply with the
presumptions of the original court suit (i.e., failure to
regulate POM).  It is probably not the case that this would
relieve EPA's responsibility to adequately explain its
actions to other interested parties.
The introduction of the NRDC settlement also added a
time constraint not explicitly present before.  The
traditional EPA NAAQS standard-setting process is circuitous
and time consuming (see Figure 8).  A similar process takes
as long as five years to develop an NSPS.  It is possible
that the administrative procedures necessary to satisfy the
rationale of the NRDC suit could actually take longer than
would a process to regulate RWC emissions based on NAAQS
attainment alone.  Issuing NSPSs for NAAQS pollutant sources
through traditional methods is a process with which EPA has
considerable experience, however.  Alternative methods of
standard development are newer but EPA has been exploring
80























































# them.  The NRDC suit in particular gave EPA added




ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION AND THE EPA
Since the concept of environmental mediation was
introduced in a 1973 Washington State dispute resolution
regarding a proposed flood control dam, much experience has
been gained in over 160 attempts to reach negotiated
settlements (Bingham 1986).  The opportunity to gather
opposing groups with different understandings of a specific
problem has been urged in such situations as the siting of
hazardous waste facilities (Smith e_t ajL. 1985; O'Hare et^
al. 1983).  The multi-interest nature of environmental
disputes is often conducive to a less confrontational
approach than are other more fact- or rule- driven disputes
where non-traditional rulemaking procedures often break
down.  Constrained by the ever-increasing labyrinth of the
notice and comment process dictated by the Administrative
Procedures Act of 1946, the EPA has been slow to respond
when any of the facts are in dispute even when the issues
are clear and when given specific dictates by Congress.
Court decisions requiring a "hard look doctrine" (eg.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 1972) have limited EPA's
discretion in the use of "informal rulemaking," and many
rules have been challenged in court (Berry 1984):  EPA
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Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus noted that about "80%
of all the rules EPA issues [were] challenged in court"
(Schneider 1985).  Also, from another standpoint, it has
been noted that "a process that does not provide for the
resolution of technically controversial issues almost
guarantees an agency will arrive at no decision" (Berry 1984
p. 44) .
Recognizing these problems, the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) adopted a resolution
in 1982 formally recommending that federal agencies
incorporate negotiation into the rule-making process under
certain circumstances (Bingham 1986).    The ACUS
elaborated on its goal:
"[These] suggested procedures provide a mechanism
by which the benefits of negotiation could be
achieved while providing appropriate safeguards to
ensure that affected interests have the
opportunity to participate, that the resulting
rule is within the discretion delegated by
Congress, and that it is not arbitrary or
capricious.  The premise of the recommendation is
that provision of opportunities and incentives to
resolve issues during rulemaking, through
negotiations, will result in an improved process
and better rules.  Such rules would likely be more
acceptable to affected interests because of their
participation." (Barter 1986)
EPA reacted guickly and in February 1983 published
plans to proceed with its Regulatory Negotiation Project
"Regulatory negotiation" is a term that refers to use
of negotiation in any decisionmaking process by an
administrative agency.  "Negotiated rulemaking" is a
specific application of regulatory negotiation, referring to
the use of negotiation in the decisionmaking process
associated with rulemaking (Perritt 1986).
ͣ'^'^^^^ ͣ^ ͣ^yficvr
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(RNP) - "an alternative that better conserves time and
resources and minimizes costly litigation" (Federal Reg ister
Feb 22 1983 p. 744).  The ACUS had advised that a limited
number of interested parties would negotiate under the
dictates of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)
(Public Law 92-463)/ which defined an advisory committee as
"any...panel...which is...established or utilized by one or
more agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or
recommendations...."  In keeping with the FACA, EPA must 1)
formally charter an advisory board,   2) announce meetings
and allow the public to attend, and 3) keep an official
transcript of the meetings (Berry 1984).  The act also
required that the advisory committee be "fairly balanced"
and not "inappropriately influenced by any special
interest."  Importantly, it is the agency that officially
writes the regulation and the negotiations "are a step in
the 'informal notice and comment' administrative procedures
EPA uses presently" (Federal Register, February 22, 1983 p.
7 494).
The Regulatory Negotiation Project was to be both
investigatory and demonstrative, but some basic guidelines
had already been developed "after a thorough review of the
considerable literature:"
This charter must first be approved by the federal
Office of Management and Budget and then filed with Congress
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1. The proposal requires the resolution of a limited
number of interdependent or related issues.  There
are several ways in which the issues can be
resolved.  The relevant legislation incorporates
these alternative outcomes.  There are no serious
obstacles to implementing a negotiated settlement.
2. There is a legislative or judicially imposed
deadline or some other mechanism forcing
publication of a rule in the near term, i.e. 8 to
12 months, that would promote a timely resolution,
and limit a party's ability to gain from delay.
3. Some or all of the parties have common positions on
one or more of the issues to be resolved that might
serve as a basis for additional agreements during
the course of negotiations.
4. The costs and benefits are narrowly concentrated on
a few entities.
5. Those parties interested in or affected by the
outcome of the development process are readily
identifiable and reasonably few in number (10-15).
They have sufficient resources to take part in
negotiations.  They have relatively equal power to
affect the outcome.
6. The parties are likely to participate in
negotiations as an alternative to litigation.  They
are more likely to achieve their overall goals
using negotiations rather than existing
alternatives.
(Federal Register, February 22, 1983 p. 7495)
With the potential field fairly well narrowed, NRDC
attorney David Doniger soon proposed that heavy duty diesel
engine emission nonconformance penalties (NCP) was a
suitable subject for regulatory negotiation (reg-neg) after
meetings with EPA, the environmental community, and the NRP
designated outside convenor/facilitator, ERM-McGlennon of
Boston.  In the spring of 1984, EPA selected NCPs as the
first of two reg-neg demonstrations.  After a period of four
months, a committee of 22 members reached a consensus.  The
m
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committee included 16 representatives from the trucking
industry, two state air pollution control agencies, NRDC and
the EPA.
ERM-McGlennon also "convened" the second demonstration
negotiation, a long standing question involving the need to
revise a rule allowing emergency exemptions to federal
pesticide licensing under section 18 of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
special assistant to EPA's General Counsel, LaJuana Wilcher,
served as facilitator.  Potential "stakeholders" included
environmental groups, national coalitions, and state
officials as well as U.S. EPA, the Dept. of Agriculture (DOA)
and pesticide users.  Again, a consensus was reached after
four months of negotiation.
In these two processes, criteria were established for
selecting the participants.  These included:  1) the party's
interest in the issue, 2) the potential impact of the new
regulation on the party, and 3) whether or not the party's
interests were represented by other groups (Schneider 1985).
EPA had published additional criteria requiring that:  1)
parties be at the preproposal state of development, 2) a
relatively small number of parties are willing to come to
the table, 3) a limited number of specific issues are
present, and 4) a near term deadline for publication of the
regulation exists  (Federal Register, April 24, 1984).
Protocols for negotiation had also been drafted in
cooperation between EPA Project Manager Chris Kirtz and
Washington D.C. attorney Phillip Harter, and these had been
sent in advance to the participants for consideration.
Specific rules of order were agreed upon later by the
negotiators.  For example, both sets of participants
eventually concurred on procedures to handle the two $50,000
12
resource pools.    According to one commentator, "Without
the funds to reimburse parties for travel costs it is
unlikely that either of the negotiations would have
occurred.  The availability of such money contributed to the
stakeholders' sense that there was relative equity among the
participants" (Schneider 1985 p. 75).
Much experience was gained in these two demonstrations.
EPA "learned that parties responsibly used the latitude
[given] them to fashion their own operational protocols or
ground-rules, to determine how they [wanted] to use their
available resources, and even how to define what they mean
by 'consensus'" (Kirtz 1985).  Both the use of an outside
convenor (NCP) and a combination of in-house and outside
convenor/facilitator (FIFRA) were shown to be successful,
even though the ACUS had recommended that a convenor be
designated who is "rigorously neutral with respect to the
subject matter of the rule" (Harter 1985).  (ERM-McGlennon
12
To aid in its own efforts at negotiated rulemaking,
the USEPA established a fund administered by the National
Institute for Dispute Resolution to pay the expenses of
public interest group participants and the costs of
technical assistance jointly requested by all the
participants (Bingham, 1986).
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noted that a team of negotiators is more appropriate for a
large committee where assistant mediators may be assigned to
working groups (Schneider 1985)).
Phillip Harter has summarized factors which a convenor
may look for in choosing subjects for a negotiated
regulation:
- The number of interests that need to be directly
represented should not exceed 15-25 (others can be
accommodated by means of teams or caucuses).
- Each interest must be sufficiently organized that it
can select individuals to represent itself.
- The issues must be "mature and ripe" - crystallized
such that the parties can focus on them.
- There must be a realistic deadline, usually in the
form of an agency commitment to move ahead on its own if
sufficient progress has not been made in negotiations.
- No party must have to compromise on an issue
fundamental to its existence.
- Each party must feel that a negotiated settlement is its
13
best alternative.    For example, if future research
would be determinative of the outcome, this uncertainty
would lead some parties to delay.
#
The concept that each party must feel that
negotiation can enable it to at least meet its best
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is described
in Henry Perrit's "Negotiated Rulemaking in Practice" (1986).
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- The agency must be interested in developing a rule
through this process and will appoint a relatively
senior official to represent it, and
- The parties must agree to negotiate in good faith.
(Harter, 198 6)
EPA administrator Lee Thomas has further stressed
that if a group negotiates a consensus rule, there has to be
a firm understanding that the agency will go forward with
the rulemaking process.  "It is a formal process and all the
formalities have to be followed in establishing the advisory
committee, soliciting invitations to participate in an open
public fashion, and then running the process in that same
fashion" (Thomas 1986).  Administrator Thomas also stated
that negotiation should be institutionalized at the "front
end" of the regulatory development process.  EPA is thus
committed to utilizing negotiation in rule-making, when a
careful assessment of the overall situation indicates that
it will be successful.  There is the potential to shorten
rulemaking time and, more likely, to achieve a better rule
less prone to challenges.
The similarities between reg-neg and the traditional
rulemaking process are expressed in a letter from EPA's Jack
Farmer (Director Emission Standards and Engineering Division,
OAQPS) to frequent RWC reg-neg meeting attendee Dr. Lawrence
Cranberg:
"The reg-neg process is not an attempt to
circumvent the normal rulemaking process, nor
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does it undermine public participation.  It is
supplemental to the normal process and in fact,
is more public than our normal procedures in that
all meetings are publicly announced beforehand
and open to anyone interested in attending.  The
negotiations will lead to a proposed standard,
after which there will be a public comment period
and a public hearing ... standards will be
revised, if appropriate, and a final rule will be
issued ....  Finally, the standards are revised
every four years and amended if revisions are




APPLICABILITY OF A NEGOTIATED REGULATION TO RWC
Although the NRDC suit agreement and the need for a
"fast track approach" affected EPA's decision to consider
mediated negotiation, other peculiarities of the RWC
emission scenario also lend themselves to this method.
Traditional EPA rulemaking procedures are not conducive to
dealing with a broad array of interests.  Comments are
received but there is no clear method to weigh the interests
of the various commentors.
Chapter 3 summarizes the multi-objective nature of RWC
emission regulation and in Table 16 suggests a crude method
to determine the combination of control alternatives that
would best satisfy the various objectives or decision
14
factors.    It is obvious, however, that even for this
simplistic model, a method to weigh the relative importance
of the factors is lacking.  Clearly, a method is needed in
14
This approach to decision analysis is called multi-
objective programming.  When suitable "objective functions"
for each interest are well defined and if the appropriate
relative interest weights can be agreed on, it is
theoretically possible to solve mathematically for an
"optimal" solution using linear programming techniques (see
Cohen 1978 pp. 13-28).
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which the relative concerns of the different factors can be
weighed.
There are many parties with various interests involved
in RWC emission control.  Various control strategies will
obviously affect groups differently.  What may be of slight
benefit to one group may be a severe detriment to another
while an alternative solution may be less onerous.  When
many groups are involved the complexities increase but it is
possible to minimize adverse effects and maximize benefits
if the facts are clearly communicated.  In the parlance of
systems operations this procedure is known as multi-
objective programming and quantitative facts are required.
Similarly, the RWC scenario is a multi-objective
problem.  Environmental interests are concerned with
minimizing POM emissions while various state air pollution
agencies are concerned with meeting NAAQSs; for some groups
fire prevention is of more importance while for others,
accurate information for the consumer is a priority.
Obviously a forum is needed in which the concerns can be
voiced and then relative importance (weights) can be
assessed.
Mediation appears to be such a process and a regulatory
negotiation is such a forum.  From the "stakeholders'" point
of view, mediation offers an opportunity to be involved in
the decision process.  From the agencies' point of view,
negotiation offers the possibility of a faster rulemaking




workable.  Mediation has not been fruitful in all instances,
however, and the RWC scenario should be assessed in view of
the various observations described in chapter 5.
The out of court agreement with New York State and NRDC
provided the impetus for what may be the most important
criterion for negotiation success, namely an imposed time
constraint (assuming that "success" is the reaching of an
agreement).  This in effect required the EPA to set a
standard regardless of whether a consensus was reached.
Thus the EPA had every reason to reach a consensus since
this would improve the "durability" of any rule, a major
vulnerability of any "fast track" approach.
Such a driving force behind only one "stakeholder" does
not guarantee that agreement will be reached.  The woodstove
industry was, however, in what may not be a typical position
for a regulated industry.  Reminiscent of mobile source
regulation, with several states having already set disparate
standards and with several others seriously considering
implementing unknown standards, the woodstove industry
needed a national standard that was strict enough that
individual states would not feel the need to regulate more
str ictly .
Other "stakeholders" also were under pressure to reach
an agreement.  The NRDC, of course, wished to bring its out
of court agreement to fruition, although it could still hold
out for a more strict rule.  The individual states, however,
•
94
were faced with the pending problem of PMIO attainment
scheduled tentatively for 1987, and needed the RWC emission
prediction figures to plug into their State Implementation
Plans (SIPs).  Moreover, they needed regulations strict
enough to affect PMIO attainment but not so strict as to
price new woodstoves off the market thus eliminating a
changeover from polluting stoves.  The currently non-
regulating states would also like to avoid the expense of
initiating their own RWC emission programs.
Most other criteria for regulatory negotiation (reg-
neg) listed in chapter 5 are also essentially met.  Primary
"stakeholders" EPA and NRDC had already been to court, while
the woodstove industry could not afford the time nor the
cost of lengthy litigation.  Thus these participants had
either already exercised their best alternative to a
negotiated agreement or had determined that negotiations
were preferable to their "BATNA" (see footnote 13).
Also, EPA had, in prenegotiation, set certain bounds
and identified issues to be negotiated.  Their considerable
background work, as well as the work done by Oregon, had
already fairly well defined the issues and the several
options available for each.  Many "stakeholders" in fact had
common positions on many of the issues, and there were to be
"strange bedfellows" in some debates.  Other criteria, such
as the appropriate number of "stakeholders" and a limited
cost benefit array, were also essentially met.
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The cost-benefit equations for RWC regulation can be
complicated and beyond available data, yet EPA's "Section
15
114" surveys   and the subsequent woodstove demand
function simulations done for the committee were more
detailed than any previously available.
Some of the criteria were clearly not met.  It is
debatable whether or not these are problematic.  Probably
not a problem was the need for further research in a few
areas.  All parties at the table had little reason to use
lack of these data as a delay.  Throughout the negotiations,
in fact, decisions were to be made on best generally
acceptable data, and resource pool funds were available to
fill the gaps.  Even when such data were essential,
agreements were reached allowing for future change (as in
altitude conversion factors).
Another criterion which may not have been met and yet
may have had little adverse effect is the requirement that
"stakeholders" have relatively equal power.  EPA obviously
had the power to write any rule it chose to, yet it could be
brought back to court by NRDC if the rule were not strict
enough or taken to court by the stove industry if it were
too strict (or the rule might also be disapproved by 0MB).
It has been suggested that the woodstove industry, through
the Wood Heating Alliance (WHA), was overpowered.  Yet
EPA used authority granted under CAA Section 114 to
request information from woodstove manufacturers regardingproduction costs and sales.
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throughout the negotiations they bargained from the position
of expertise in the industry.  While they could not offer a
preponderance of overwhelming data (as might some
industries), the negotiation process presumes "in good
faith" that such tactics are not used.  It is not clear that
the WHA was in ^n unfair position.
What is also not clear, however, is whether or not the
controlling WHA members might benefit from a stricter
standard to the exclusion of the perhaps underrepresented
small manufacturers and the unrepresented very small (less
than 200/yr.) manufacturers (see chapter 10).  One criterion
for successful negotiation requires that a "stakeholder" not
have to compromise on issues fundamental to his/her
existence.  Another requires that all interests be
sufficiently organized to participate in the negotiation.
Yet, EPA assumed from the outset that a large number of
small manufacturers would go out of business.  A pertinent
question is how less strict a standard would be required to
less impact the small manufacturer and at what cost to the
environment (and at what cost to equity if small
manufacturers were excluded).  This question was not to be
explicitly addressed in the negotiations, yet it is not
clear that a different agreement would have been reached if
it had been, barring an affirmative action program for
cottage industry.  At any rate, all "stakeholders" had the
opportunity to be heard by, if not seated on, the committee.
CHAPTER VII
THE RULEMAKING:  PRE-NEGOTIATION STATUS
By September 1985, EPA analysts already had a fairly
good picture of what form RWC emission control was to take.
EPA contractor Radian, Inc. had already completed a detailed
literature review and RWC issue paper, and most of the major
potential "stakeholders" had been aware of RWC emission
control developments for some time.  EPA was committed to a
"fast track" approach as a result of the pending court
settlement with New York State and NRDC.  The Wood Heating
Alliance (WHA) had been involved with the EPA in the NRDC
POM case and in fact both NRDC attorney David Doniger and
WHA attorney David Menotti had independently proposed a
negotiated regulation.  Both to convince itself of reg-neg
viability and to get the ball rolling, EPA held a pre-
negotiation meeting of proposed "stakeholders" in September
1985 to identify the issues and discuss what EPA felt could
and could not be negotiated.  Attending were representatives
from EPA, Oregon DEQ, Colorado Air Pollution Control, a
large woodstove manufacturer, NRDC, WHA with counsel, and
EPA negotiation consultant Philip Harter.
During this meeting it was agreed that representatives
from testing labs, catalytic combustor manufacturers, and
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the Consumer Federation of America should be contacted to
represent groups concerned with consumer costs and indoor
air pollution.  Mr. Doniger suggested that 0MB be
represented and Mr. Harter said that they normally would be
present as an observer but not as a committee member.  (As
agreement would be by consensus, 0MB ultimately would have
veto power anyway.)  It was later agreed that attendees at
the public meetings would be allowed to offer comments
although the conferees would be fixed.
The attendees represented various groups with varying
concerns.  It is of interest to reflect on how a negotiation
committee represents an array of overlapping interests.  It
is clearly not the case that RWC emission control was simply
a matter of industry versus the environmentalists with the
EPA in the middle.  The various decision factors (and other
concerns not listed but brought out during the negotiations)
obviously had different importance (or weights) for each of
the participants (see Table 16).  The issues to be
negotiated in general dealt with the specifics of the
standard and compliance, but it is important that each
participant know how each issue relates to his/her position
on the underlying factors.
EPA proposed that several items were probably not
negotiable..  These included:
1. The schedule - a January 1987 proposal date and a
January 1988 promulgation date.
2. The regulated pollutant - only particulate matter
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(PM) would be regulated since the pertinent control
technology also reduces CO and POM.
3. Liability - those liable for compliance; e.g.
manufacturer, retailer and/or consumer would be
determined according to EPA enforcement priorities.
4. Enforcement and legal requirements - EPA would
determine procedures for audit and enforcement.
5. The standard would be based on best demonstrated
technology (BDT).
Both industry and environmentalist groups preferred to
include the enforcement, certification or accreditation
procedures and the liability issue in the discussion.
The January 1987 proposal date was actually the
critical date since it required that an agreement be
reached per the allowed Advisory Committee Charter
timetable.  EPA also required a near final draft to be ready
for a National Air Pollution Control Techniques Advisory
Committee (NAPCTAC) meeting scheduled for September 1986.
Since the July 1988 promulgation date was mandated by the
out of court NRDC agreement, this date was reasonably
subject to negotiation.  The regulated pollutant assumption
was not to be challenged by any of the participants (see
discussion on p. 41).  PM was the only pollutant with an
adequate data base on which to base a standard.  The
liability and enforcement assumptions were due to "internal
EPA legal and enforcement strategies" and did not in fact
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limit debate through the negotiations. The committee was to
play a major role in determining auditing procedures and, as
it turned out, an alternative certification process.
EPA also listed a limited number of issues believed to
be pertinent to reaching a settlement.  These included the
following:
1. Sampling methods - MM5, 0M7 or ASTM and their
,      16eguivalances.
2. Gas flow measurement - dilution tunnel or Oregon DEQ.
3. Wood loading - density, arrangement and fuel type - and
their effect on test ranking.
4. Burn rate - what burn rate profile is appropriate, and
how the standard should reflect this.
5. Altitude effects - how should compliance testing account
for altitude.
6. Affected facility definition - what is the technical
definition of the affected wood burning appliance.
7. Applicability date - what is the appropriate schedule
for compliance, regarding manufacture and retail sales.
1 c
MM5 - Modified Method five was developed by EPA to
accurately measure both particulate matter and
gaseous phase aeromatic emissions from wood smoke.
0M7 - Oregon Method seven was developed by Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality.  It is a
simplified version of MM5 and was used to establish
Oregon's standard.
ASTM - American Society of Testing and Materials initiated
this procedure which collects only particulates or
emissions adsorbed onto particulates.  It is
therefore cheaper to install and easier to operate
than the other two methods.
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8. Best demonstrated technology - how is BDT defined for
woodstoves.
9. Format of standard - in what units should the standard
be expressed (g/hr, g/kg wood burned or ug/J heat
produced - see page 107).
10. Numerical level of standard - how should BDT be
represented in a standard.
11. Certification - what are appropriate procedures for
certifying woodstoves.
12. Labeling - permanent or temporary, what information.
13. Catalyst replacement - how to best encourage or require
catalyst replacement. ,
Since many of these issues involved unresolved
technical questions, EPA was to prepare a series of staff
reports to summarize the available knowledge and EPA's
position where applicable.  A tentative schedule was offered
to coordinate testing research and summary paper generation
(see Table 17).  This was a schedule to which EPA felt it
would have to adhere whether or not it would proceed with a
negotiated regulation.  In fact there would be little slack
available since the actual negotiations did not start until
March 19 86.
The participants in the September meeting agreed that
the woodstove industry is comprised of many small businesses
which may be adversely affected by an NSPS.  EPA had been
unable to obtain substantive economic data on the woodstove
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Table 17
SCHEDULE OF EPA ACTIVITIES
- SAMPLING METHODS - Dec. 1985
- GAS FLOW MEASUREMENT - Dec. 198 5
- WOOD LOADING - Dec. 1985
- BURN RATE - Nov. 198 5
- ALTITUDE EFFECTS - Nov. 1985
- AFFECTED FACILITY DEFINITION - Jan. 1986
- APPLICABILITY DATE - Nov. 1985
- BEST DEMONSTRATED TECHNOLOGY - Spring 198 5
Non-catalyst modifications paper - Nov. 1985
Comparison testing - Dec. 1985
Catalyst paper - Dec. 1985
Follow-up emission testing - Winter
Catalyst testing - Spring 1986
- FORMAT OF STANDARD - Oct. 198 5
- NUMERICAL LEVEL OF STANDARD - Summer 1986
- CERTIFICATION - Dec. 19 85
Who test analysis - Sept. 1985
Small business impact mitigation analysis - Oct. 1985
Sampling methods and procedures - Dec. 1985
- LABELING - Sept. 1985
- CATALYST REPLACEMENT - Spring 1986
Catalyst replacement analysis - Oct. 1985
Public Education analysis - Nov. 1985
Catalyst paper - Dec. 1985
Catalyst longevity testing - Spring 1986
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industry due to the lengthy and cumbersome 0MB survey
approval process.   Although WHA offered to assist in data
gathering, EPA eventually had to secure 0MB approval
(necessary to send out 10 or more questionnaires) to send
out the "Section 114" economic information survey
(authorized under CAA Section 114).  The information gleaned
from this survey was to prove relevant but perhaps not
essential in developing the standards exclusion procedure
for small producers.  The Section 114 data was however
essential for the economic analysis required by the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (Reg-Flex) and Executive Order
12291.  Thus the lack of this imformation was a significant
delaying factor in getting negotiations off the ground.  By
the time 0MB gave approval for the survey in February 1986,




The first session of a negotiation is perhaps unique in
that the mood of the entire process can be set by what is
said or implied.  As recommended by the various proponents
of mediation, the first reg-neg committee meeting commenced
with the setting of organizational and resource pool
protocols.  EPA had already prepared a draft protocol which
was basically endorsed by the committee.  Its provisions
included the following:
- Any substantially affected party may be represented.
- Decision making would be by consensus, interim work
groups would address recommendations for specific
issues.
- A facilitator would be available if an impasse were
declared by any party.
- All participants must negotiate "in good faith."
In discussion, the committee also agreed that proposals
would be distributed in advance whenever possible.
Several members felt that part of the $32,500 available
in a resource pool shoud be used to defray travel and
other expenses.  Particularly, the Consumer Foundation of
10 5
America (CFA) said that they could not participate unless
the committee gave them a grant to support their time and
independent research.  CFA director Steve Brobeck urged
EPA to "reconsider its policy of not compensating
participants" (letter to Bob Ajax-U.S. EPA March 17 1986).
He added that "no other group on the committee directly
represented the consumer interests."  In fact, the CFA was to
play an instrumental role in the labeling and warranty
decisions.
A tentative reg-neg agenda was established at a
February 12 organizational meeting (see Table 18). The
issues to be discussed at the first session were
appropriately not intended to be resolved at that meeting.
While all the technical considerations cannot be adequately
17
addressed m this paper,    the positions of various groups
in the committee on pertinent issues will be briefly
described in order to present a sense of how the
negotiations advanced.  These issues will be lettered here
in the order that they arose in the negotiations.  Table 20
(p. 132) summarizes the actual discussion and resolution
timetable by issue.
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Technical Reports and Issue Papers are filed in the




TENTATIVE REGULATORY NEGOTIATION SCHEDULE
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ECONOMIC MODEL OVERVIEW April 17-18
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CATALYST REPLACEMENT June 11-12
SELECTION OF BDT June 11-12






A.  Format of the Standard;  Emissions can be measured as a
function of the time elapsed (hr), the amount of wood burned
(kg), or the amount of heat produced (Joules or BTU).  There
are several assumptions implicit in these.  The use of ug/J
best relates the amount of emissions per unit heat needed
(by definition) but requires more expensive and not always
accurate heat measurement (or in essence, efficiency
testing).  The underlying question was how well heat
efficiency correlated with emission efficiency.  The choice
of units (g/hr, g/kg or ug/J) thus relates mathematically to
other issues as well :  stove efficiency (Joules/kg wood
burned), burn rate (kg/hour); fuel type (Joules/kg); and
heat requirements or weather weighting (Joules/hr).  The EPA
favored g/kg because this format would not require
efficiency testing but would correlate well with ug/J (which
would encourage the development of more heat efficient
stoves).   Another related issue is labeling, since the
consumer will theoretically tend to buy the stove with the
best heat efficiency (BTU/kg).  Oregon and Colorado
representatives favored a g/hr format because this best
reflected air shed emission reduction strategy.  WHA opposed
a g/hr format because it would favor small stoves.  (This
bias would be lessened by an appropriate burn rate weighting
scheme.)  WHA adamantly opposed a ug/J format because of
additional efficiency testing expense.
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B. Burn Rate;  Users burn their stoves under a variety of
conditions and stoves perform differently at different burn
rates.  At issue was what scheme or formula best
approximated real conditions on a nationwide basis.  Oregon
had already determined a formula for their program.  WHA
questioned the universal applicability of their system.
They felt nationwide heat requirements (burn rates) should
be higher.  On the other hand, EPA and state representatives
thought a lower minimum burn rate would be necessary since
users could easily decrease the burn rate themselves by the
addition of a stove-pipe damper.  This was a "loophole" in
the Oregon method.  It was generally agreed that the federal
standard would be a weighted average of several appropriate
burn rates subject to a maximum constraint or "cap."  Oregon
wanted burn rate expressed in BTU (or Joules)/hr. while WHA
advocated kg/hr.  By whatever format, determination of the
specific burn rates and the appropriate burn rate weights
was postponed awaiting the results of empirical testing in
progress.
C. Altitude;  Like mobile sources, woodstoves emit
differently at higher altitudes (due to lower air pressures).
Most of the data developed by Oregon for its RWC program was
generated by low altitude laboratories.  They allowed for a
conversion factor of 2:1 for stoves tested at higher
altitudes.  More recent data indicated that catalyst and
non-catalyst stoves were affected differently and often
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unpredictably by pressure changes.  It was generally agreed
that there were insufficient data to properly characterize
the altitude (i.e., air pressure) effect.  WHA was very
opposed to a dual standard (as with automobiles) since a
single standard was an important factor in bringing WHA to
the negotiating table.
D.  Woodload;  At issue here was the appropriate fuel
spacing to be used for testing.  WHA favored the ASTM load
while EPA and Oregon favored the 0M7 load (see footnote 16).
The real questions were what best approximated real world
conditions, what had the best data base, and what difference
it made.  EPA concluded that there was no evidence to
indicate that the Oregon loading was inappropriate.
COMMENTS ON THE FIRST SESSION
With the exception of the ubiquitous question of
efficiency testing, the issues discussed in the first
session involved technical questions of how to best
approximate the real world, how to best reduce real
emissions and how to best avoid circumvention and
"gamesmanship."  All parties were in basic accord with these
principles.  Progress was made on issues which involved
technical questions.  The efficiency testing issue was
perhaps more of a policy question.  It did not improve the
mood of the forum.  However, since it necessarily related to
the format of the standard which was essential to define at
the outset, efficiency was an unavoidable issue.
no
There were three different individuals directly
representing EPA at the first few meetings:  the negotiator,
an "executive secretary," and a "facilitator."
Additionally, the neutral "convenor" was hired by EPA.
According to standard usage of terms in the literature, the
actual "facilitating" was done not by EPA, but appropriately
by the neutral contractor.  The distinction may have been
confusing to some participants.
THE SECOND SESSION
E.  Compliance Date;  This was the main substantive issue of
the second reg-neg meeting.  According to WHA it may well
have been their most important issue.  The major concerns
were the manufacturers' need for dead time to conduct research
and development and to retool; their need to deplete unsold
uncomplying inventories; EPA's need for lead time to
accredit test labs; and the need to avoid a testing
"logjam."  Related issues were "grandfathering" of Oregon
and/or Colorado certified stoves, and the question of
extensions or exemptions.  EPA's position was that
compliance by at least the largest manufacturers would be
required within two years (from the anticipated July 1986
reg-neg agreement date) in order to protect the environment.
WHA was not willing to state its position before the level
of the standard, method of testing and the certification
procedures were specified.  Both Oregon and WHA supported a
"grandfather" proposal, but NRDC felt that the federal
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standard should be more strict than the Oregon standard and
that "grandfathering" was therefore inappropriate.
F. Labeling and Consumer Education;  Considerable time was
spent in the second (and later) meetings discussing what
would be required on stove labels.  Temporary labels were
considered first.  CFA felt that stove heat efficiency was
the "most controversial stove attribute" and favored its
inclusion on labels (or a default value if efficiency and
emissions were shown to correlate).  This would aid
consumers in stove choice.   WHA felt that EPA should not
get involved in what it considered to be a market issue.
Oregon emphasized that total emissions would decrease if
efficiency were increased.  NRDC felt that a default (i.e.
derived from emission tests) efficiency would be acceptable
if it were slightly lower than average.  This would
encourage voluntary efficiency testing.  WHA agreed in
principle to the default approach.
Permanent label requirements were addressed next.  EPA
felt that date of manufacture was necessary on a permanent
label for enforcement purposes and for the staggered
compliance (exemption) proposal.  WHA opined that this would
be an unnecessary expense.  CFA preferred that consumer data
be confined to the temporary label except that a catalyst or
non-catalyst designation should be on the permanent label.
G. Affected Facility;  There was no essential disagreement
on Shelton Research's definition of an affected facility
which basically excluded fireplaces and very large wood
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fired boilers and furnaces.  Further refinement of the
definition followed in later sessions.
COMMENTS ON THE SECOND SESSION
A considerable portion of the second session was spent
discussing the EPA's Economic Analysis Branch (EAB)
econometric simulation model.  This model was developed to
summarize EPA's knowledge of the woodstove industry and the
effects of regulation on sales and user preferences.   It
was essentially a demand simulation model but could also be
used to predict emission levels as a function of different
control regulations.  EAB data came primarily from the EPA
Section 114 survey responses (see footnote 15).  Although
many of the model's assumptions were questioned by the
group, the model conclusions were minimal:  that a
compliance delay for small manufacturers would not greatly
increase emissions, that an increase in average stove
efficiency (presumably through consumer education labels)
would lead to substantial societal cost savings, and that
the cost of such labels would be an insignificant factor in
stove sales.
Considerable time was also spent on the presentation of
a WHA-contracted user survey which disputed some of the EAB
assumptions.  EPA agreed to run their model using other
various assumptions suggested by the parties.  It is
questionable that the EAB model was instructive in the
negotiations.  The concept of multi-factor econometrics is
•
113
at best tenuous when the data are not complete.  It can also
be viewed as an exclusionary tool if all parties do not have
equal resources.  If any of the EAB model's conclusions were
truly contentious, it is unlikely that the model would have
added to their credibility at the negotiating table.
THE THIRD SESSION
H.  Test Method:  The choice of test method involved the
technical and policy questions of what is being measured,
how accurately is it measured and how often has it been
measured (i.e. data base).  At the outset, EPA chose to
regulate particulate matter only, but as a surrogate for POM
and CO regulation as well.  From the limited data, however,
POM emission does not correlate well with PM emission.
Physically, less POM is generated at low burn rates.  The
effect on specific POM species mutagenicity is even more
unclear.  There was no good data base for effective POM
reduction:  most stove development data measured particulate
matter only.
Of the three test method candidates, EPA's MM5,
Oregon's 0M7, and ASTM, 0M7 had the largest data base (see
footnote 16).  These data were to be the basis for best
demonstrated technology (BDT) determination.  EPA had to
insist, therefore, that 0M7 would be the reference method if
the standard were to be logically consistent.  WHA's
preference for the ASTM method stemmed from the fact that
most manufacturers will require their own test facilities
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for R&D.  The ASTM dilution tunnel method is considerably
cheaper and simpler to operate (less intra-lab variability).
Inter-lab variability was not well known however.  Requiring
the 0M7 method would also increase the "logjam" potential, a
fundamental WHA concern, since there would presumably be
fewer 0M7 test laboratories.
I.  BDT Selection:  Since determinization of BDT would in
effect determine the standard, EPA representatives chose to
present their methodology for determining BDT at the third
meeting even though selection of BDT was not scheduled until
the fourth session.  Essentially the method selected, from
26 of the Oregon-1986 certified stoves, a set of stoves
which had similar and superior emission profiles.  An
algorithm developed to predict lifetime emissions showed
that catalyst BDT and non-catalyst BDT had similar net
emissions.
Oregon was in agreement with the methodology.  NRDC
felt that the set of Oregon-1988 certified stoves would be
more appropriate in determining a long-term federal
standard.  WHA felt that the Oregon-86 group choice was in
fact too selective since Oregon allowed data selectivity.
(This would not be a problem for a "well-controlled" stove
with a fairly level emission profile - a criterion for the
BDT set selection).
J.  Certification Procedures;  Discussion of certification
procedures was initiated via EPA's presentation of an
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example rule.  Most of the discussion involved WHA assertion
that manufacturers needed to be present during testing and
EPA's insistence that they not be.  WHA favored certifying
manufacturer-owned labs but the majority felt this was
inadvisable.  It was generally resolved that certification
would be good for five years and that EPA could re-test
under an audit program.  All parties agreed that a plan to
assume adequate test labs was desireable.
COMMENTS ON THE THIRD SESSION
Test Method was perhaps the main substantive issue of
the third session.  The real issue was:  How well did ASTM
and 0M7 correlate?  If they did, then WHA should have no
problem with 0M7 as a reference method.  If they did not,
then there would be considerable R&D misdirection if
manufacturers were to use ASTM.  This was a technical
question and involved test lab reliability.  This suggests
that appropriate use of an audit system could resolve the
issue:  to assure EPA that an ASTM tested stove was indeed
compliant and to assure WHA that an ASTM developed stove
would not "flunk" an audit.
Several issues illustrate the use of interim committees
to save valuable session time.  Considerable time was again
spent in debating the assumptions of the EAB model.  EPA
aptly proposed that interested parties could meet separately
to discuss the assumptions and their implications in the
model results.  Less time was spent on what may be a more
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important issue:  labeling.
The labeling/public information sub-committee reported
on its progress with little debate.  This sub-committee's
recommendations were to be essentially followed by the reg-
neg committee but many details were left unresolved until
the last session.
A lengthy discussion of the EPA-prepared example rule
involved several issues.  As well as bringing to light
possible procedural problems, the example rule also served
as a focal point.  In a multi-issue negotiation it is easy
to lose track of the real objective, writing a final rule.
The language use in the rule itself must evolve as the
negotiations progress, but an earlier presentation of an
example rule probably would have been premature:
participants might have thought it was being "rammed down
their throats."  As some observers felt that EPA had already
made up its mind, this timing was sensitive.
At the third meeting it was agreed to schedule a sixth
meeting in August to more fully resolve the issues.  All
members realized, however, that EPA's schedule would allow
no further meetings. <
THE FOURTH SESSION
K.  Catalyst Replacement:  This was the last essentially
singular issue brought up.  The issue was intrinsically
data-driven but related to the issue of a catalyst-non-
catalyst lifetime equivalence factor (LEF) (see pp. 71-72),
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to warranties, and to certification procedures.  A low LEF
would imply a lower non-cat standard, a benefit to catalyst
producers, but could oblige a longer warranty which they
were against since most catalyst failures were shown to be
related to stove design.  NROC favored certification lab
inspection to eliminate stove designs most likely to fail
prematurely, but WHA felt that EPA could not impose what
would amount to a design standard.  EPA, Oregon, NRDC and
CFA all expressed the need to assure catalyst integrity, but
WHA and the catalyst manufacturers felt this was a market
issue.  The specifics of the warranty were deferred until
the July meeting.
L.  Level of the Standard;  This final issue, essentially
the "bottom line" of the NSPS, was first specifically
introduced at the fourth meeting.  Three proposals were
presented by the three major factions, EPA, WHA, and an
"environmental coalition" of NRDC, state representatives and
CFA.  Fundamentally, these were "package deals" and were
based on assumptions relating to each party's perception of
the various anticipated group agreements on other issues.
The proposals thus were a starting point for bargaining.
They are presented in Table 19.  The major differences were
the timetable and the numerical standard.  It is clear that
there was significant distance between the two "extremes" -
Table 19
COMPARISON OF REGULATORY APPROACHES
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Exemptions  All mfrs could small mfrs
produce up to (<2000/yr).
2000 noncertified exempted for
stoves during 2 years







fined to mfrs to
give retailers
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Oregon   stoves
<12,000   Btu/hr
for   1988
small  mfrs
(<2000/yr)
exempted   for
1   year
(until   7/89)
NRDC,   et  al
-  Strong   audit
program   includ¬




WHA and NRDC et  a_l. - especially on emission limits.    The
WHA was looking for final controls two to three times less
restrictive than those of NRDC e_t al_. with compliance coming
half a year later than EPA's target date for phase I
compliance.
The WHA proposal also included a non-specific EPA
performance requirement and a "safety valve kickout" for
good faith effort.  The purpose of these was to avoid
failure to get a certificate for reasons beyond a
manufacturer's control.  NRDC and Colorado representatives
pointed out that due to production schedules, the WHA 1/1/89
compliance date was equivalent to a 7/1/89 date (Colorado
had been criticized by the industry for its standard's mid¬
winter date).
After NRDC e_t a^. had introduced their proposal, the
0MB representative arose to criticize its stringency.  He
then proposed a novel scheme wherein the standards would be
determined by actual sales weighted BDT in such a way that
there would be market incentives to produce a cleaner
burning stove.   This is discussed in more detail in chapter
10.
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The differences are somehwat obscured by the use of
two weighting systems.  On the average, WHA's 4.3 g/hr
(Nebraska weighted) is equivalent to EPA's 4 g/hr (Oregon
weighted) but the equivalence relationship is emission
profile specific - i .e. catalyst and non-catalyst stove
equivalences are quite different.
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COMMENTS ON THE FOURTH SESSION
Almost all the aforementioned issues were discussed at
the fourth reg-neg meeting.  In general, the committee was
firming up agreement on the more technical and definitional
issues.  EPA was amenable to Oregon's g/hr format, but the
issue of fixing burn rate to BTUs/hr or g/hr was left
unresolved.  The CONEG weather weighting data had convinced
WHA of the efficacy, in principle, of the Oregon weighting
system.  Data better establishing the equivalences of these
various measurement systems were becoming available through
the several test lab representatives on the committee.
However, some relationships such as the ASTM-0M7 correlation
or a workable altitude correction factor were still not well
defined.
It was becoming increasingly clear that WHA's primary
concerns, beyond the numerical level of the standard,
involved the rule's impact on R & D and production
scheduling.  They were afraid that a poorly run
certification test could have crucial scheduling
consequences.  The procedural concerns of EPA and the
"environment coalition," however, required guarantees of a
fair and  accurate test.  They tentatively agreed to WHA's
demand that manufacturers be allowed to be present during
the test if an audit program could be assured by a surcharge
(eg. one free test for every five) to be used to re-test
stoves on a random basis (NRDC specifically didn't want the
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audit program tied to the vagaries of the EPA budget).  This
was not inconsistent with WHA's desire to avoid
circumvention possibilities.
WHA's concern for an adequate "logjam" remedy, and the
need for an appeal procedure, also related to manufacturing
schedule concerns.  Manufacturers were particularly uneasy
due to the annual cycle of their business - a few months'
delay in certification could affect an entire year's
production line.  Thus the details of the certification
process were inherent in WHA's position on the numerical
value of the standards themselves.
The fact that EPA had not defined BDT for 1990 in its
proposal allowed room for bargaining, yet WHA had also left
room for bargaining.  Its one-phase-only proposal was
probably flexible since, in fact, one purpose of EPA's two-
tiered standard was to ease the burden on the industry.
WHA's proposed standard was basically equivalent to Oregon
1988 for catalyst stoves.  The difference in their non-cat
position would depend on how non-cat BDT and the catalyst
degradation rate would be determined; both were essentially
technical questions.  Since the issue was proper
interpretation of the data, there were no immovable
positions.
The WHA position on exemptions was pliant as well.
They in fact later proposed a percentage-based exemption
which would obviously favor large producers but would not
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benefit the cottage industry (less than 200 stoves/yr) at
all.  WHA then amended that to 2000 stoves for all
manufacturers after an evening caucus.  Possibly those
present were not firm on this either.   As long as they
could guarantee that uncertified old inventory could be
sold, equity actually would require that the 2000 exemption
not be extended to all manufacturers because it would-
benefit only those for whom a 2000 stove uncertified line
would be advantageous.  Thus, in its attempt to moderate the
impact on the industry, EPA's 2000 stove exemption offer
(although for one year only), may not have been advantageous
to the industy as a whole.  Indeed, the "environmentalists'"
proposal (2000 exemption for small manufacturers only) was
the ultimate consensus.
THE FIFTH SESSION
All substantive issues had been presented and discussed
by the beginning of the fifth session.  At the end of the
fourth session convenor Philip Barter had asked that all
parties send him a summary of proposals to circulate before
the fifth session.  He also had met with the parties
separately during the interim.  Parties were thus prepared
to reach agreement on most substantive issues, yet major
areas were still unresolved.
A key proposal was introduced by WHA - an alternative
certification for logjam relief.  This was conceptually
agreed upon by the committee, subject to checks and balances
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to address the concerns of other parties.  As proposed by
WHA, EPA would make monthly assessments of test lab backlogs
and related EPA administrative capacity.  An alternative
certification procedure would be triggered when a logjam
exceeding six months existed.  This certification would be
based on manufacturer's R&D test data in lieu of test lab
data and would give temporary certification until 12/31/88,
or at most until the stove was laboratory tested.  If the
stove subsequently failed, a laboratory test, production must
halt within 24 hours if it is a "major flunk."  The
definition of major or minor flunk was not resolved.
Substantial agreement was also reached on most of the
other issues listed above.  There were, of course, details
and points of discussion not reported in this analysis.  For
convenience, the issues are summarized here in the order
listed previously:
A. Format - g/hr - resolved
B. Burn rate - kg/hr . CONEG weighting,
one test below 1.25 kg/hr in phase I,
1.0 kg/hr in phase II - resolved
C. Altitude - No altitude adjustment for
certification purposes until data is
available (Alternative certification
R&D test data may be adjusted however) - essentially
unresolved
D. Loading - (see test method) - resolved
E. Labeling - draft owners manual and
temporary labels presented by labeling
task force.  Permanent label details
not yet firm - unresolved
F. Affected Facility - Fireplaces and "coal
only" stoves exempt.  All others included
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except:  1) firebox greater than 20
cubic feet 2) lowest burn rate air-fuel
ratio greater than 35:1, 3) lowest burn
rate greater than 5 kg/hr, and 4)
appliance weight greater than 2000 kg
(to exclude "high mass" stoves) resolved
(WHA to define coal only) - essentially
resolved
G.  Test Method - 0M7 the reference method.
Test labs to individually show ASTM
equivalence until data indicate a
concrete relationship - resolved
H.  BDT Selection - Essentially resolved.
Non-catalyst implications not resolved -    unresolved
I.  Certification Procedures - Oregon
approved test labs will be
"grandfathered" for EPA accreditation.
A task group will work out details of
lab proficiency requirements.
Enforcement program audit tests will use
the same test method.  What constitutes
an audit failure and other details to be
worked out by interim task force - essentially
resolved
J.  Catalyst Replacement - A public
information program will be developed.
The rule will require that catalysts be
easy to examine and to replace.  Stoves
must have a port available for catalyst
temperature sensors which will be
required if and when their reliability
is adequately documented.  Catalysts
will be warranteed for two years
unconditionally but a three year
physical integrity warranty had not been
accepted by catalyst manufacturers -        unresolved
K.  Level of the Standard and Exemptions -
The following agreements were reached (based on Oregon
we ighting):
phase I 4 g/hr 9 g/hr
(7/88 to 7/90)   no cap no cap
12S
phase II        3 g/hr 7.5 g/hr
(7/90 to 7/92)   cap of 2.3 SD        cap not resolved
Since catalyst stoves generally showed a well-defined
increase in emissions at higher burn rates, a
cap was set at 2.3 standard deviations above the
composite slope (of BDT defined stoves).  Non-catalyst
stoves showed more variance.  (see Appendix 5 for
examples.)  WHA wanted a cap of 20 g/hr, NRDC e^ al.,
wanted a cap of 15 g/hr.  Also unresolved was whether all
manufacturers would get the 2000 stove exemption, large
manufacturers be confined to exempt their smallest
"line," or small manufacturer (less than 2000) exemption
only (and not more than a base line previous
production). unresolved
COMMENTS ON THE FIFTH SESSION
There was substantial give and take and frequent
caucusing at the fifth session, which took a full two and a
half days to complete.  Some of the discussion became heated
at times.  At one point WHA suggested that they might
withdraw to which EPA countered by threatening that they would
write a stricter standard.  The STAPPA/ALAPCO representative
reminded WHA several times that over 100 areas were expected
to be non-compliant due to PMIO and that several states had
standards "waiting in the wings."  Progress continued to be
made, however.
There was again considerable discussion on the
exemption specifics.  WHA proposed several schemes for
determining exemptions.  Interestingly, WHA suggested that
2000 stove exemptions per manufacturer be marketable
although they had previously disagreed with EPA's
involvement in market issues.  WHA claimed that they needed
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a 300,000 stove "spillover" or almost all of what they had
estimated as total yearly production (EPA was to use
800,000/year in the September 1986 Federal Register Notice).
The Oregon representative commented that a percentage
reduction had advantages for SIP predictions:  it
better predicted how many stoves would be non-compliant.
Since one stove manufacturer had confided privately that he
thought there should be jio exemptions, WHA seemed to be
spending considerable time on what relatively may have been
a non-issue (given that an exemption for at least small -
<2000 - manufacturers was already resolved).
The issue of certification procedure was also discussed
at length.  Principles of the logjam relief and audit
programs were worked out with few major areas of contention.
Details suoh as what constituted audit failure were left to
an interim task force to work out by the last session in
August.
The "environmental coalition" had presented their
proposal first:  a 1990 standard of 3.1 g/hr for catalysts
and 6.9 g/hr for non-catalysts (based on CONEG weighting),
stating that the 6.9 g/hr "should be reachable by 1990."
Only after logjam relief and other issues were essentially
resolved did WHA present its last level-of-standards
proposal.  WHA proposed essentially the Oregon 1988
standards for July 1988 and 4.1 g/hr for catalysts, 8.9 g/hr
for non-catalysts for the 1990 standard (also CONEG
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weighted).  WHA had come a substantial distance from its
original proposals (see Table 19).  The final agreement was
actually a compromise.  It was somewhat confused by the
juxtapositioning of CONEG and Oregon weighting systems.
Since the conversion factor between the two is dependent on
the emission/burn rate profile, the equivalences of the
various proposals were perhaps obscured.  Actually, NRDC et
al. acquiesced on catalytic stoves (3 g/hr Oregon = 4.1 g/hr
CONEG for catalyst BDT) but WHA met them more or less half
way on non-catalytic stoves (7.5 g/hr Oregon =7.5 g/hr
CONEG for non-catalytic BDT).
WHA maintained its insistance on a 20 g/hr non-
catalytic cap, so the non-catalytic standard essentially
remained unresolved.  Nonetheless, substantial "give and
take" had occurred.  Most observers felt that the last
session should proceed smoothly with only a few details left
to be resolved.
THE SIXTH SESSION
At the outset of the sixth meeting, convenor Philip
Harter presented an agenda of twelve topics with yet
unresolved differences.  Only one of these involved the
numerical level of the standard itself.  The other eleven
were relatively less controversial.
Four of these were basically refinements of the
certification procedures.  These included enforcement
provisions/audit program details; logjam relief details;
laboratory accredation details; and grandfathered stove
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provisions.  All parties had already agreed in principle to
the need for these provisions.  Many of the details had been
worked out by interim groups to address some of the concerns
expressed at the fifth meeting.  For example, inter-lab
reliability factor data were essential in determining what
would constitute a "major flunk" in the alternate
certification procedure.  It was agreed that an excess of
50% would be a statistically significant violation and would
trigger immediate (72 hr) certification revocation.
Three of the topics were basically technical in nature:
conversion of emission limits from Oregon to CONEG
weighting, correlation of test methods, and attitude
adjustment.  The first of these was essential to the writing
of the standard and involved the determination of the most
appropriate BDT population.  The latter two were essentially
19based on how to interpret best available data.    It was
decided that no altitude allowance would be given for
regular certification purposes since high altitude labs
could be pressurized to duplicate the BDT data base.
Provision was made, however, for an altitude adjustment
factor in grandfathered stoves, alternative certification
tests, and enforcement audit tests.
19
Although seemingly appropriate semantically, a log-
log best fit approximation factor was rejected in favor of
the average ASTM-0M7 correlation determined by three test
labs.
129
Details were also easily resolved in the labeling and
affected facility issues.  In labeling, it was decided that
the permanent label should contain enforcement information,
the temporary label should present comparative information,
and the owner's manual should contain operating and
maintenance information.  Details of how this information
would be portrayed were resolved.  A default efficiency was
allowed in lieu of actual standard efficiency test results.
On the affected facilities issue, boilers (i.e. water
heaters) and furnaces (as defined by Canadian and American
safety codes) were exempted.  This did not, however, preclude
EPA from eventually reconsidering if data should later
warrant their inclusion.
The question of catalyst warranty was finally resolved.
A third year non-prorated warranty on substrate damage would
be required after July 1, 1990.  CFA had argued against the
concept of prorated warranties from the outset as not
in the consumer's best interest, being basically an
assured-sales gimmick.
The two remaining topics, the one-year exemption and
the non-catalyst cap specifications were the most
contentious.  It was finally agreed that only small
manufacturers (<2000/yr) would be exempted up to a maximum
of 2000 or production from July 1, 1987 to the compliance
date July 1, 1988.  This was resolved concurrently with the
cap question.
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The NRDC e_t ai_l. had proposed a 7.2 g/hr standard with a
15 g/hr straight line cap for non-catalyst stoves.  WHA
amended its 20 g/hr cap proposal to settle on a 15 g/hr cap
up to 1.5 kg/hr burn rate and 18 g/hr over 1.5 kg/hr .  This
accommodated the concern for the low burn rate - high
emission tendency of non-catalyst stoves, but allowed more
flexibility than the NRDC e_t al . proposal.
It was also resolved that the members appeal to EPA
Administrator Lee Thomas to adequately fund the EPA
involvement necessary to carry out the provisions of the
agreement.  Executive Secretary Chris Kirtz (Director of
EPA's Regulatory Negotiation Project, assured the group that
the Administrator had pledged his support if consensus were
reached.  The 0MB representative, however, suggested that
EPA might have sent someone to the negotiating table who
could have guaranteed adequate EPA funding support.
COMMENTS ON THE SIXTH SESSION
Although most of the substantive issues had already
been worked out, the sixth and final meeting was the most
vocal.  The final two issues were not resolved until late
the second day.  The environmental consequences of the
difference between a 15 g/hr cap and a 20 g/hr cap are
probably not significant since each stove must pass the
user-established burn rate profile weighting.  It would be
an extremely rare circumstance for a user to burn
exclusively in the worst burn rate of a given stove.  Yet it
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appeared at times that the entire proceedings might be
jeopardized by this one sub-issue.
This last minute, face-saving posturing may be a lesson
to be learned in scheduling the agenda for negotiations.  If
time for a sixth meeting had not been available (the EPA's
scheduled NAPCTAC meeting in September precluded another
reg-neg meeting if a January 1987 proposal date were to be
met) it is likely that the last minute trepidations would
have coincided with substantive issues.  While commentors
cited in chapter 5 agree that a deadline for agreement is a
necessity to successful negotiation, it is apparent that too
inflexible a deadline can be a detriment.
A draft copy of the latest compilation of the final
agreements included in Appendix 1.  It is the version
submitted to the NAPCTAC meeting September 1985.  Amendments
may be made before official publication scheduled for
January 1, 19 87.
Table 20 summarizes the issues discussed in this
chapter.  It is clear that the major agreements occurred in
the fourth and fifth sessions.  The discussion above has
shown how these issues were interdependent.  Some of these
interdependencies may not have been clear to all
participants at the outset but their importance became more
apparent as the negotiations progressed.
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COMMENTS ON THE ROLE OF 0MB
"When a government agency can find nothing better
to do than to attempt to regulate how individual
Americans burn wood in a fireplace, we have
reached the point at which all reason has
vanished from the government's„effort and non¬
sense is the rule of the day"
For most of the participants in the negotiations it was
clear who represented whom and what their interests were.
Some of these overt interests have been discussed in Chapter
6.  The roles of some other participants warrant more
discussion.  Some have suggested that EPA was most concerned
with setting any regulation relieving them of their court
obligation, but the evidence indicates that EPA primarily
wanted a "workable and durable" rule.  For two of the
participants, however, there remain questions regarding whom
they represented and what their underlying interests were.
Any WHA "covert agenda," or lack of such, is discussed in
the next chapter.  The role of 0MB will be discussed here.
Partly from an attempt to coordinate government
regulatory philosophy and specifically from their review of
the positive benefit-cost criterion of executive order 12291,
20
Letter from concerned citizen to President Reagan,
October 29, 1985, RWC Docket II-D.
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the Office of Management and Budget has gained considerable
regulatory oversight power in recent years.  In effect, 0MB
reviews all agency decisions for reasonableness and
consistency of purpose, the latter being often a subject of
contention between an administration's interpretation of its
electoral mandate and the agency's interpretation of its
congressional mandate.
Although not listed as a participant, 0MB was included
in the conferee list as an "observer."  Its presence had
been suggested by NRDC's David Doniger in the Sept. 1984
reg-neg feasibility meeting.  One commentor has observed
that participation by 0MB reduces the real - or perceived -
potential for parties to undermine the negotiating process
by making "end runs" to 0MB (Perritt 1986).  The point of
negotiations is to get all interests likely to influence the
substance of the regulation to communicate directly with
each other.  The participation of 0MB is therefore
appropriate and perhaps necessary in regulatory negotiations
in general.  The nature of its role is more obscure.
At times, the 0MB observer seemed to be an advocate for
the WHA interests and was perceived as such by some of the
WHA members.  One member commented that only 0MB kept EPA
from imposing excessive regulations; another member,
however, felt that EPA's place in the negotiations was
actually mid-ground between WHA and NRDC and that 0MB did
not really side with WHA.
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The last few lines of the RWC Federal Advisory
Committee Charter lead one to suspect that 0MB is wary of
the negotiated regulation process.  At 0MB's request it was
stated that this approval would not imply future reg-neg
approval.
The reg-neg process, by its incremental development of
consensus among affected parties, can in effect limit 0MB's
power of blanket approval or disapproval (sometimes without
comment). According to 0MB statistics, almost a quarter of
all rules sent to 0MB for review were changed last year at
the budget office's direction (Washington Post, June 30
1986) .
The office has been accused of "sitting on regulations,
weakening them, intimidating bureaucrats not to propose
them, undermining their implementation, holding private
meetings with industry and operating in secret" (Washington
Post, June 30 1986).  Due to congressional reaction to these
complaints, 0MB agreed to fuller disclosures wherein all
drafts of proposed rules would be made available to the
public before and after OMB's sugested changes with the
reasons for them.  Previously, only the published version of
a rule, in which OMB's revisions could not be tracked, was
available.  These changes do not decrease OMB's authority
but make it more accountable to its Congressional and public
oversight. Accordingly, the more public nature of its role
in the reg-neg process should not be substantially different
from its role in more formal rule-making procedures.
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Perhaps as an adjunct to its role as an advocate for
regulatory relief, 0MB has often suggested that market-
oriented mechanisms generally be used as incentives as an
alternative to more rigid agency rulemaking.  The use of
economic incentives for environmental protection has been a
much disputed subject.  There is an apparent impasse between
0MB's proclivity for market solutions and EPA's intact
regulatory machinery.  Thomas C. Schelling has observed,
"There is a discrepancy between the approach of economists
to environmental protection and the approach of nearly
everyone else.  Prohibition and other modes of regulation
are exceptions to [economists'] general presumption"
(emphasis added) (Schelling 1983).  Economic incentives are
not in the usual EPA NSPS development process.  An NSPS
must, however, "take into account the cost of achieving such
emission control" (CAA Section 111(a)(1)).
It is debatable that market-related incentives are
less obtrusive to industry than traditional hard-and-fast
rules.  Mid-way through the fourth session of the
negotiations, the 0MB representative proposed an alternative
schedule for phasing in new standards, wherein the sales-
weighted average emissions of stoves meeting the initial
standards (to be negotiated in the committee, but presumably
to be less strict) would be used to set a subsequent new
21
standard.    In effect if 50% of the stoves sold
21
0MB suggested every four years - the same time that
the standard would ordinarily be up for review.
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achieved 50% better results than the required standard in
spite of their anticipated excess price, while the remaining
50% just met the standard, then the next phase standard
would automatically adjust to require 25% lower emissions.
Since there would thus seem little incentive to decrease
emissions below the NSPS other than to put other companies
not able to do better than the standard out of business, 0MB
additionally suggested that credits (for example in stove-
grams per hour below the standard) be allowed to accrue
which could then be sold, within a year, to manufacturers
not able to meet the new standard.  This would presumably
drive up the price of the more polluting stoves.  Fewer
would then be sold which would again lower the resultant new
sales-weighted emission average for the second term.  This
procedure would thus define the next best demonstrated
technology (BDT).  To limit the downward spiral effect a
lower bound was suggested.
This procedure obviously has interest to
environmentalists who might question whether regular
standard review in four years would be likely to occur or
otherwise if review might even loosen standards.  The EPA
could either object to its loss of influence four years down
the road, or welcome the automatic nature of the proposal.
When WHA proposed a variation on marketable credits in
the final negotiations EPA was not able to consider the use
of "credits" without higher-level EPA approval.  Certainly
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0MB was aware of this.  One manufacturer remarked that
whereas EPA positions had been distributed in staff papers
in advance of each session, and whereas both Oregon and WHA
had sent similar notices, the 0MB proposal seemed more or
less "out of the blue."  Such a novel concept would require
considerable economic analysis by the industry in order even
to form a reasonable opinion on its merits; why then did 0MB
wait until the fourth (and originally the last scheduled)
substantive negotiation session to propose it? If the 0MB
were WHA's supposed advocate, and if such a proposal were to
be taken seriously, industry support would be critical.  Yet
no advance notice of this proposal was sent to the
participants.
It is perhaps regrettable that more effort could not
have been given to what might have been a credible case for
market incentives.  Unfortunately those who propose such
designs often "have not devised in sufficient detail for
implementation, the schemes that their general reasoning
leads them to admire and sometimes to advocate" (Thomas C.
Schelling 1983).
OMB's role in these negotiations, and its position on
reg-neg in general, is thus unclear.  On the one hand, the
committee process itself is in a sense a market test in that
it reflects the interests of those affected by the
regulation.  A market-oriented 0MB should not have major
concerns with an agreement reached by a consensus which
implies that each participant has determined that he/she is
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better off with the regulation.  On the other hand, 0MB had
raised several objections before approving the RWC Advisory
Committee charter - namely the use of the resource pool for
travel (although this use was specifically recommended by
ERM-McGlennon), a lower maximum number of conferees (also
against ERM-McGlennon suggestions) and finally questioning
the continued use of reg-neg in general.  Curiously, at one
time 0MB had been supportive of the process and had promised
a 24-hour turn-around on any notice that was based on a
consensus (Harter 1986).  That policy has since been
rescinded, however, and 0MB appears ambivalent, although it
has so far approved each consensus-based regulation.  It
would appear that 0MB may be experiencing a "loss of turf"
and yet can find no substantive grounds on which to object.
When asked about 0MB's official position, their
representative responded that there really was none as such,
that 0MB was internally pro and con.  Regarding the lack of
interest in the marketable credit proposal, he felt that
both the NRDC and WHA were afraid of the uncertainty.  0MB's
main objection to the RWC reg-negs, he stated, was that the
small manufacturers - "who keep the large manufacturers
honest" - were underrepresented.  Moreover, if this had been
a full-time-schedule regulation, he felt that EPA would have
devised a prototype design or plan which small manufacturers
could "plug into" to stay in business.  He did not mention.
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however, that this could be interpreted as a design standard
which the woodstove industry did not want.
Although it may be true that small manufacturers were
underrepresented, it is not clear that this was by design
(see Chapter 10).  Early in the negotiations EPA had
proposed a 2,000 stove exemption for the first year
primarily to give small manufacturers more time.  Also, EPA
had ascertained that there would be certifiable designs
available on the market that a small manufacturer could buy,
although this issue was not raised in negotiations.  While
0MB's suspicions that WHA did not represent the small
manufacturer's interests may have been affirmed at times -
such as when WHA proposed that the one year exemption be set
at a percentage of the baseline production for each
manufacturer - the fact that WHA rescinded that position
after caucus suggests that the small manufacturer interests
did indeed have a voice that was heard.
OMB's contention that the small manufacturers keep the
large ones honest may actually be somewhat inaccurate in the
RWC industry.  Many "small" manufacturers are actually
subdivisions of larger firms which saw excess profits
available in woodstoves in the 1970s.  Many of these
companies are not interested in design development, and some
would probably have expired in the unregulated market.  The
truly small one-man shop operation will indeed have a
problem, but many others will survive.  In fact, according
to a Missoula, Montana test lab owner, it is the small
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manufacturers who will be the innovators in emission
control.  They are already coming up with new designs while
many large manufacturers (though not all) tend to "stick
with what works" with little incentive to innovate.
CHAPTER X
COMMENTS ON INTERVIEWS WITH
WOODSTOVE MANUFACTURERS
In order to investigate questions regarding the
woodstove industry's participation in the regulatory
negotiations, individual stove manufacturers were
interviewed.  Names of stove manufacturers in North Carolina
and the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia were obtained from the
EPA's Section 114 questionnaire mailing list and from Wood
'n' Energy's 1985 and 1986 Buyer's Guide issues.  It was
felt that this method would accurately sample a cross-
section of the industry.  In total, twenty-two manufacturers
were contacted.
The most important information gained from these
interviews was that the wood smoke industry is very diverse,
both in plant size and in perception of RWC regulation and
how it will affect them.  It was, in fact, apparent that
size was not the only criterion influencing NSPS impact.  One
large manufacturer had not yet produced a certified stove,
although another "medium" (about 2500 stoves/yr) already
sold 60% catalyst models.  The observation that smaller
manufacturers may be more innovative was supported in that
14 3
two small companies had plans on line to produce pellet-
burning stoves.
Another aspect of the diversity was apparent in the
"medium" manufacturers.  For some of these, woodstoves were a
side line which had become less profitable.  One said they
probably would get out of the business.  Others were more
positive and felt that regulation would help the industry
improve its product.  Small manufacturers also showed this
dichotomy, with some being unaware of the pending regulations
and what they would mean, and others already starting to
plan for them.
To those manufacturers familiar with the reg-neg
developments, the main criticism was that the test
conditions didn't duplicate real use and that stoves would
be too small and wouldn't burn overnight.  (The low burn
rate requirements would mollify this complaint.)  Many did
not feel RWC emissions were a problem in the Southeast.  One
manufacturer feared an emergence of a black market for
uncertified stoves.  He explained that the many inferior
stoves that had proliferated during the stove boom were
finally disappearing from the market but would return.  This
concern was not explicitly addressed in the negotiations.
It would be unfortunate if EPA's Enforcement and Compliance
Division allowed complying manufacturers to be hurt by an
illegal market.  In fact, the EAB model predicted that low-
heat-requirement areas would tend to buy the more polluting
stoves.
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Only about half the manufacturers contacted were WHA
members.  One member felt that most WHA members joined only
for the WHA's yearly woodstove trade show - that only the
large manufacturers were on the WHA Board of Directors.
A WHA poll, however, had shown that most manufacturers
favored national regulations of some type and few complaints
were heard on WHA's involvement.  Nonetheless, WHA
membership dues are proportional to the members' production,
so WHA is financially tied to large manufacturers.  Also
there is an unknown number of very small manufacturers not
contacted who were not on the EPA or Wood 'n' Energy lists:
WHA has essentially no financial incentive to represent
them.  The relevant issue is:  do they have basically
different interests?  The case of one small (less than
300/yr) non-WHA manufacturer indicates this may not be the
case.  He already sells 10% catalyst stoves because of
consumer demand and has been very impressed with their
performance.  He did not feel regulations would hurt his
business.
The interviews indicated that the NSPS will definitely
hurt some and probably help others.  Essentially, the less
efficient and less innovative manufacturers will be hurt.
It is not clear that large manufacturers will definitely
benefit although the impact on the small manufacturers
contacted will no doubt be greater.  A NSPS will clearly
change the rules of the game.
CHAPTER   XI
SUMMARY   AND   CONCLUSIONS
Although the concept of negotiation is not new, it has
only recently been applied to new areas as an alternative to
22
more traditional adversarial decision processes.   Indeed,
the 1980's may turn out to be the decade of mediation.
Although each negotiation is unique, several observations
can be made that apply to regulatory negotiation in general.
The most obvious conclusions one might draw from the
RWC reg-neg process are that the issues most important to
one participant were not necessarily the issues most
important to the others and that subsequently the mediation
process is not a "linear" one.  Mediation is not simply a
process wherein two opposing sides start from their
respective positions and then meet at some compromised
midpoint determined by the relative strengths of the
opposing sides.  It is rather a process much like multi-
objective optimization whereby each of perhaps many parties
uses the negotiation forum to identify the aspects of
various issues that are most important to itself.  Through
22
Even such traditional adversaries as car owners and
auto mechanics are utilizing mediation procedures to resolve
disputes in several locally sponsored programs (NIASE
Newsletter, August 1986).
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the negotiation process these aspects are weighed against
the various concerns of the other parties.  If the
appropriate facts are adequately communicated it is
conceivably possible to minimize the net adverse affects of
a regulation while maximizing the net desired effects - each
party having concurrently a different measurement of the
relative value of each effect.  Another related conclusion
is that this allows parties to discuss the issues and their
implications at a timely manner - before decisions are made
and before the regulatory machinery is set in motion.  This
is a concept which is deficient in the traditional
rulemaking process.
The RWC regulatory negotiations particularly
illustrated these precepts.  The "environmental coalition"
for example had within itself many different priorities.
Moreover, it is evident that EPA's priorities coincided with
neither the WHA nor NRDC et a_l.  The standard that EPA might
have written by its traditional procedures would very likely
have been quite different, particularly in areas such as
consumer interests or fire safety where it had little
expertise or agenda.  Also EPA may not have otherwise been
as aware of WHA's scheduling concerns.  The timely
consideration of WHA's logjam proposals may actually have
allowed EPA to set a stricter standard than if these had
been addressed after a standard had been set.  It is
difficult to suppose that all of the considerations
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expressed in the reg-neg meetings would have arisen in the
traditional notice and comment process.
The RWC emission reg-neg process thus demonstrated that
negotiation can be not only a viable alternative but even a
superior alternative to traditional rulemaking.  All of the
participants apparently were satisfied that the agreement
reached had adequately addressed their concerns, or at least
had bettered their "Best Alternative to Negotiated
Agreement" (BATNA) (see Perritt 1986 p. 404).  NRDC got a
standard which reasonably assured that RWC-generated POM
would be minimized, at least for new stoves.  It would seem
23
unreasonable to regulate existing stoves nationwide.    The
state air pollution agencies got a standard in terms easily
related to emission predictions that they might use on their
24
PMIO attainment plans.    WHA got a much stricter standard
than they would have written themselves but their major
scheduling concerns were met.  Most importantly, they had
surpassed their "BATNA" - which was their presumption upon
entering negotiations (see chapter 6).  EPA got a standard
- on an accelerated schedule - which met its POM obligations
and would help areas meet the pending PMIO standards as
23
In fact NRDC had agreed that they would not press EPA
to decrease POM emissions from existing woodstoves if EPA
would set new stove regulations on an accelerated schedule.
Reg-neg met this schedule.
24
EPA's refusal to authorize an altitude factor will
however lessen the credit that high altitude states will be
allowed to use for RWC emission reduction predictions.
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well. Moreover, the standard would be less susceptible to
court challenges since all parties affected presumably had
been involved in the decision.
It is not altogether clear that a strict formula can be
drawn up to predict success.  Many of the tenets set forth
in chapter 5 applied, but some did not.  It is apparent that
there should be enough flexibility to adapt these guidelines
to each case.  For example, commentors on mediation
techniques (see chapter 5) agree that the first sessions
should be reserved for less contentious issues,
communication of appropriate facts and for defining areas of
concern.  The scheduling of issues is an important
consideration.  Subsequent sessions should focus the issues
and pinpoint the areas of contention - then positions can be
taken and compromises made.  In the RWC reg-negs, however,
it was necessary to introduce the relatively contentious
issue of efficiency testing in the first session.  It was
important that each of the participants knew where the
others stood on the issues.  Nonetheless, contentious issues
are probably best avoided at the initial negotiations.
Related to the importance of this judicious use of
issue scheduling at the beginning, the RWC reg-negs also
demonstrated a need for flexibility at the end - without
violating the "imposed time constraint" tenet.  Although
most substantive issues were resolved within the five
sessions originally scheduled, a sixth session proved to be
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essential to an agreement.  If this flexibility had not been
available, it is likely that an agreement might not have
been reached.  The NAPCTAC meeting scheduled for September
1986 put a limit on this flexibility.  Whether by design or
by chance, the RWC time constraints appear to have been
optimal.
There are, however, several EPA procedural decisions
which seem to have been problematic - both having to do with
the "equal power" tenet expressed in chapter 5.  One is the
applicability of the EPA's Economic Analysis Branch (EAB)
model or more generally, the use of programmed decision
analysis (see pp. 111-112).  The EAB model was in existence
primarily because of E012291 and the Regulatory Flexibility
Act requirements but it was also introduced as a rationale
for EPA's position on some of the issues.  Debate on its
assumptions consumed much valuable time for little apparent
product.  Programmable decision analysis is a powerful tool,
but it presumes not only that the data assumptions are
correct but also that the model itself is correct (see
footnote 14).  The assumptions can be debated but the model
itself is a "black box" except to econometric experts.  As
participants became better acquainted with this model, they
were more accepting of it yet considerable relatively
unproductive time was spent discussing the model's
assumptions.
An additional lesson might be the impropriety of the
EPA "triumvirate" present at the first few meetings. It is
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not evident that EPA required such a show of strength - it
already had the power to write a rule if the negotiations
had broken down and it is not clear that the extra presence
helped the process.  In other circumstances, for example
with an industry more experienced with regulatory
maneuvering, this may not be the case.  This is not the kind
of criterion easily expressed in a list of "rules for
successful negotiations."  It also emphasizes the continuous
assessment and flexibility necessary during the process to
assure the likelihood of success.  Nonetheless, the
importance of individual personalities, and of course the
skills of the negotiators, cannot be overemphasized.  This
is an attribute which may be impossible to characterize in a
list of rules.
The RWC regulatory negotiations serve as a
demonstration of how mediation can be applied to a technical
problem where the interests involved are diverse.  It is
likely that other candidates exist for regulatory
negotiation and negotiated rulemaking in particular.  As EPA
and the regulated community gather experience with
negotiation, they will be able not only to better choose
"successes" a_  prior i but also to more advantageously set
procedures.
A FINAL NOTE
Missoula, Montana health director Elaine Bild has
recently reported, "...We are not seeing a huge decrease in
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air pollution but we know that less wood is burned in the
city" (Wood 'n' Energy, October 1986 p. 11).  In Denver,
however, the Metro Air Council will still initiate mandatory
no-burn days.  The same issue of Wood 'n' Energy also had a
feature article entitled, "An Inside Look at Coal Stoves."
It will be interesting to see if "coal only" stove sales
increase when the standards take effect - and more
interesting to see what is being burned in them.  The reg-
neg agreements specifically do not prevent EPA from later
regulating non-affected facilities so any notable increase
in coal burning or evidence of circumvention via the "coal
only" exemption could initiate further EPA action.
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APPENDIX   1
RWC   EMISSION   REGULATORY   NEGOTIATION
LEGAL   COMMITTEE   DRAFT
U.S.    EPA,    OCTOBER   1986
Re9 Neg Legal Coaiittee Draft - (10/2/86)
PART 60 [AMENDED]
It is proposed that 40 CFR Part 60 be amended as follows:
1. The authority citation for Part 60 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Sees. 101, 111, 114, 301(a), Clean Air Act as
amended (42 Q.S.C. 7401, 7411, 7414, 7601).
2. By adding a new Subpart AAA consisting of S5  60.530
through 60.539 as follows:
Subpart AAA - Standards of Performance for Residential Wood
Heaters
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Subpart AAA - Standards of Performance for Residential Wood
Heaters
S  60.530 Applicability and designation of affected facility.
(a) The affected facility to which the provisions of this
subpart apply is each wood heater manufactured on or after
July 1/ 1988 or sold at retail on or after July 1, 1990. The
provisions of this subpart do not apply to wood heaters
constructed prior to July 1, 1988, that are or have been owned by
a noncommercial owner for his personal use.
(b) Each affected facility shall comply with the applicable
emission limits in 5 60.532 unless exempted under paragraph (c),
(d), (e), (f) or (g) of this section.
(c)(1)   Within a model line, an affected facility
manufactured prior to July 1, 1990 is exempt from the
requirements in S 60.532 and shall be certified by the
Administrator if that model line has been issued a valid
certificate of compliance by the Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality prior to January 1, 1988, and meets the
Oregon 1988 standards for particulate matter emissions, provided
that
(A) The manufacturer requests the exemption in writing from
the Administrator, and certifies that the information used in
obtaining Oregon certification satisfied applicable requirements
of the Oregon law.
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(B) The certification test included at least one test run
at a burn rate'of less than 1.25 kg/hr; and
(C) No changes in components that may affect emissions have
been made to the model line that would require recertification
under S  60.533(lc).
(2) Affected facilities exempted under this paragraph may
not be sold at retail after July 1,  1992.
(3) Any certificate issued under this paragraph shall be
modified to reflect any modifications in Oregon certification
approved by the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality prior
to January 1, 1988.  The manufacturer shall notify the
Administrator of any such modifications within thirty days of
their approval by the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality.
(4) Upon denying a certificate under this subsection the
Administrator shall give written notice to the manufacturer
involved setting forth the basis for his determination.
(d) An affected facility is exempt from the applicable
emission limits of S 60.532, provided that (1) it was
manufactured between July 1, 1988 and June 30, 1989; (2) the
manufacturer was a manufacturer of wood heaters as of January 1,
1987, and manufactured fewer than 2,000 wood heaters between
July 1, 1987 and June 30, 1988; (3) the manufacturer manufactures
no more uncertified wood heaters between July 1, 1988 and
June 30, 1989 than it manufactured between July 1, 1987 and
June 30, 1988; and (4) the affected facility is sold at retail
before July 1, 1991.
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(e) Affected facilities manufactured in the U.S. for export
are exempt from the applicable emission limits of S 60.532.
(f) A wood heater used for research and development
purposes that is never offered for sale or sold is exempt from
the applicable emission limits of S 60.532.  No more than 50 wood
heaters manufactured per model line may be exempted for this
purpose.
(g) A coal-only heater is exempt from the applicable
emission limits of S 60.532.
(h) The following are not affected facilities and are not
subject to this subpart:
(1) Wood heaters modified or reconstructed as defined in
S 60.14 and $ 60.15 of Subpart A.




As used in this subpart, all terms not defined herein shall
have the meaning given them in the Act and Subpart A of this
part.
"At retail" means the sale by a commercial owner of a wood
heater to the ultimate purchaser.
"Boiler" means a solid fuel burning appliance used primarily
for heating spaces other than the space where the appliance is
-s-
locatedf by the distribution through pipes of a gas or fluid
heated in the Appliance.
"Coal-only heater" means an enclosed, coal-burning appliance
capable of and intended for space heating, domestic water
heating, or indoor cooking, which has all of the following
characteristics:
(a) art opening for loading coal which is located near the
top or front of the appliance;
(b) an opening for emptying ash which is located near the
bottom or the side of the appliance;
(c) an opening which admits air only up and through the
fuel bed;
(d) a grate or other similar device for shaking or
disturbing the fuel bed;
(e) installation instructions which state that the use of
wood in the stove except for coal ignition purposes is prohibited
by law; and
(f) the model was safety tested by a nationally recognized
safety-testing laboratory using coal only, except for coal
ignition purposes.
"Commercial owner" means any person who owns a wood heater
in the course of the manufacture, importation, distribution, or
sale of the wood heater.
"Furnace" means a solid fuel burning appliance used
primarily for heating spaces other than the space where the
appliance is located, by the distribution through ducts of air
heated in the appliance.
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"Manufactured** means completed and ready for shipment
(whether or not packaged).
"Manufacturer** means any person who constructs or imports a
wood heater.
"Model line" means all wood heaters offered for sale by a
single manufacturer that are similar in all material respects.
"Representative affected facility" means an individual wood
heater that is similar in all material respects to other wood
heaters within the model line it represents.
"Sale" means the transfer of ownership, except that transfer
of control shall not constitute a sale for purposes of
S 60.530(f).
"Similar in all material respects" means that the
construction materials, exhaust and inlet air system, and other
design features are within the allowed tolerances for components
identified in $ 60.533(k).
"Wood heater" means an enclosed, woodburning appliance
capable of and intended for space heating, domestic water
heating, or indoor cooking, that meets all of the following
criteria:
(a) An air-to-fuel ratio in the combustion chamber
averaging less than 35-to--l as determined by the test procedure
prescribed in $ 60.534;
(b) A usable firebox volume of less than 20 cubic feet;
(c) A minimum burn rate less than 5 kg/hr; and
(d) A maximum weight of 800 kg.
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S  60.532 Standards for particulate matter.
Unless exempted under S 60.530^ each affected facility
(a) Manufactured on or after July 1, 1988, or sold at
retail on or after July 1, 1990, shall comply with the following
particulate matter emission limitations as determined by the test
methods and procedures in S 60.534:
(1) An affected facility equipped with a catalytic
combustor shall not discharge into the atmosphere any gases which
contain particulate matter in excess of a weighted average of
5.5 g/hr.
(2) An affected facility not equipped with a catalytic
combustor shall not discharge into the atmosphere any gases which
contain particulate matter in excess of a weighted average of
8.5 g/hr.
(b) Manufactured on or after July 1, 1990, or sold at
retail on or after July 1, 1992, shall comply with the following
particulate matter emission limitations as determined by the test
methods and procedures in S 60.534:
(1) An affected facility equipped with a catalytic
combustor shall not discharge into the atmosphere any gases which
contain particulate matter in excess of a weighted average of
4.1 g/hr.  Particulate emissions during any test run at any burn
rate that is required to be used in the weighted average shall
exceed the value calculated for "C" calculated using the
following equation:
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(A) At burn rates less than or equal to 2.82 kg/hr,
C * 3.55-g/kg x BR *  4.98 g/hr, where
BR « burn rate in kg/hr
(B) At burn rates greater than 2.82 kg/hr, C » 15 g/hr.
(2) An affected facility not equipped with a catalytic
combustor shall not discharge into the atmosphere any gases which
contain particulate matter in excess of a weighted average of
7.5 g/hr. Particulate emissions shall not exceed IS g/hr during
any test run at a burn rate less than or equal to 1.5 kg/hr that
is required to be used in the weighted average, and particulate
emissions shall not exceed 18 g/hr during any test run at a burn
rate less than or equal to 1.5 kg/hr that is required to be used
in the weighted average.
S 60.533 Compliance and certification.
(a) For each model line, compliance with applicable
emission limits may be determined based on testing of
representative affected facilities within the model line.
(b) Any manufacturer of an affected facility may apply to
the Administrator for a certificate of compliance for a model
line. The application shall be in writing to:  Stationary Source
Compliance Division (EN-341), U.S. EPA, 401 M Street, S.W.,
Washington, O.C., 20460, Attention: Wood Heater Program.  The
application must be signed by the manufacturer, or an authorized
representative, and shall contain the following:
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(1) The model name and/or design number;
(2) A ptT&tograph of the tested unit;
(3) Engineering drawings and specifications of components
that may affect emissions (including specifications for each
component listed in paragraph (lc)(2) of this section).
Manufacturers shall identify tolerances of components of the
tested unit listed in paragraph (k)(2) of this section that are
different than those specified in that paragraph^ and demonstrate
that such tolerances may not reasonably be anticipated to cause
wood heaters in the model line to exceed the applicable emission
standards.
(4) All documentation pertaining to a valid certification
test, including the complete test report and raw data sheets;
laboratory technician notes, calculations, and test results for
all test runs.
(5) For catalytic wood heaters, a copy of the catalytic
combustor warranty;
(6) A statement that the manufacturer will conduct a
Quality Assurance Program for the model line which satisfies the
requirements of paragraph (o) of this section;
(7) A statement that the test unit was sealed by the
laboratory after the completion of certification testing; and
(8) A statement that the manufacturer will notify the
accredited laboratory if the application for certification is
granted, within thirty days of receipt of notification from EPA.
(c) If the affected facility is a catalytic wood heater,
the warranty for the catalytic combustor shall include the
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replacement of the combustor and any prior replacement combustor
without charge*to the consumer for:
(1) 2 years from the date the consumer purchased the heater
for any defects in workmanship or materials that prevent the
combustor from functioning when installed and operated properly
in the wood heater, and
(2) 3 years from the date the consumer purchased the heater
for thermal crumbling or disintegration of the substrate material
for heaters manufactured after July 1, 1990.
(d) The manufacturer of an affected facility equipped with
a catalytic combustor shall provide for a means to allow the
owner readily to gain access to the catalyst for inspection or
replacement purposes.
(e)(1) The Administrator shall issue a certificate of
compliance for a model line if he determines, based on all
information submitted by the applicant and any other relevant
information available to him, that:
(A) a valid certification test has demonstrated that the
wood heater representative of the model line complies with the
applicable particulate emission standard in S 60.532#
(B) any tolerances for components listed in paragraph
(k)(2) that are different than those specified in that paragraph
may not reasonably be anticipated to cause wood heaters in the
model line to exceed the applicable emission standard; and
(C) the requirements of paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and (m)
of this Section have been met.
-11-
(2) For the period between proposal of this subpart through
June 30r 1988f''an applicant may elect to have his application
determined under the requirements of subpart AAA proposed on
(date of proposal).
(3) Upon denying certification under this paragraph, the
Administrator shall give written notice to the manufacturer
setting forth the basis for his determination.
(f) To be valid, a certification test must be
(1) Announced to the Administrator at least 30 days prior
to such testing, pursuant to S 60.534;
(2) Conducted by a testing laboratory accredited by the
Administrator pursuant to S 60.535;
(3) Conducted on a wood heater similar in all material
respects to other wood heaters of the model line which is to be
certified; and
(4) Conducted in accordance with the test methods and
procedures specified in S 60.534.
(h)(l)(i) The Administrator on a monthly basis between
April 1, 1987 and July 1, 1990 shall determine whether an undue
certification delay exists, pursuant to subsection (2) of this
paragraph.  Such determinations shall be made on or about the
20th day of the month.
(ii) Any failure of the Administrator to make a required
determination under subsection (i) by the 30th day of any month
shall constitute a determination that an undue certification
delay exists.
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(iii) Any determination under subsection (i) or (ii) shall
remain in effect until superceded by a subsequent determination;
except that a determination under subsection (ii) shall remain in
effect for at least thirty (30) days.
(iv) The Administrator shall mail notice of all
determinations under subsection (i) or (ii) to all persons who
have requested in writing to receive them.
(2) An undue certification delay exists when the sum of the
average testing lead time and the certification lead time is
greater than six months.
(i) The average testing lead time shall be determined from
the information submitted by accredited laboratories pursuant to
S  60.538(h).  The average testing lead time is the simple average
of lead times reported under S 60.538(h)(2) for the previous
month.
(ii) The certification lead time shall be an estimate, as
of the date of the determination, of the time likely to be
required to determine whether to issue a certificate of
compliance for a complete application received on that date.
This estimate shall be based on such factors as past experience,
the number of applications to be processed, and the resources
available for processing.
(3) (i) While any determination under subsection (1) that
an undue certification delay exists is in effect, a manufacturer
may submit an application for alternative certification.
(ii) An application for alternative certification shall be
in writing to:  Stationary Source Compliance Division (EN-341),
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O.S. EPA, 401 M Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20460,
Attention; Wood Heater Program.  The application must be signed
by the manufacturer, or an authorized representative, and contain
the following:
(A) The documentation required under subsections
(b)(1) - (6) of this section, except that, in
applying subsection (b)(4), subsections
(f)(1) - (3) shall not apply;
(B) Evidence of compliance with paragraphs (c),
(d) and (m) of this section;
(C) A statement that a representative affected
facility for the model line in question has
been tested in accordance with 5  60.534(a),
and meets applicable emission standards in
S 60.532.  Such testing may be conducted in
any laboratory of the manufacturer's choice;
(0)  A statement identifying the month which will
be the end of the manufacturer's production
year for that model;
(E) Evidence that the manufacturer has scheduled
with an accredited laboratory the testing
required for full certification under this
subpart at the earliest feasible date;
(F) Evidence that the manufacturer has notified
the laboratory, that he intends to apply for
alternative certification; and
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(G)  A conimitment to report the results of the
tes€ing required for full certification to
the Administrator,
(iii)  Test results not obtained under pressurized




E » measured emissions in g/hr at ALTj^
AAF * altitude adjustment factor where,
AAF « ^^L - 300  ͣͨ 1.0
—Wmi—
ALTr " altitude above mean sea level of laboratory infeet
(4)(i)  Submission of an application for alternative
certification pursuant to subparagraph (3) automatically renders
a model line certified thirty days after receipt of the
application for alternative certification by the Administrator,
unless alternative certification is sooner denied, on the basis
that the application is not complete, or that the test results do
not show compliance with the applicable emission standards in
S  60.532.  Except as provided in subsections (4)(ii) through
(4}(iv) of this paragraph, alternative certification shall expire
on the earlier of (A) the completion of the manufacturer's
production year during which the Administrator takes action under
paragraph (e) of this section on an application for
certification; or (B) twelve months after such action.
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(ii) lit  in any certification tests performed pursuant to
subparagraph (3)(ii)(E) and (F), the affected facility exceeds
the applicable emission standards in section 60.532 by greater
than a 50% deviation, alternative certification pursuant to this
paragraph shall expire 72 hours after the manufacturer receives
notification from the laboratory of the test results, which
satisfies subsection (4)(v).
(iii)  Iff in any certification test performed under
subparagraph (3)(ii), the affected facility exceeds the
applicable emission standards in section 60.532, alternative
certification pursuant to this paragraph shall expire 72 hours
after the manufacturer receives notification satisfying
subsection (4)(v) from the laboratory of the test results, if
such notification is received within 100 days of the date on
which the manufacturer scheduled the certification test.
(iv) Alternative certification shall expire 72 hours after
the manufacturer receives notification from the Administrator
that the manufacturer has failed to meet a scheduled commitment
for certification testing.
(V) Any notification under subsection (4)(ii) or (4)(iii)
of this paragraph shall include a copy of a preliminary test
report from the accredited laboratory.  The accredited laboratory
shall provide a preliminary test report to the manufacturer and
to the Administrator within ten days of the completion of
testing, if a wood heater exceeds the applicable emission
standard in S 60.532 in certification testing.
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(i) An applicant for certification may apply for a waiver
of the requirement to submit the results of a certification test
pursuant to subsection (1)(4), if the wood heaters of the model
line are similar in all material respects to another model line
that has already been issued a certificate of compliance. A
manufacturer that seeks a waiver of certification testing must
identify the model line that has been certified and must submit a
copy of an agreement with the owner of the design permitting the
applicant to produce wood heaters of that design.
(j)(l) Unless sooner revoked by the Administrator, a
certificate of compliance shall be valid:
(A) To and including June 30, 1990, for a model line
certified as meeting emissions standards in $ 60.532(a); and
(B) For five years from the date of issuance, for a model
line certified as meeting emission standards in S 60.532(b).
(2) Upon application for renewal of certification by the
manufacturer, the Administrator may waive the requirement for
certification testing upon determining that the model line
continues to meet the requirements for certification in
paragraph (e) of this section, or that a waiver of certification
is otherwise appropriate.
(3) Upon waiving certification testing under this
paragraph, the Administrator shall give written notice to the
manufacturer setting forth the basis for his determination.
(k)(l) A model line must be recertified whenever any change
is made in the design submitted pursuant to S 60.533(b)(4) that
is presumed to affect the particulate emission rate for that
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model line.  The Administrator may waive this requirement upon
written request by the manufacturer, if he determines that the
change may not reasonably be anticipated to cause wood heaters in
the model line to exceed the applicable emission standards.  The
grant of such a waiver does not relieve the manufacturer of any
compliance obligations under this subpart.
(2) Any change in the indicated characteristics of the
following components is presumed to affect particulate emissions
if that change exceeds a tolerance specified in engineering
drawings submitted with the certification application, or, if no
tolerance is so specified, ^1/4 inch for any linear dimension and
^5 percent for dimensions relating to air introduction systems:
(A) Firebox:  dimensions;
(B) Air introduction systems:  cross-sectional area of
restrictive air inlets, outlets, and location and method of
control;
(C) Baffles: dimensions and locations;
(0)  Refractory/insulation:  dimensions, and location;
(E) Catalyst:  dimensions, and location;
(F) Catalyst bypass mechanism: dimensions and location;
(G) Flue gas exit:  location and dimensions; and
(H) Ooor and catalyst bypass gaskets:  dimensions and fit.
(3) Any change in the materials used for the following
components is presumed to affect emissions:
(A) Refractory/insulation;
(B) Ooor and catalyst bypass gaskets;
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(C)  Firebox.
(4) A change in the make, model, or composition of a
catalyst is presumed to affect emissions, unless the change has
been approved in advance by the Administrator.
(1)(1) The Administrator may revoke a certificate of
compliance if he determines that the wood heaters being produced
in that model line do not comply with the requirements of this
section or section 60.532.  Such a determination shall be based
on all available evidence, including:
(A) Test data from a re-testing of the original unit on
which the certification test was conducted;
(B) A finding that the certification test was not valid;
(C) A finding that the labeling of the wood heater does not
comply with the requirements of $ 60.536 or $ 60.537.
(D) Failure by the manufacturer to comply with reporting
and recordkeeping requirements under S  60.538;
(E) Physical examination showing that a significant
percentage of production units inspected are not similar in all
material respects to the representative affected facility
submitted for testing; or
(F) Failure of the manufacturer to conduct a quality
assurance program in conformity with S 60.533(0).
(2) Revocation of certification under this subsection shall
not take effect until the manufacturer concerned has been given
written notice by the Administrator setting forth the basis for
the proposed determination and an opportunity for to request a
hearing under S 60.539.
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(3) Determination to revoke certification based upon audit
testing shall be made only in accordance with paragraph (p) of
this section.
(m) A catalyst-equipped wood heater shall be equipped with
a permanent provision to accommodate a commercially available
temperature sensor which can monitor combustor gas stream
temperatures within or immediately downstream (within 1 inch) of
the combustor surface.
(n) Any manufacturer of an affected facility that is
subject under §  60.530(b) to the applicable emission limits of
this Subpart and does not belong to a model line certified under
this section shall cause that facility to be tested in an
accredited laboratory in accordance with subparagraphs (f)(1)/
(f)(2)/ and (f)(4)/ of this section before it leaves the
manufacturers hands and shall report the results to the
Administrator.
(o)(l)  For each certified model line/ the manufacturer
shall conduct a quality assurance program satisfying the
requirements of this paragraph.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (5) of this paragraph,
the manufacturer or his authorized representative shall inspect
at least one out of every 150 units produced within a model line,
to determine that the wood heater is within applicable tolerances
for all components that affect emissions as listed in paragraph
(k)(2) of this section.
(3) (A) Except as provided in subsection (5) of this
paragraph/ the manufacturer or his authorized representative
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shall conduct emissions tests on affected facilities produced
within a model line certified under S 60.533(e) or S 60.533(h),




70% or less,of std.
Within 30% of std.
If yearly production
< or » 2500
When directed by EPA,





Every 10,000 stoves or
triennially (whichever
is more frequent)
Every 5,000 stoves or
annually (whichever
is more frequent)____
(B) Emission tests shall be conducted in conformity with
S 60.534(a), using the same test method and procedure used to
obtain certification. The manufacturer shall notify EPA by U.S.
mail that an emissions test required pursuant to this paragraph
will be conducted within one week of the mailing of the
notification.
(4)  The manufacturer shall take remedial measures, as
appropriate, when inspection or testing pursuant to this
paragraph indicate that affected facilities within the model line
are not within applicable tolerances or do not comply with
applicable emission limits. Manufacturers shall record the
problem identified, the extent of the problem, the remedial
measures taken, and the effect of those measures as projected by
the manufacturer or determined by any additional testing.
(5)(A)  If two consecutive passing tests are conducted under
either subsection (2) or (3) of this paragraph, the required
frequency of testing under the applicable subsection(s) shall be
modified as follows:  skip every other required test.
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(B) If five consecutive passing tests are conducted under
the modified schedule provided for in subsection (A),  the
required frequency of testing under the applicable subsection
shall be further modified as follows:  skip three consecutive
required tests after each required test that is conducted.
(C) Testing shall resume on the frequency specified in
the subsection (2) or (3), as applicable, if a test failure
results in any test conducted under a modified schedule.
(5) If emissions tests under this paragraph are conducted at
an altitude different from the altitude at which certification
tests were conducted, and are not obtained under pressured
conditions, the results shall be adjusted for altitude in
accordance with subsection (h)(3)(iv).
(p)(l)(A)  The Administrator shall after July 1, 1990 select
for random compliance audit testing certified wood heater model
lines that have not already been subject to a random compliance
audit under this paragraph.  The Administrator shall use a
procedure that insures that the selection process is random.
(B)  The Administrator may, by means of a neutral selection
scheme, select model lines certified under S 60.533(e) or
S 60.533(h) for selective enforcement audit testing under this
paragraph.  Prior to July 1, 1990, the Administrator shall only
select a model line for a selective enforcement audit on the
basis of information indicating that affected facilities within
the model line may exceed the applicable emission standard in
$ 60.532.
(2) The Administrator shall randomly select for audit
testing five production wood heaters from each model line
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selected under paragraph (1). These wood heaters shall be
selected from "completed units ready for shipment from the
manufacturer's facility (whether or not the units are in a
package or container). The wood heaters shall be sealed upon
selection and remain sealed until they are tested or until the
audit is completed. The wood heaters shall be numbered in the-
order that they were selected.
(3)(A) The Administrator shall test the first of the five
wood heaters selected under subsection (2) in a laboratory
accredited under S 60.535 that is selected pursuant to subsection
(4).
(B)(i)  In the case of a random compliance audit, the
expense of the test shall be paid from the escrow account
established by the laboratory under S 60.535(b)(3), unless the
funds in that account are insufficient, and the laboratory is not
obligated pursuant to S 60.535(b)(3) to perform an audit test for
the Administrator. The escrow agent shall pay for such a test
from the laboratory's escrow account, on the instructions of the
Administrator.  The maximum amount that the laboratory may charge
the Administrator for performance of an audit test shall be
determined by the following formula:
B   , where
A »       D/5 - PA
B = the balance in the laboratory's escrow account;
D a the total number of deposits into that accountunder S  60.535(b)(4), and
PA = the number of previous audits charged against thatescrow account
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(ii) The Administrator may direct the escrow agent to
utilize funds In the escrow account of a laboratory, to pay for a
random compliance audit at another accredited laboratory, only if
the laboratory which established the escrow account is no longer
accredited, or is no longer in the business of certification
testing of wood heaters under this subpart.  In such a case, the
charge for the test shall be determined by the Administrator,
taking into account the average charge for random compliance
audit tests during the preceeding year.
(C) The test shall be conducted using the same test method
and procedure used to obtain certification. If the test is
performed in a pressure vessel, air pressure in the pressure
vessel shall be maintained within It of the average of the
barometric pressures recorded for each individual test run
required to be used under S 60.534(a) to calculate the weighted
average emissions rate.  The Administrator shall notify the
manufacturer at least one week prior to any test under this
paragraph, and allow the manufacturer and/or his authorized
representatives to observe the test.
(4)(A)  Except as provided in this subsection, the
Administrator may select any accredited laboratory for random
compliance audit testing.
(B}(i) Until the Administrator has amended this subpart to
include a determination of the interlaboratory precision of the
test method and procedure used to obtain certification, the
Administrator shall select the accredited laboratory which
performed the test used to obtain certification.  If another
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laboratory is selected pursuant to this subsection, and the
overall precision of the test method and procedure is > 1 gram
per hour at laboratories below 1000 feet elevation (or
equivalent)r the interlaboratory component of the imprecision
shall be added to the applicable emissions standard for the
purposes of this paragraph.
ͣI
(ii) With respect to each test method and procedure set out
in S 60.534(a)(2), the Administrator shall, by July 1, 1990,
publish a decision, after notice of an opportunity for comment,
which either (I) amends this subpart to include a determination
of the overall imprecision of the method and procedure, and the
interlaboratory component thereof; or (II) sets forth a
determination that the available data are insufficient to
determine the overall imprecision of the method and procedure,
and the interlaboratory component thereof.
(C) The Administrator shall not select an accredited
laboratory that is located at an elevation more than 500 feet
higher than the elevation of the laboratory which performed the
test used to obtain certification, unless the audit test is
performed in a pressure vessel.
(D) The Administrator shall not select a laboratory which
is not obligated pursuant to S 60.535(b)(B) to perform a random
compliance audit for the Administrator, unless there is no
accredited laboratory which is so obligated.
(5)(A)  If a wood heater tested under paragraph (3) exceeds
the applicable weighted average emissions standard by more than a
50% deviation, the Administrator shall so notify the manufacturer
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that certification for that model line is suspended effective 72
hours from the receipt of the notice, unless the suspension
notice is withdrawn by the Adminstrator. The suspension shall
remain in effect until withdrawn by the Administrator, or 30 days
from its effective date (if a revocation notice under subsection
(B) is not issued within that period), or the date of final
agency action on revocation, whichever occurs earlier.
(B)(i)  If a wood heater tested under paragraph (3) exceeds
the applicable weighted average emissions standard, the
Administrator shall notify the manufacturer that certification is
revoked for that model, line.
(ii) A revocation notice under subsection (i) shall become
final and effective sixty days after receipt by the manufacturer,
unless it is withdrawn, a hearing is requested under
Section 60.539, or the deadline for requesting a hearing is
extended.
(iii)  The Administrator may extend the deadline for
requesting a hearing for up to 60 days, for good cause.
(iv)  A manufacturer may extend the deadline for requesting
a hearing for up to six months, by agreeing to a voluntary
suspension of certification.
(C) Any notification under subsection (5)(A) or (5)(B) of
this paragraph shall include a copy of a preliminary test report
from the accredited laboratory.  The accredited laboratory shall
provide a preliminary test report to the Administrator within ten
days of the completion of testing, if a wood heater exceeds the
applicable emission standard in S  60.532.  The laboratory shall
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provide the Administrator and the manufacturer# within thirty
days of the completion of testing/ all documentation pertaining
to the test, including the complete test report and raw data
sheets, laboratory technician notes, and test results for all
test runs.
(0) Upon receiving notification of a test failure under
section (B), the manufacturer may submit some or all of the
remaining four wood heaters selected under subsection (3) for
testing at his own expense, in the order they were selected by
the Administrator, at the laboratory that performed the emissions
test for the Administrator.
(E) Whether or not the manufacturer proceeds under
subsection (D), the manufacturer may submit any relevant
information to the Administrator, including any other test data
generated pursuant to this subpart.  The manufacturer shall pay
the expense of any testing performed for him.
(F) The Administrator shall withdraw any notice issued under
subsection (B) if tests under subparagraph (D) show either
(i)  that all four wood heaters tested for the manufacturer
met the applicable weighted average emissions standard; or
(ii)  that the second and third wood heaters selected met
the applicable weighted average emissions standard and the
average of all three weighted averages (including the original
audit test) was below the applicable weighted average emissions
standard.
(G> The Administrator may withdraw any proposed revocation,
if the Administrator finds that an audit test failure has been
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rebutted by information submitted by the manufacturer under
subsection D efnd/or subsection E or by any other relevant
information available to him.
(H) Any withdrawal of a proposed revocation shall be
accompanied by a document setting forth its basis.
S  60.534 Test Methods and procedures.
Test methods and procedures in Appendix A of this partr except as
provided under S 60.8(b)r are used to determine compliance with
the standards and requirements for certification under SS  60.532
and 60.533 as follows:
(a)(1) Method 28 - Procedure for the Certification of
Emissions Control Capabilities for Residential Wood Heaters - is
used to establish the certification test conditions and the
particulate matter weighted averages.
(2)  Emission concentrations may be measured with either:
(A) Method 5G - Determination of Particulate Matter
Emissions from Residential Wood Heaters Using a Dilution Tunnel
Sampling Locationr or
(B) Method 5H - Determination of Particulate Matter
Emissions from Residential Wood Heaters Using a Stack Location.
(b) Method 29 - Determination of Air-to-Fuel Ratio for
Residential Wood Heaters - is used to determine that a wood




(c) Appendix G - Determination of Thermal Efficiency for
Residential Wood Heaters -> is used as an optional procedure in
establishing the overall thermal efficiency of wood heaters.
(d) The manufacturer of an affected facility shall provide
the Administrator at least 30 days prior notice of any
certification test to afford the Administrator- the opportunity to
have an obsisrver present. Notification of schedule changes in
certification testing may be made by telephone provided that such
notification is documented in writing by the manufacturer. The
Administrator shall accept notifications under this paragraph on
and after October 16, 1986.
S  60.535 Laboratory accreditation.
(a)(1) A laboratory may apply to the Administrator to be
accredited to conduct wood heater certification tests pursuant to
S  60.533.  The application shall be in writing to:  Emissions
Measurement Branch (M0-13)r U.S. EPA, Research Triangle Park,
North Carolina 27711, (Attn; Wood Heater Laboratory
Accreditation).
(2) For the period between proposal of this subpart through
June 30, 1988, the criteria for accreditation shall be the
requirements of Subpart AAA proposed on (date of proposal).
(3) Upon denying accreditation under this section the
Administrator shall give written notice to the laboratory setting
forth the basis for his determination.
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(b) In order for a test laboratory to qualify for
accreditation the laboratory musts
(1) Be accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program (NVLAP) for wood heater emissions testing,
pursuant to 15 CPR 7;
(2) Have no conflict of interest or stand to gain any
financial benefit from the outcome of certification testing
conducted pursuant to S 60.533;
(3) Agree to perform one audit test at the Administrator's
direction for each five tests performed by the laboratory on the
basis of which model lines are certified under S 60.533(e) to
meet the emission standards in S 60.532(b).
(4) Establish/ prior to the effective date of
accreditation, an interest-bearing escrow account at a federally
insured financial institution in trust for the benefit of the
Administrator. The laboratory shall agree that within 30 days
after certification is granted under S 60.533(e) to meet the
emission standards in S 60.532(b) on the basis of a test
conducted at the laboratory, the laboratory will deposit into the
escrow account an amount equal to 20 percent of the charge to the
manufacturer for the certification test (calculated without
regard to any amount surcharged to cover the escrow fund
deposit).
(5) Demonstrate proficiency to achieve reproducible results
with at least one test method and procedure in S 60.534(a), by:
(A) performing a test consisting of at least nine test runs
on a wood heater identified by the Administrator;
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(B) providing the Administrator at least 30 days prior
notice of the test to afford the Administrator the opportunity to
have an observer present; and
(C) submitting to the Administrator all documentation
pertaining to the testr including a complete test report and raw
data sheets f laboratory technicial notes»- and test results for
all test ruri's;
(6) Be located in the continental United States; and
(7) Agree to participate, no more frequently than annually,
in a proficiency testing program conducted by the Administrator.
(c) Laboratories accredited by the State of Oregon prior to
January 1, 1988, may be accredited by the Administrator without
regard to the requirements in paragraph (b)(1) of this section,
provided that the laboratory requests the accreditation in
writing and, in addition to other applicable requirements,
certifies under penalty of law that the information used in
obtaining Oregon certification satisfied applicable requirements
of Oregon law.
(d) If on or after February 1, 1987, NVLAP accreditation is
unavailable, a laboratory may be provisionally accredited by the
Administrator, without regard to he requirements of paragraph
(b)(1) of this section, provided that the laboratory requests
provisional accreditation in writing, and establishes, in ͣ
addition to other applicable requirements, that:
(1)  laboratory personnel have a total of one year of
relevant experience in particulate measurement, including at
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least three months experience in measuring particulate emissions
from wood heaters;
(2) the laboratory has the equipment necessary to perform
testing in accordance with at least one test method and procedure
in S 60.534(a); and
(3) laboratory personnel have experience in test management
and laboratory management.
(e)(1) The Administrator may revoke laboratory
accreditation if he determines that the laboratory
(A) No longer satisfies the requirements for accreditation
in paragraph (b), (c) or (d);
(B) Does not follow required procedures or practices, as
shown in a laboratory audit;
(C) Had'falsified data or otherwise misrepresented emission
data;
(D) Failed to apply funds to an escrow account as required
in paragraph (b)(4) of this section or used funds from that
account for purposes other than audit testing directed by the
Administrator; or
(E) Failed to participate in a proficiency testing program,
in accordance with its commitment under paragraph (b) of this
section.
(2) Revocation of accreditation under this subsection shall
not take effect until the laboratory concerned has been given
written notice by the Administrator setting forth the basis for




(f) Unless sooner revoked, a certificate of accreditation
shall be valid:
(1) for five years from the date of issuance, for
certificates issued under paragraph (b) of this section;
(2) until July 1, 1990, for certificates issued under
paragraph (c) of this section;
(3) for one year from the date of issuance, for
certificates issued under paragraph (d) of this section.
(g) An accredited laboratory shall seal any wood heater on
which it performed certification tests, upon completion of
certification testing.
S 60.536 Permanent Label, Temporary Label, and Owner's Manual.
(a)(1)  Each affected facility manufactured on or after
July 1, 1988 or offered for sale at retail on or after July 1,
1990 shall have a permanent label affixed to it that meets the
requirements of this section.
(2) Except for units subject to S 60.530(e), (f), or (g),
the permanent label shall contain the following information:
(A) Month and year of manufacture,
(B) Model name or number, and
(C) Serial number.
(3) The permanent label shall:
(A) Be affixed in a readily visible or accessible location;
(B) Be at least 3'l/2 inches long and 2 inches wide;
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(C) Be made of a material expected to last the lifetime of
the wood heater;
(0) Present required information in a manner so that it is
likely to remain legible for the lifetime of the wood heater; and
(E) Be affixed in such a manner that it cannot be removed
from the appliance without damage to the label.
(4) The permanent label may be combined with any other
labelr as long as the required information is displayed^ and the
integrity of the permanent label is not compromised.
(b) If the wood heater belongs to a model line certified
under S 60.533^ and has not been found to exceed the applicable
emission limits or tolerances through quality assurance testing,
one of the following statementsr as appropriate^ shall appear on
the permanent label:
"O.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Certified to comply with July, 1988, particulate emission
standards.  Not approved for sale after June 30, 1992."
or, . ,
"U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Certified to comply with July, 1990, particulate emission
standards.
(c)(1)   If compliance is demonstrated under S 60.530(c),
the following statement shall appear on the permanent label:
"O.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Certified under 40 C.F.R. 60.530(c). Not approved for sale
after June 30, 1992."
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(2) If compliance is demonstrated under S 60.530(h), one of
the following'statements, as appropriate, shall appear on the
permanent label:
-O.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Certified under 40 C.F.R. «0.533(h) to comply with July, 1988
particulate emissions standards. Not approved for sale after
June 30, 1992."
ot
"U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Certified under 40 C.F.R. 60.533(h), to comply with July,
1990 particulate emissions standards."
(d) Any label statement under paragraph (b) or (c)
constitutes a representation by the manufacturer as to any wood
heater that bears it (i) that certification was in effect at the
time the wood heater left the hands of the manufacturer,
(ii) that the manufacturer was, at the time the label was
affixed, conducting a quality assurance program in conformity
with S 60.533(0), (iii) that as to any wood heater individually
tested for emissions by the manufacturer under S  60.533(o)(3),
that it met the applicable emissions standards, and (iv) that as
to any wood heater individually inspected for tolerances under
S 60.533(0)(2), that the wood heater is within applicable
tolerances.
(e) If an affected facility is exempt from the emission
standards in S 60.532 under the provisions of $ 60.530(d}, the
following statement shall appear on the permanent label:
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"O.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Not certified. • Approved for sale until June 30, 1991."
(f)(1)  If an affected facility is manufactured in the U.S.
for exportr the following statement shall appear on the permanent
label:
"U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Export stove. May not be operated within the
United States."
(2) If an affected facility is manufactured for use seieiy
for research and development purposes as provided in section
60.530(g)» the following statement shall appear on the permanent
label:
"U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Not certified. Research Stove.
Not approved for sale."
(3) If an affected facility is a coal-only heater, the
following statement shall appear on the permanent label:
"U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
This heater is only for burning coal. Use of any
other solid fuel except for coal ignition purposes
is a violation of Federal law."
(g) Any affected facility that does not qualify for
labelling under any of paragraphs (b) through (f) shall bear one
of the following labels:
(1) If the test conducted under section 60.533(n) indicates
that the facility does not meet applicable emissions standards:
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"U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Not certified. Does not meet EPA particulate emission
standards. IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO OPERATE THIS WOOD
HEATER."
(2) If the test conducted under section 60.533(n) indicates
that the facility does meet applicable emissions standards:
"U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Not certified. Meets EPA particulate emission standards."
(3) If the facility has not been tested as required by
section 60.533(n):
"O.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Not certified.  Not tested.  Not approved for
sale.  IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO OPERATE THIS WOOD
HEATER."
(h) For affected facilities equipped with catalytic
combustors, the following statement shall appear on the permanent
label:
"This wood heater contains a catalytic combustor,
which needs periodic inspection and replacement for
proper operation.  Consult owners manual for
further information.  It is against the law to
operate this wood heater in a manner inconsistent
with operating instructions in the owner's manualr
or if the catalytic element is deactivated or
removed."
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(i) The removable label of an affected facility permanently
labeled under paragraph (b) or (c) of this section shall contain
only the following information:
(1) A statement indicating the compliance status of the
model.  The statement shall be one of the statements provided in
Appendix __, Section __;_.  Instructions on the statement to select
are provided in Appendix __.
(2) A graphic presentation of the composite particulate
matter emission rate as determined in the certification test.
The method for presenting this information is provided in
Appendix __.
(3) A graphic presentation of the overall thermal
efficiency of the model. The method for presenting this
information is provided in Appendix __,  Section __. At the
discretion of the manufacturer, either the actual measured
efficiency of the model or its estimated efficiency may be used
for purposes of this paragraph.  The actual efficiency is the
efficiency measured in tests conducted pursuant to S  60.534(c).
The estimated efficiency shall be 72 percent if the model is
catalyst equipped and 63 percent if the model is not catalyst
equipped.
(4) A numerical expression of the heat output range of the
unit, in British thermal units per hour (Btu/hr) rounded to the
nearest 100 Btu/hr.
(A)  If the manufacturer elects to report the overall
efficiency of the model based on test results pursuant to
subparagraph (3) of this paragraph, he shall report the heat
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output range measured during the efficiency test.  If an
accessory devi'ce is used in the certification test to achieve any
low burn rate criterion specified in this subpart, and if this
accessory device is not sold as a part of the wood heater, the
heat output range shall be determined using the formula in (B)
based upon the lowest sustainable burn rate achieved without the
accessory device.
(B) If the manufacturer elects to use the estimated
efficiency as provided in subparagraph (3) of this paragraph# he
shall estimate the heat output of the model as follows;
H0£ , (19,140) X (Estimated overall efficiency/100) x BR, where
H0£ a Estimated Heat Output in Btu/hr
BR « Burn rate in dry kilograms of test fuel per hour
(5) Statements regarding the importance of operation and
maintenance.  Instructions on which statements must be used are
provided in Appendix __, Section __.
(6) The manufacturer and the identification of the model,
(j) The removable label of an affected facility permanently
labeled under paragraph (e), (f)(3) or (g) of this section shall
contain only the information provided for in Appendix __,
Section __.
(k) The removable label shall be affixed to a readily seen
and accessible location on the wood heater when the wood heater
is offered for sale to consumers by any commercial owner. This
label may not be combined with any other label or information.
The label shall be attached to the wood heater in such a way that
it can be easily removed by the consumer upon purchase.  The
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removable label shall be printed on 90 pound bond paper in black
ink with a whJTte background except that models that are not
otherwise exempted which do not meet the applicable emission
limits or have not been tested pursuant to this subpart, shall be
on a red background as described in Appendix __, Section __.  The
dimensions of the removable label shall be five inches by seven
inches as described in Appendix __/ Section __. The arrangement
of the wording, the requirements for presentation of the graphic
data, and the specified typography for the removable label are
presented in Appendix B.
(1)(1) An owners manual required to be provided under this
subpart shall contain the information listed in subsection (1)(2)
(pertaining to installation), and subsection (1)(3) (pertaining
to operation and maintenance).  Such information shall be
adequate to enable consumers to achieve optimal emissions
performance.
(2) Installation Information:  requirements for achieving
proper draft.
(3) Operation and Maintenance Information:
(A) wood loading procedures, recommendations on wood
selection, and warnings on what fuels not to use, such as treated
wood, colored paper, cardboard, solvents, trash and garbage;
(B) fire starting procedures;
(C) proper use of air controls;
(0) ash removal procedures;
(E)  instructions on gasket replacement; and
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(F) for catalytic models, information on the following
pertaining to the catalytic combustor: procedures for achieving
and maintaining catalyst activity, maintenance procedures,
procedures for determining deterioration or failure, procedures
for replacement, and information on how to exercise warranty
rights;
(G) for catalytic models, the following statement
"This wood heater contains a catalytic
combustor, which needs periodic inspection and
possible replacement for proper operation. It
is against the law to operate this wood heater
in a manner inconsistent with operating
instructions in this manual, or if the
catalytic element is deactivated or removed."
(4) Any manufacturer using EPA model language to satisfy
any requirement of this paragraph shall be in compliance with
that requirement, provided that the particular model language is
printed in full, with only such changes as are necessary to
insure accuracy for the particular model line.
S  60.537 Reporting and recordkeeping.
(a)(1)  Each manufacturer who holds a certificate of
compliance under S  60.533(e) or S 60.533(h) for a model line
shall maintain records containing the information required by
this paragraph with respect to that model line.
(2)(A) All documentation pertaining to the certification
test used to obtain certification, including the full test report
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and raw data sheets, laboratory technician notes, calculations,
and the test results for all test runs.
(B) Where a model line is certified under S 60.533(h) and
later certified under S  60.533(e), all documentation pertaining
to the certification test used to obtain certification in each
instance shall be retained.
(3) For parameter inspections conducted pursuant to
S 60.533(0)(2), information indicating the extent to which
tolerances for components that affect emissions as listed in
5  60.533(k)(2) were inspected, and at what frequency, the results
of such inspections, remedial actions taken, if any, and any
follow-up actions such as additional inspections.
(4) For emissions tests conducted pursuant to
S 60.533(0)(3), all test reports, data sheets, laboratory
technician notes, calculations, and test results for all test
runs, the remedial actions taken, if any, and any follow-up
actions such as additional testing.
(5) The number of affected facilities that are sold each
year, and to whom they were sold.
(b)(1)  Each accredited laboratory shall maintain records
consisting of all documentation pertaining to each certification
test, including the full test report and raw data sheets,
technician notes, calculations, and the test results for all test
runs.
(2) Each accredited laboratory shall report to the
Administrator by the 8th day of each month between March 1, 1987
and July 1, 1990:
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(A) The iiumber and identification of wood heaters scheduled
for testing;
(B) The estimated date on which certification testing could
commence for a wood heater, if such a test were requested on the
first day of that month;
(C) -The Identification of the wood heaters tested for
purposes of 'certification during the previous month.
(3) Each accredited laboratory shall report to the
Administrator within 24 hours whenever a manufacturer which has
notified the laboratory that it intends to apply for alternative
certification for a model line fails to submit on schedule a
representative unit of that model line for certification testing.
(c) Any wood heater upon which certification tests were
performed based upon which certification was granted under
S  60.533(e) shall be retained, sealed and unaltered for as long
as the model line in question is manufactured. Any such wood
heater shall be made available upon request to the Administrator
for inspection and testing.  The requirements of this paragraph
may be satisfied by either the manufacturer or the testing
laboratory.
(d) Each commercial owner of an affected facility shall
maintain records of the name and address of each person to whom
he sells or transfers an affected facility, the model of the
affected facility, and for commercial owners who are not
manufacturers, the identity of the manufacturer.
(e) Any manufacturer seeking exemption under S 60.530(d)
shall:
-43-
(1) Report to the Administrator by September 1^ 1988, the
number of wood'heaters manufactured between July 1, 1987 and
July 1, 1988» and evidence that he was a manufacturer of wood
heaters as of January 1, 1987;
(2) Report to the Administrator by September 1, 1989 the
number- of uncertified wood heaters manufactured that were subject
to paragraph S 60.530(d)r between July 1, 1988 and July 1, 1989.
(3) Maintain wood heater production records covering the
period July 1, 1987 to July 1, 1989.
(f) Each manufacturer of an affected facility certified
under S 60.533 shall submit a report to the Administrator every
(2) years following issuance of a certificate of compliance for
each model line. This report shall certify that no changes in
the design or manufacture of this model line have been made that
require recertification under S 60.533(k).
(g) Each manufacturer shall maintain records of the model
and number of wood heaters exempted under S 60.530(g).
(h) Each commercial owner of a wood heater previously owned
by a noncommercial owner for his personal use shall maintain
records of the name and address of the previous owner.
(i)(l)  Unless otherwise specified, all records required
under this section shall be maintained by the manufacturer or
commercial owner of the affected facility for a period of no less
than 5 years.
(2) Unless otherwise specified, all reports to the
Administrator required under this subpart shall be made to:
Stationary Source Compliance Division (EN-341), U.S. EPA, 401 M
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Streetr S.H.r Washingtonr O.C.r 20460 Attention: Wood Heater
Program.
(3) A report to the Administrator required under this
subpart shall be deemed to have been made when it is properly
addressed and mailed, or placed in the possession of a commercial
courier service.
S  60.538 Prohibitions.
(a) No person shall operate an affected facility that does
not have affixed to it a permanent label pursuant to S 60.536(b)r
(c), (e) or (g)(2).
(b) No manufacturer shall advertise for sale, offer for
sale, or sell an affected facility that (1) does not have affixed
to it a permanent label pursuant to S 60.536 and (2) that has not
been tested when required by S 60.533(n).
(c) On or after July 1, 1990, no commercial owner shall
advertise for sale, offer for sale, or sell an affected facility
that does not have affixed to it a permanent label pursuant to
S 60.536(b), (c), (e), (f)(3), (g)(1) or (g)(2).  No person shall
advertise for sale, offer for dale, or sell an affected facility
labelled under subsection (f)(1) except for export.
(d)(1)  No commercial owner shall offer for sale or sell an
affected facility permanently labelled under S 60.53S(b) or (c)
unless
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(A) the affected facility has affixed to it a removable
label pursuant" to S  60.536 of this subpart,
(B) He provides any purchaser or transferee with an owners
manual pursuant to S 60.536(1) of this subpart; and
(C) He provides any purchaser or transferee with a copy of
the catalytic combustor warranty (for affected facilities with
catalytic combustors).
(2) No commercial owner shall offer for sale or sell an
affected facility permanently labelled under S 60.536(e), (f)(3),
or (g)/ unless the affected facility has affixed to it a
removable label pursuant to S 60.536 of this subpart.
(3) A commercial owner other than a manufacturer complies
with the requirements of paragraph (d) of this section if he
(A) receives the required documentation from the manufacturer or
a previous commercial owner and (B) passes that documentation on
unaltered to any person to whom the wood heater that it covers is
sold or transferred.
(e) In any case in which the Administrator revokes a
certificate of conformity for the knowing submission of false or
inaccurate information, or other fraudulent acts, he may give
notice of thait revocation and the grounds for it to all
commercial owners.  From and after the date of receipt of that
notice no commercial owner may sell any wood heater covered by
the revoked certificate (other than to the manufacturer) unless
(1) it has been tested as required by S 6b.533(n) and labelled as
required by S 60.536(g), or (2) the model line has been
recertified in accordance with this subpart.
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(f) No person shall install or operate an affected facility
except in a manner consistent with the instructions on its
permanent label and in the owners manual pursuant to S  60.537(c)
of this subpart.
(g) No person shall operate an affected facility which was
originally equipped with a catalytic combustor if the catalytic
element is deactivated or removed.
(h) No person shall operate an affected facility that has
been physically altered to exceed the tolerance limits of its
certificate of conformity.
(i) No person shall alter» deface, or remove any permanent
label required to be affixed pursuant to S 60.536 of this
subpart.
S  60.539.  Hearing and Appeal Procedures
(a)(1)  In any case where the Administrator (A) denies an
application under S  60.530(c) or S 60.533(e); (B) issues a notice
of revocation of certification under S 60.533(1); (C) denies an
application for laboratory accreditation under S 60.533(b); or
(D) issues a notice of revocation of laboratory accreditation
under S 60.535(e)r the manufacturer or laboratory affected may
request a hearing under this section within thirty days following
receipt of the required notification of the action in question.
(2)  In any case where the Administrator issues a notice of
revocation under S 60.S33(p)y the manufacturer may request a
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hearing under this section with the time limits set out in
5 60.S33(p)(5J*(I).
(b) Any hearing request shall be in writing, shall be signed
by an authorized representative of the petitioning manufacturer
or laboratory, and shall include a statement setting forth with
particularity the petitioner's objection to the Administrator's
determination or proposed determination.
(c)(1) Upon receipt of a request for a hearing under
paragraph (a), the Administrator shall request the Chief
Administrative Law Judge to designate an Administrative Law Judge
as Presiding Officer for the hearing.  If the Chief
Administrative Law Judge replies that no Administrative Law Judge
is available to perform this function, the Administrator shall
designate a Presiding Officer who has not had any prior
responsibility for the matter under review, and who is not
subject to the direct control or supervision of someone who has
had such responsibility.
(2)  The hearing shall commence as soon as practicable at a
time and place fixed by the Presiding Officer.
(3)(A) A motion for leave to intervene in any proceeding
conducted under this section must set forth the grounds for the
proposed intervention, the position and interest of the movant
and the likely impact that intervention will have on the
expeditious progress of the proceeding. Any person already a
party to the proceeding may file an answer to a motion to
intervene, making specific reference to the factors set forth in
the foregoing sentence and subsection (3)(c) of this paragraph.
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within ten (10) days after service of the motion for leave to
intervene.
(B) A motion for leave to intervene in a proceeding must
ordinarily be filed before the first prehearing conference or, in
the absence of a prehearing conference, prior to the setting of a
time and place for a hearing. Any motion filed after that time
must include, in addition to the information set forth in
subsection (3)(A) of this paragraph, a statement of good cause
for the failure to file in a timely manner. The intervenor shall
be bound by any agreements, arrangements and other matters
previously made in the proceeding.
(C) Leave to intervene may be granted only if the movant
demonstrates that (i) his presence in the proceeding would not
unduly prolong or otherwise prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties; (ii) the movant may be adversely
affected by a final order; and (iii) the interests of the movant
may not be adequately represented by the original parties.  The
intervenor shall become a full party to the proceeding upon the
granting of leave to intervene.
(D) Persons not parties to the proceeding who wish to file
amicus curiae briefs may so move.  The motion shall identify the
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why the
proposed amicus brief is desirable.  If the motion is granted,
the Presiding Officer or Administrator shall issue an order
setting the time for filing such brief. An amicus curiae is
eligible to participate in any briefing after his motion is
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granted, and shall be served with all briefs, reply briefs,
motions, and orders relating to issues to be briefed.
(4)  In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed
in this subpart, the day of the event from which the designated
period begins to run shall not be included.  Saturdays, Sundays,
and Federal legal holidays shall be included. When a stated time
expires on a' Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the stated time
period shall be extended to include the next business day.
(d)(1)  Upon his appointment the Presiding Officer shall
establish a hearing file.  The file shall consist of the notice
issued by the Administrator under S 60.530(c), S 60.S33(e),
S 60.533(1), S 60.533(p), S 60.535(a), or S 60.535(d), together
with any accompanying material, the request for a hearing and the
supporting data submitted therewith, and all documents relating
to the request for certification or accreditation, or the
proposed revocation of either.
(2) The hearing file shall be available for inspection
by any party, to the extent authorized by law, at the office of
the Presiding Officer, or other place designated by him.
(e) Any party may appear in person, or may be represented by
counsel or by any other duly authorized representative.
(f)(1)  The Presiding Officer upon the request of any
party, or in his discretion, may order a prehearing conference at
a time and place specified by him to consider the following:
(A) Simplification of the issues;
(B) Stipulations, admissions of fact, and the introduction
of documents;
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(C) Limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(0) Possibility of agreement disposing of all or any of the
issues in dispute;
(E) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
hearingr including such additional tests as may be agreed upon by
the parties.
(2) The results of the conference shall be reduced to
writing by the Presiding Officer and made part of the record.
(g)(1)  Hearings shall be conducted by the Presiding
Officer in an informal but orderly and expeditious manner. The
parties may offer oral or written evidence, subject to the
exclusion by the Presiding Officer of irrelevant, immaterial and
repetitious evidence.
(2) Witnesses will not be required to testify under
oath. However, the Presiding Officer shall call to the attention
of witnesses that their statements may be subject to penalties
under title 18 U.S.C. S 1001 for knowingly making false
statements or representations or using false documents in any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States.
(3) Any witness may be examined or cross-examined by
the Presiding Officer, the parties, or their representatives.
(4) Hearings shall be recorded verbatim. Copies of
transcripts of proceedings may be purchsed by the applicant from
the reporter.
(5) All written statements, charts, tabulations, and
similar data offered in evidence at the hearings shall, upon a
-51-
showing satisfactory to the Presiding Officer of their
authenticity, relevancy, and materiality, be received in evidence
and shall constitute a part of the record.
(h)(1)  The Presiding Officer shall make an initial
decision which shall include written findings and conclusions and
the reasons or basis therefor on all the material issues of fact,
law, or discretion presented on the record. The findings,
conclusions, and written decision shall be provided to the
parties and made a part of the record. The initial decision
shall become the decision of the Administrator without further
proceedings unless there is an appeal to the Administrator or
motion for review by the Administrator.  Except as provided in
paragraph (3) below, any such appeal shall be taken within 20
days of the date the initial decision was filed.
(2) On appeal from or review of the initial decision
the Administrator shall have all the powers which he would have
in making the initial decision including the discretion to
require or allow briefs, oral argument, the taking of additional
evidence or the remanding to the Presiding Officer for additional
proceedings. The decision by the Administrator shall include
written findings and conclusions and the reasons or basis
therefor on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion
presented on the appeal or considered in the review.
(3)  In any hearing requested under paragraph (a)(2) of this
section the Presiding Officer shall render his initial decision
,. 'i-4'U!0m»i0-
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within 60 days of that request. Any appeal to the Administrator
shall be taken within ten days of the initial decision^ and the
Administrator shall render his decision in that appeal within 30
days of the filing of the appeal.
APPENDIX   2
OREGON   DEO   CERTIFIED  WOODSTOVES
AND   THEIR   EMISSION   PROFILES
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